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to be good, I should start it with the line “It was a dark and stormy night...” 
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Article 2 
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction 
of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
 
a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
 
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
 
c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
 
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 
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Abstract 
This thesis centres on issues of policing accountability and oversight. It examines the extent 
to which the police oversight agencies in the United Kingdom and Ireland with the remit for 
investigating deaths involving the police have evolved and adapted their investigative 
practice and capacity to meet the positive obligation under Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) created by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) of conducting an effective investigation of any state caused death. It first examines 
the problem presented by deaths involving the police and considers a number of typologies 
of deaths involving the police. The thesis then examines the evolution and contextual 
operation of three police oversight agencies, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for 
Northern Ireland, the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission. It then conducts a critical analysis of the evolution of the positive 
obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR and the development through European Court 
jurisprudence of the five standards of an effective investigation: independence, adequacy, 
timeliness, victim involvement and public scrutiny. The theory of Europeanization of Human 
Rights and the process by which European Court decisions impact upon domestic states is 
explored. An evaluation of the response to the Article 2 obligations by each of the oversight 
agencies from the perspective of those responsible for the investigation of deaths involving 
the police is conducted through qualitative interviews with senior investigating officers. The 
importance of the “political will” to conduct investigations as per the definition put forward 
by Luna and Walker has also been considered. Using Borzel and Risse’s definition of the 
degrees of domestic change caused by Europeanization the thesis concludes that the 
arrangements for policing oversight policies, processes and institutions have been 
“transformed” by the Article 2 obligations imposed by the ECtHR. It further concludes that 
the independence of oversight agencies is a complicated concept and is dependent on 
several interlinking variables that cannot be described or evaluated in simple linear terms. 
The performance and capacity of oversight agencies to meet the five standards is not 
constant and can be impacted upon by both internal and external factors. Oversight 
agencies can be seen to follow Herzog’s model of scandal and reform. The capacity of the 
oversight agencies to conduct investigations into deaths involving the police employing ‘high 
policing’ methods as defined by Brodeur is also explored. Finally, the research assesses 
whether in the viewpoint of the police oversight investigators the standards set by Europe 
are relevant, realistic and achievable in practice. 
Key Words: Police, Oversight, Accountability, Deaths in Custody, An Garda Síochána, Garda 
Síochána Ombudsman Commission, Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, Independent 
Police Complaints Commission, Article 2, Right to Life, European Convention on Human 
Rights  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 The Problem of Deaths Involving the Police 
There are few events more challenging to a modern democratic state than police 
involvement in the death of a citizen (Williams H. E., 2008). Any death involving the police 
will almost inevitably lead to considerable media and public scrutiny (MacAlister, 2012) and 
have a significant impact on the criminal justice system and the community at large (Ross, 
2010). This is further heightened when the deceased dies whilst in police custody. Indeed, 
deaths in police custody in the United Kingdom have been described as a “significant 
national problem” (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2005, p. 109). Such a 
death has the potential to generate criminal or disciplinary proceedings against police 
officers, civil litigation, calls for police reform and even on occasion civil unrest (Di Miao, 
2010; Fyfe, 1988).  Deaths following the use of force by the police can also be problematic 
for democratic states as they are often seen as ‘political’ in nature as police forces are seen 
to reflect the governments of the state in which they serve (Das & Palmiotto, 2002) using 
force to ensure the “maintenance of the order and security associated with a political power 
structure” (Flyghed, 2002, p. 23).  
Bruggeman states that a “precarious relationship exists between police powers and the 
democratic control of the police in all democratic states” (Bruggeman, 2002, p. 259).  A 
death involving the police can damage that precarious relationship resulting in a range of 
public reaction, from calls for enquiry and reform to the widespread public disorder such as 
that experienced in England in August 2011 (Lewis, Newburn, Taylor, & Ball, 2011). This is 
increasingly the case in a world where distaste for the physical use of force as a controlling 
mechanism has heightened alongside a growing awareness of human rights and a greater 
concern for the oppressed (Alpert & Dunham, 2004; Binder & Fridell, 1984). Widespread 
media reporting of alleged police misconduct can undermine public confidence in the police 
in the long term and enter into the “cultural repertoire” of how the police are perceived 
(Weitzer, 2002, p. 406) meaning that the impact of any death involving the police can 
resonate and grow creating the impression amongst communities that serious problems 
exist within police services (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004).  This can erode public trust in the police 
in democratic societies, a trust earned by the police through the very legitimacy of their 
actions (Kaariainen, 2007) , and can threaten the ability of other police officers to function 
properly within that society (Alpert & Dunham, 2004; Punch, 2000). Punch has stated that 
this “elicits a special feeling of betrayal” in the public who then condemn the police “for the 
infringement itself and also for the breach of trust” (Punch, 1985, p. 8). Furthermore, it is 
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often posited that the police embody public perceptions of “law and order, the nation state 
or the dominant social group”  (Bradford, Stanko, & Jackson, 2009, p. 143) which implies 
that the public may register the impact of negative interactions with the police in the wider 
context of the relationships with other broader social structures such as government and 
the criminal justice system generally or as Punch put it, “Police officers are the state made 
flesh” (Punch, 2000, p. 322).   
Following a death involving the police the state is faced with a second potential opportunity 
to risk losing the confidence of the public in not initiating a fair, transparent and effective 
investigation into the circumstances of the death. Accountability of the police is seen as a 
requirement of the democratic principle, (Bayley & Shearing, 2009) and a failure of 
accountability is consequentially a threat to democracy. Repeated failures of the state to 
investigate police caused deaths can lead to abuses of police authority becoming “part and 
parcel of the policing remit” (Milton-Edwards, 2000, p. 317) and create a “culture of 
impunity” within the police (Neild, 2000, p. 223).  In contrast a properly integrated “holistic” 
approach (Harris F. , 2012, p. 2) to policing oversight balancing both deterrence of 
inappropriate behaviour and improving the performance of the police (Luna & Walker, 
2000; Brereton, 2000) by undertaking an effective investigation into the death can create a 
“self sustaining culture of accountability” (Walker, 2001, p. 86). It has been argued that the 
process of the investigation is as important as the outcome so that the citizens of the state 
feel that they have been treated fairly and justly (Kaariainen, 2007; Engel, 2005; Tyler, 1999) 
and that emphasis in such investigations should be on “effective accountability and 
transparency to ensure respect for the rule of law and maintain public confidence” (Reid, 
2007, p. 545). In short, once a death has occurred involving the police it is in the interests of 
the state, the community,  the police and the family of the deceased that the circumstances 
of the death are properly and diligently examined as “what is at stake is nothing less than 
public confidence in the state’s monopoly on the use of force”1. 
1.2 Types of Deaths Involving the Police 
 
The varied and pervasive nature of the role of policing in society means that deaths 
involving the police can occur in diverse and complex circumstances and various typologies 
of deaths involving the police have evolved. The Home Office in the UK have, for example, 
defined four categories of deaths involving the police. These are fatal road traffic accidents 
involving the police, fatal shooting incidents involving the police, deaths in or following 
custody and deaths during or following other types of contact with the police (Home Office, 
                                                          
1 Ramsahai v Netherlands (52391/99) (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 54 ECHR 
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2002). However these categories are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Some typologies are 
based on the temporal proximity of the involvement of the police with the deceased; “those 
occurring at the time of the arrest, those while being transported to jail or hospital, and 
those while the deceased is a resident of the jail” (Di Miao, 2010, p. 1). Other typologies 
attempt to organise the phenomenon of police involved deaths by looking at the causal 
factors of the death itself; “Alcohol and Drug Overdose, Natural Causes, Violent Deaths and 
Suicide” (MacAlister, 2012, p. 29). Shepherd distinguishes between deaths that result 
directly from police actions, acts of commission, and deaths that result from a lack of care or 
a lack of police action, acts of omission. Of these he states that deaths resulting from direct 
police actions, including the use of force, cause the greatest concern to the media and the 
public (Shepherd, 2005).  
Although Jacobs and O’Brien argue that the use of violence by police officers is uncommon 
in advanced states (Jacobs & O'Brien, 1998), no country is free from the excessive use of 
force or the even the improper use of lethal force by its police force (Das & Palmiotto, 
2002). A controversial death involving police use of force can have a negative effect on the 
effectiveness of policing in general. Flyghed comments that where force has been used by 
police resulting in a death, claims that the force used was unnecessary or excessive can 
cause a backlash in the form of “increased sympathy for the phenomenon” that the police 
are attempting to hold in check (Flyghed, 2002, p. 26). Excessive use of police force may also 
hold the potential to polarize and isolate the areas of the community that most need the 
police (Fyfe, 1988). The police in Europe are sanctioned to use force, including in some 
circumstances force that can result in a fatal outcome, by the state in which they serve. 
However, this power comes with a corollary responsibility to properly account for the use of 
force. No death involving the police could be considered as straightforward and all carry 
both the potential for controversy and also the opportunity for the police to reflect on their 
actions and performance. 
 
1.3 The European Court and Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Court has recognised that when a death involving the police, or indeed the 
state, occurs there is a need for a thorough and transparent investigation. This thorough 
and transparent investigation has the narrow function of establishing whether any criminal 
or disciplinary culpability may fall as a result of the death and also the broader function of 
establishing the narrative of the death, identifying and rectifying any systemic failures and 
reassuring the public that they are not at risk of arbitrary state killings (MacAlister, 2012). 
The right to life was established under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
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Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) subsequently developed a 
“procedural or investigative duty to examine how and why a person died” (Turner, 2009, p. 
1). This procedural obligation evolved through the European Court jurisprudence to become 
a “fundamental right” which “enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies 
making up the Council of Europe.2” Therefore, in their investigation of deaths involving the 
police, signatory states to the ECHR are liable if they fail to conduct an effective 
investigation in accordance with the five principles or standards necessary to fulfil the 
obligations, created by the Article 2 jurisprudence and subsequently articulated in an 
opinion of the European Commissioner (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009) as  
 independence, 
 adequacy, 
 promptness, 
 public scrutiny, and 
 victim involvement. 
These principles are designed to have a dual purpose; firstly, “to ensure that an individual 
has an effective remedy for an alleged violation of Article 2” and secondly to “protect 
against violation of these fundamental rights by providing an investigative framework that is 
effective and capable of bringing offenders to justice” (Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2009, p. 8).   
1.4 Deaths Involving the Police: A Personal Perspective 
I have worked in the area of police oversight as an investigator since 2000. I started my 
career as an investigator with the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland 
(OPONI) and I am currently a Senior Investigating Officer with the Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) in the Republic of Ireland. In the past thirteen years I have 
had various roles in the investigation of deaths involving the police including working with 
bereaved families as a Family Liaison Officer (FLO) and leading investigation teams as an SIO. 
I have also investigated a wide range of circumstances in which deaths involving the police 
have occurred and that the principles of Article 2 of the ECHR can be said to have engaged. 
These have included fatal police shootings, restraint deaths, fatal road traffic incidents and 
deaths whilst in the custody of the police. I therefore approach this research as a 
“practitioner researcher” (Coy, 2006, p. 428) or as an “insider” i.e. as someone who is 
involved in the investigation of deaths involving the police (Merton, 1972, p. 11). This has 
also been described as “insider action research” (Coghlan & Shani, 2007, p. 643). However, 
it is also worth noting that using the framework put forward by Savage to categorize the 
                                                          
2
 McCann v UK (1966) EHRR 97, ECHR, para 147. 
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types of police complaints investigators in relation to their policing or civilian backgrounds, 
it could be said that I commenced my oversight career as an “outsider” i.e. an investigator 
“with neither policing nor investigative experience” (Savage, 2013, p. 5). It is with this 
perspective that I approach this thesis and as the research aims and objectives in the next 
section will set out, the thesis is grounded in examining the views and experiences of other 
oversight practitioners in relation to practice and performance in the investigation of deaths 
involving the police. 
1.5 Research Aims and Objectives  
The aim of this thesis is to examine the extent to which three selected European police 
oversight agencies have evolved and adapted their investigative practice, performance and 
capacity to meet the five standards of the positive obligation of conducting an effective 
investigation into a death involving the police under Article 2 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR).  In meeting this aim the thesis will examine the practices of the Garda 
Síochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) in the Republic of Ireland, the Office of the Police 
Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) and the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) in England and Wales. The three agencies have been selected for this 
study as they each represent what has been described as a “watershed in police reform” i.e. 
the introduction in their respective jurisdictions of external independent or non police 
bodies that would have the responsibility for the investigation of police complaints and 
deaths involving the police (Savage, 2007). As can be seen in the chart below, since their 
commencement each of the organisations has been involved in the investigation of a 
number of deaths involving the police on a yearly basis.  
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Figure One: Deaths Involving the Police by Year 
(IPCC, 2012; GSOC, 2008; GSOC, 2009; GSOC, 2010; GSOC, 2011; GSOC, 2012; GSOC, 2013; OPONI, 2008; 
OPONI, 2009; OPONI, 2010; OPONI, 2011; OPONI, 2012; OPONI, 2013) 
The United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are all signatories to the 
ECHR and each of the jurisdictions has incorporated the Convention into their domestic 
legislation; the extent to which each state’s mechanisms for police accountability have the 
capacity to comply with the arising obligations is worthy of examination.  
In achieving the aim of the thesis the following objectives have been identified: 
 Through analysis of academic literature and official reports to examine the role of 
the police and consider the types and nature of deaths involving the police; 
 To explore the academic literature on the concept of accountability and its specific 
importance to policing and policing legitimacy; 
 To examine the origin, development and operational policing context of the three 
policing oversight agencies OPONI, the IPCC and GSOC. 
 To critically analyse the positive procedural obligation for an effective investigation 
into deaths involving the police from its origins in Article 2 of the ECHR, its evolution 
through the subsequent European jurisprudence and its codification by the 
European Commissioner for Human Rights; 
 Using qualitative interviews with Senior Investigators to examine the investigative 
capacity of OPONI, the IPCC and GSOC to meet the Article 2 standards. 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GSOC 13 12 16 8 23 13 
OPONI 5 3 6 8 4 3 
IPCC 86 81 93 86 104 82 
0 
20 
40 
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The first objective of the thesis then will be to examine the role of the police and consider 
the context in which deaths involving the police can and do happen. To that end Chapter 
Two of the thesis will first examine the prevalent and multi faceted role of police in society 
and explore how this role can lead to incidents of heightened risk of death or serious harm.  
The use of Brodeur’s high and low policing/control paradigms will show that deaths 
involving the police can occur through both everyday reactive policing and also through 
planned policing operations based on intelligence gathering and covert surveillance 
techniques (Brodeur, 1983). To illustrate this point reference will be made to the death of 
Jean Charles de Menezes in July 2005 and it will be argued that in order to ensure 
accountability policing oversight mechanisms must have the capacity to deal with deaths 
involving the police that fall within either the high or low policing paradigms. The chapter 
will then explore the general concept of accountability in policing and trace the evolution of 
different accountability models that are used in police oversight. The range and variation of 
typologies of police oversight models will be outlined with emphasis on the emergence and 
evolution of independent policing oversight mechanisms. The dominant issue of “who 
investigates the police?” will be explored along with some inherent risks in over emphasis of 
a single element of policing oversight. Following this discussion two significant risks to 
accountability mechanisms, regulatory capture and the lack of a political will, will be 
examined. Finally, the chapter will introduce a history of each of the three oversight 
agencies and the policing environment into which they were introduced.  
Chapter Three will set out the research methodology used to examine the three oversight 
agencies. The chapter will first outline the parameters for a critical analysis of the evolution 
of the Article 2 standards and then outline the choices that led to the use of a qualitatively 
driven mixed methods approach to assess the response of each of the three jurisdictions in 
evolving and orientating oversight structures to meet the standards. The chapter will discuss 
the difficulties that led to a decision to only report on the qualitative findings arising from 
interviews conducted with SIs in each of the three oversight agencies.  
Chapter Four will outline the critical analysis conducted into the evolution of the Article 2 
standards examining and describing the positive procedural obligation for an effective 
investigation into deaths involving the police from its origins in Article 2 of the ECHR, its 
evolution through the subsequent European jurisprudence and its elucidation by the 
European Commissioner for Human Rights. The practical application of the positive 
obligation will also be examined and each of the five standards of an effective investigation: 
independence, adequacy, promptness, public scrutiny and victim involvement will be 
considered in turn in relation to the European law and relevant literature. In order to 
examine this issue consideration is given as to how the standards themselves migrate from 
judgements made in the ECtHR to their application in the signatory states of the ECHR 
through a process referred to as Europeanization. The effect of decisions of the ECtHR and 
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European policy on member states and the extent to which this can be measured will also 
be explored and outlined.  
Chapter Five sets out the findings of the research.  Firstly the question as to the level of 
awareness of the Article 2 standards will be examined amongst the SIs and investigators in 
each of the three organisations. The central question of independence will be explored in 
detail with an examination of the value and nature of independence and the views of the SIs 
in relation to the use of ex-police officers, the culture of the organisation and the reality of 
regulatory capture. Following the section on independence, the research findings in relation 
to the adequacy and promptness of investigations into deaths involving the police will be set 
out. The conjoined issues of public scrutiny of investigations and the involving the families 
of the deceased in the investigation will then be explored. The capacity of the oversight 
agencies to investigate deaths that have occurred in circumstances aligned to both the high 
and low policing paradigms described by Brodeur will then be examined and the views of 
the SIs in relation to their capacity to gain access to the intelligence information that 
grounds high policing operations will be explored. The SIs perception of the political will of 
their respective organisations to conduct effective investigations into deaths involving the 
police will then be explored. The Chapter concludes with the SIs views on the purpose of 
investigating deaths involving the police and their considerations as to whether the Article 2 
standards are realistic and attainable.  
Chapter Six will then analyse the findings using both the relevant literature and the 
European and domestic law. In doing so, the research will attempt to trace issues relevant 
to the Article 2 standards from the propositions of the criminological discourse, through the 
European jurisprudence and to their ultimate practical application by oversight investigators 
and therefore to “make accurate connections between what the law does and to what 
happens on the ground” (Goodman & Jinks, 2003, p. 182). The research will also consider 
the purpose and effectiveness of the standards and consider whether the positive obligation 
works to secure the right to life or whether it is just an “onerous burden on a state” 
(Chevalier-Watts, 2010, p. 701). Finally Chapter Seven will summarise the thesis to identify 
the contribution to knowledge the research has made. The thesis will conclude with a 
consideration of further possible areas of research. 
  
24 | P a g e  
 
Chapter Two: 
Accountability, Oversight and Deaths Involving the Police 
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Chapter Two: Accountability, Oversight and Deaths involving the Police  
2.1 Introduction 
The central concern of this thesis is the investigation of deaths involving the police. This 
chapter will look at this issue from three perspectives. Firstly it will examine the nature of 
the police role and the types of death that the police may be involved in. Secondly it will 
examine the concept of accountability and its importance in the policing context and finally 
the chapter will examine the question of who is tasked to investigate deaths involving the 
police and ensuring policing accountability in the three jurisdictions that are the subject of 
this research. This chapter therefore begins with a discussion of the role of police in society 
and considers some of the different contexts in which the police may be involved in the 
death of a citizen. Further to this aim Brodeur’s (Brodeur, 1983) theory of high policing and 
low policing will be outlined and applied to the issue of investigating deaths involving the 
police. The investigation of deaths involving the police is, however, one strand of the wider 
issue of accountability in policing; therefore, it is necessary to explore the conceptual 
underpinnings of policing oversight and accountability. The difficulties in reaching a 
definition of accountability are discussed and some conceptual models of accountability are 
outlined followed by a discussion of the application and importance of accountability in 
policing. The evolution of police accountability mechanisms and the development of civilian 
oversight in policing will then be examined. The multiplicity of typologies for categorising 
policing oversight models will be considered and applied to the research at hand. 
Consideration is also given to some of the difficulties and challenges that may inhibit 
achieving true accountability with a discussion of the concepts of regulatory capture and 
political will.  Moving from the conceptual to the practical application of policing 
accountability the chapter then examines the three oversight agencies tasked with 
conducting effective investigations into a death involving the police. As will be outlined in 
the methodology section of this thesis the policing oversight agencies in Ireland, Northern 
Ireland and England and Wales have been selected primarily due to their remit to undertake 
independent investigations of police conduct. This chapter will conclude with an 
examination of the evolution and introduction of the three agencies and attempt to 
establish the policing context and events that led to the introduction in each of the three 
jurisdictions of independent police oversight and the implications that followed. A brief 
history of each of the oversight mechanisms since their introduction will be outlined as well 
as an analysis of their structure, statutory powers and responsibilities.  The oversight 
agencies will be examined in chronological order as to their incorporation in law starting 
with OPONI and then considering the IPCC and finally GSOC. Particular emphasis will be 
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placed upon GSOC as the most current iteration of the evolution of independent oversight 
following lessons learned from the development of its predecessors OPONI and the IPCC.  
2.2 The Role of the Police 
While the proper role of police in society has been the subject of debate for decades 
(Rosenbaum, 1998; Reiner, 1998) attempts to distil the role to a simple explanation or its 
manifest parts have proved elusive and instead it is recognised that the police in Western 
democracies are called upon to perform “manifold roles” (Herzog, 1999, p. 477) the variety 
of which “beggars description” (James, 2003, p. 1). Policing has been described as both 
“knowledge intensive” (Holgersson & Gottschalk, 2008, p. 365), “more like a craft than a 
science” (Bayley & Bittner, 1997, p. 128) and a “superhuman role: part priest, part 
scapegoat” (Whittaker, 1979, p. 8). Bittner, however, suggested that the role was more 
straightforward and primarily to prevent “something that ought not to be happening and 
about which someone had better do something now” (Bittner, 1974, p. 30). The police have 
been described as “protectors of moral rights” (Miller & Blackler, 2005, p. 5), “a social 
service with exceptional and unique authorities, responsibilities, and public expectations” 
(Cotton & Coleman, 2012, p. 24) and as a “social regulatory agency” tasked with making 
“social and political judgements” to ensure the status quo (Bass, 2000, p. 149). Removed 
from these conceptual descriptions of policing Bayley has produced a statistical analysis of 
police work to split the role into tasks such as “patrol and respond to requests of service”, 
“investigate crime”, “regulate traffic” and “administer” (Bayley, 2009, p. 578). However, 
Marenin argues that the “reach and domain” of policing increasingly extends far beyond 
these minimal concepts of law enforcement and is pervasive in society (Marenin, 2005, p. 
101).   
Whatever the definition of the role, it is clear that policing in all its functions is intimately 
bound with the issue of human rights (Sheptycki, 2000). This is acutely accurate when the 
police are involved in an incident in which someone dies. There are, however, some 
elements of the role of policing that may make their involvement in incidents of fatality 
more likely and whether the death occurs by way of an act of commission or of omission the 
police must be called upon to account for the circumstances in which the death has 
occurred.  The elements of policing that may lead to a fatality are aligned to their “array of 
coercive powers” (Choongh, 1997, p. 1) and include the police use of force, the arrest, 
detention and care of persons and police pursuits. By way of illustration the figure below 
outlines the 82 deaths involving the police in England and Wales recorded in 2011/12 
broken down into four categories of road traffic fatalities, fatal police shootings, deaths in or 
following police custody and other deaths following police contact. 
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Figure Two: Deaths During or Following Police Contact: Figures for England and Wales 
2011/2012 (IPCC, 2012) 
2.3 High Policing and Low Policing 
Whilst it is not possible to provide a definitive typology to cover the circumstances in which 
all types of deaths involving the police will occur an interesting and useful construct in 
examining the nature of deaths involving the police and also the capacity of oversight 
agencies to examine the circumstances that led to the death are Brodeur’s paradigms of 
High and Low Policing. This section will first outline the definitions of the paradigms and 
then consider their application to the investigation of deaths involving the police.    
Brodeur (Brodeur, 1983) describes the two paradigms of policing as Low Policing and High 
Policing. He cites Bordua (1968), Chapman (1970), Tobias (1972) and Manning (1977) and 
“equates low policing with criminal policing” (Brodeur, 1983, p. 512) describing it as 
“forceful reaction to conspicuous signs of disorder, whether or not of a criminal nature”. 
Low Policing is in effect “the myriad of duties relating to community security” and “everyday 
policing largely performed by agents in uniform” (Brodeur, 2007, p. 25). In contrast High 
Policing is the paradigm associated with political policing, “it reaches out for potential 
threats in a systemic attempt to preserve the distribution of power in a given society” 
(Brodeur, 1983, p. 513). Brodeur listed four basic features of the High Policing paradigm. 
The first feature, which he describes as the most important, is that High Policing is primarily 
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“all absorbent” (Brodeur, 1983, p. 513) policing which aims to control by the all 
encompassing gathering and storing of intelligence. The second feature of Brodeur’s High 
Policing paradigm is that it is not “uniquely bound to enforce the law and regulations as they 
are made by an independent legislator” (Brodeur, 1983, p. 513). Thirdly, “Protecting the 
community from law violators is not an end to itself for high policing; crime control may also 
serve as a tool to generate information which can be used to maximize state coercion of any 
group or individual perceived as threatening the established order” (Brodeur, 1983, pp. 513-
514) and finally, “High policing not only makes extensive use of undercover agents and paid 
informers, but it also acknowledges its willingness to do so” (Brodeur, 1983, p. 514).  
Brodeur argues that just as there are two paradigms for policing there may also be two 
paradigmatic models for controlling the police “namely high and low control” (1983, p. 517) 
arguing that for policing oversight to be successful, it needs to move away from narrow 
constructs such as the culpability of officers for their actions and concentrate instead in 
analysing the policing culture and frameworks that allow any such abuses to exist.  
However, the challenge of successful oversight of High Policing activity should not be 
underestimated. Bruggeman notes that the general difficulties of achieving police 
accountability are heightened in the context of a High Policing function such as under cover 
policing (Bruggeman, 2002).  The secrecy inherent in High Policing functions effectively 
weakens the transparency essential to achieve effective accountability (Marenin, 2005) and 
if the functions of the police are not wholly transparent, the correlation is that they are not 
wholly accountable (Marenin, 2005; Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000; Perez T. E., 2000).  
To extrapolate Brodeur’s theory to the problem of deaths involving the police, it can be 
stated that if two paradigms of policing exist, High and Low Policing, then civilian deaths can 
occur from policing activities aligned to either paradigm. These deaths should therefore be 
investigated by agencies with the capacity to enquire into both High and Low Policing 
activity and with the authority to assert High and Low Control in terms of holding the police 
to account. This research in considering the extent to which police oversight agencies have 
developed the capacity to investigate deaths involving the police to the standards set by the 
European Courts will also seek to examine the extent to which the oversight agencies are 
able to investigate both High and Low policing activity that may lead to a fatal outcome. This 
is best illustrated by way of a practical and real example. 
The fatal shooting of Jean Charles De Menezes on the 22nd of July 2005 by an “élite firearms 
unit of the Metropolitan Police” (Turner, 2008, p. 1) engaged in a counter terrorism 
operation who mistakenly believed Mr. De Menezes have participated in a failed suicide 
bombing brings into sharp focus the High/Low Policing and High/Low Control dynamic. As 
Turner stated: 
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“The circumstances of the shooting did not involve a stand-off between police and a 
suspect brandishing a weapon, threatening the life of a hostage or the lives of armed 
officers; an entirely innocent man was summarily executed in the full glare of a 
packed London underground train. Nevertheless, the events surrounding the shooting 
symbolise the new and unique forms of terrorism that the UK authorities now face 
post ‘9/11’, overshadowing the IRA atrocities of the 1980s and 1990s. They challenge 
the very nature of policing in the 21st Century and the state’s obligation to maintain 
safety and security” (Turner, 2008, p. 5).  
Punch described the De Menezes shooting as, “one of the defining moments in the history 
of British policing” (Punch, 2011, p. 5) raising a host of issues “not only around operational 
practice but crucially also about policymaking, legality, transparency, accountability and 
above all legitimacy.” The investigation of the shooting presented a “major challenge” for 
the IPCC (Wood, 2012, p. 80). As will be outlined later, the investigation was required under 
the positive procedural obligation under Article 2 to examine not only the decision making 
of the firearms officer who fired the fatal shot but also all of the High Policing elements of 
intelligence gathering and operational planning that led to the deployment of the armed 
officers in the first place. This thesis will examine whether the policing oversight institutions 
of the UK and Ireland would have the capacity to ensure the necessary accountability of 
policing should a similar event occur again. First some of the key, fundamental issues of 
accountability and the development within police oversight of the capacity for independent 
investigation will be explored.  
2.4 The Concept of Accountability 
Koppell argues that although accountability is almost universally seen as a positive the 
“meaning of accountability remains elusive” (Koppell, 2005, p. 94). Accountability as a term 
is commonly used to denote bureaucratic control, transparency or responsiveness to 
popular demands and has also been conflated with related concepts of responsibility, 
accessibility and answerability (Cheung, 2005; Mulgan, 2000).   
A simplistic definition of accountability has been put forward by Bovens as: 
“the relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation 
to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens, 2006, p. 6).  
Bovens et al. would later identify three “perspectives” for assessing accountability: the 
democratic perspective by which the accountability mechanism should yield accurate and 
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timely information about conduct, the constitutional perspective which should effectively 
deal with abuse of powers and corruption and the learning perspective which uses feedback 
of a high quality information and critique to promote reflection and learning (Bovens, 
Schillemans, & Hart, 2008, p. 233). It is clear then that accountability is a complex construct 
which encompasses more than simply holding a person or group of persons to account; 
there is also the possibility of applying accountability mechanisms to future as well as past 
conduct.  
In that regard Smith sees a nexus between the concepts of regulation and accountability 
which share a common commencement and end point in standard setting and the issue of 
reward or sanction: 
“In regulatory processes standard setting is for the purpose of controlling, guiding or 
influencing events or behaviour. Rewards, awards and sanctions serve to encourage 
compliance and deter non compliance in achieving the expected standard. In 
accountability processes, rewards, awards and sanctions generally function to 
commend successful performance, make reparation, or punish failure” (Smith G. , 
2009, p. 423) 
In Smith’s regulatory/accountability nexus the purpose of accountability is retrospective 
whilst regulation is forward looking or prospective.  
Several typologies of accountability exist. Radin and Romzek conceptualize accountability 
according to the source of the control and the degree of control suggesting four 
accountability types as “hierarchical, legal, professional and political” (Radin & Romzek, 
1996, p. 61). Hierarchical accountability mechanisms are internal controls such as 
supervisory roles within an organisation. Legal accountability mechanisms are manifested in 
external oversight and monitoring activities. Whilst both hierarchical and legal 
accountability are seen to exert high levels of control, professional accountability, which 
manifests itself in professional norms and standards, and political accountability, which is 
based on an expectation of response to external political or stakeholder control, are seen to 
exert low levels of control.  In contrast Behn concentrates on the specific purposive area of 
accountability to cite four categories where accountability is routinely required or applied: 
finances, fairness, abuse of power and performance (Behn, 2001). However, Koppell argues 
that these typologies do not provide for the distinct dimensions that can exist within 
accountability and has proposed a typology of five accountability dimensions that 
concentrate on the “nature” of accountability each with a corresponding “critical question” 
that is to be asked of an organization to determine its accountability (Koppell, 2005, p. 96). 
The five dimensions of accountability are articulated in the table below: 
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Table: Conceptions of Accountability   
Conception of Accountability 
Transparency 
 
 
Liability 
 
 
Controllability 
 
 
Responsibility 
 
Responsiveness 
Key Determination 
Did the organization reveal the facts of its 
performance? 
 
Did the organization face consequences for 
its performance? 
 
Did the organization do what the principal 
(e.g. Congress, president) desired? 
 
Did the organization follow the rules? 
 
Did the organization fulfil the substantive 
expectation (demand/need)? 
Table One: Conception of Accountability (Koppell, 2005, p. 96) 
Similarly Smith (Smith G. , 2009, p. 423) presents the six elements of the accountability 
process conceptualized by Marshaw (2006) as a series of questions: 
The Accountability Process:  
 
i. Who is accountable? 
 
ii. To who are they accountable? 
 
iii. For what are they accountable? 
 
iv. By what standards of appraisal? 
 
v. Through what processes are they held accountable? 
 
vi. What consequences may follow? 
Table Two: The Accountability Process (Smith G. , 2009, p. 423) 
Examination of these questions in the context of this thesis and the investigation of deaths 
involving the police opens up some interesting discussions. The question of ‘who is 
accountable?’ is for example deceptively complex, as will be outlined in the next chapter, 
the investigation of deaths involving the police under Article 2 of the ECHR may require 
consideration of issues of both individual liability for wrongdoing and also police practice 
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and procedures, therefore encompassing elements of both personal and organisational 
accountability (Smith G. , 2004). Similarly the question of ‘to whom?’ the individual police 
officer or the wider police organisation are accountable is also complex, as any police 
oversight mechanism can be considered as one strand of a larger thread that encompasses 
political, legal, social and professional accountability mechanisms (National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs, 2005). Questions three and four are considered in the next 
chapter as I examine the development of standards of effective investigations under Article 
2 of the ECHR in relation to deaths involving the police. The remaining questions relating to 
the process by which the police are held accountable and the consequences of the 
processes reflect the focus of this research which relates to the extent to which the policing 
oversight arrangements have the capacity to meet the standards mandated by the ECtHR.  
2.5 Accountability in Policing: The Development of Civilian Oversight 
Markham and Punch see the value of accountability in stark terms: 
“Policing is accountability, for without it there is no legitimacy: and without 
legitimacy the police cannot function adequately within a democratic state” 
(Markham & Punch, 2007, p. 300). 
Why then is accountability in policing a concept for which universal acceptance should be 
expected (Bovens, Schillemans, & Hart, 2008)? The importance of accountability in policing 
derives from the both the extensive powers given to the police and their role as the 
gatekeepers of the criminal justice system. Police misconduct and lack of accountability 
serves to undermine the police service itself, the wider criminal justice system and the 
legitimacy of the state in which they operate (Seneviratne, 2004). Accountability in policing 
is important then because the stakes are much higher than in other spheres of public life. As 
accountability in policing can be characterised along different strands or aspects reminiscent 
of the Radin and Romzek model outlined above, for example democratic accountability by 
which elected representatives may seek to hold the police to account, financial 
accountability ensuring financial integrity through audit, legal accountability which ensures 
compliance with statute and internal accountability by which the individual officers are 
accountable to the police service (Patten, 1999), it is logical that different accountability 
mechanisms have developed to address these different aspects. Indeed, the array of 
accountability mechanisms to which a single police service may have to answer has been 
described as the “accountability industry” (Orde, 2008, p. 221).  
This thesis is most concerned with legal accountability by which it is meant that the police 
should be accountable to the same laws that they are charged to enforce and that there 
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should be an investigation and a resulting charge and sanction when they breach them 
(Smith G. , 2004). The question though of who investigates the police is not one that has 
been easily answered and instead different structures and mechanisms have evolved 
through the history of policing to address the issue. Alpert and Dunham envisage three ages 
of police reform, from a starting point of “non-regulation” through the movement to 
“professionalize” the police and finally to the current age characterised by the move to 
“external control” (Alpert & Dunham, 2004, p. 4). Policing oversight mechanisms have rarely 
been self-generated but instead oversight mechanisms have been instigated outside of the 
police (Bayley, 2008) and usually without a consensus amongst the police, government and 
the community as to their value (Miller J. , 2002) . Several academics (Punch, 2000; Herzog, 
1999) have noted that the evolution of external or civilian oversight of policing has been 
punctuated by scandals followed by periods of review of the policing accountability 
mechanisms, the production of a “detailed enquiry report and an accompanying set of 
recommendations” (Prenzler, 2002, p. 10) and “a realignment of power” (Punch, 2003, p. 
194). Herzog (1999, p. 483) proposes a cyclical dynamic that is observable in the evolution 
of police oversight towards increased civilian involvement and notes that following the 
completion of one revolution of the cycle the situation improves “pending the next crisis” 
(Herzog, 1999, p. 477).    
 
Figure Three: Herzog’s Cycle of Evolution  
Adapted from Herzog (Herzog, 1999).  
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2.5.1 Typologies of Police Oversight Models 
Goldsmith and Lewis have said that “Holding police to account has become a growth 
industry” (2000, p. 1) and there exist a “bewildering diversity” (Harris, 2012, p. 2) of 
accountability mechanisms across the Europe and the rest of the globe (Den Boer & 
Fernhout, 2008). The variety of approaches to oversight in the European context has been 
explained by the differing starting positions of states in establishing Human Rights 
compliance (Vaughan & Kilcommins, 2007). Several criminologists have attempted to 
provide a typology “at least crudely” (Miller J. , 2002, p. 8) for oversight agencies. Typologies 
can be useful as a classification system to assist in “organising complex phenomena” 
(MacAlister, 2012, p. 28) but they can also present an oversimplification of the issue in order 
to create neat labels and categories. Indeed the variations as regards structure, powers, 
remit and activities effectively ensures that any attempt to conduct a comparison between 
two oversight models would be faced with considerable methodological difficulties 
(Brereton, 2000; Mohr, 2007). Just as there is no one off-the-shelf organizational model of 
democratic policing that can be imported into other settings, there is no system of police 
oversight that is readily transferable between states (Marenin, 2005; Bratton & Malinowski, 
2008). In fact as Perez has concluded, “to establish an effective and accountable system of 
policing, democracies need multiple mechanisms of control” (Perez T. E., 2000, p. 48). It is 
difficult then to describe the multiple mechanisms of accountability and accountability 
relationships that exist with a simple typology. 
Many of the existing typologies, therefore, are based on a single element within the 
oversight models that can be used as a comparator. Frequently the element used is the 
“enduring issue of independence” (Wood, 2012, p. 90) or as Smith puts it, the “degree of lay 
involvement in police complaints procedures” (Smith G. , 2004, p. 15). Smith argues that the 
last half century of discussion on police complaints has been dominated by “structural and 
procedural questions” and that the issue of independence or “who investigates the police? 
issue emerging as predominant” (Smith, 2004, p. 15). Smith also notes the models identified 
in several typologies can be arranged as to the perceived location of the oversight agency on 
a continuum with “police operated systems at one end of the spectrum and non-police 
structures at the other” (Smith G. , 2004, p. 15). Smith warns, however, that preoccupation 
with a single issue, such as independence, “carries the risk that equally important matters 
are overlooked” (Smith G. , 2004, p. 16)  and Kempa contends the search for the ideal 
demarcation of who is responsible for what investigative function has plagued the operation 
of oversight agencies creating a near constant review of the mechanisms and resulting in a 
myriad of attempts to attain the “golden fleece” of optimal allocation of investigative 
responsibility (Kempa, 2007, p. 113).  
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It could be argued then the issue of effective oversight of policing is less about finding the 
right model (O'Rawe & Moore, 2000; Milton-Edwards, 2000) and more about integrating the 
oversight agency into a wider oversight structure with an agenda based on the 
professionalization of policing as part democratic reform encouraging both individual and 
organizational accountability. Nevertheless, the typologies have evolved over decades to 
include variations of increased and more sophisticated civilian involvement along the 
continuum suggested by Smith. Some examples are: 
Mohr 
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Review”
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Figure Four: Police Oversight Typologies 
In this thesis, reference will be made to the three category typology put forward by Prenzler 
and Ronken of the “internal affairs model”, “the civilian review model” and “the civilian 
control model” (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001, p. 152). Prenzler and Ronken’s typology assists as 
GSOC, the IPCC and OPONI could all be seen to be at the independent end of the oversight 
continuum as each of them has the statutory mandate to conduct their own investigations 
and are therefore aligned with what is referred to as the civilian control model. The internal 
affairs model necessitates police internally investigating other police and the civilian review 
model involves the independent review of investigations carried out by police officers. The 
civilian control model, however: 
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 “involves the fully independent, civilian investigation of at least the more serious 
allegations of misconduct, ostensibly as a means of ensuring both effective and 
publicly acceptable standards of police accountability” (Savage, 2013, p. 4). 
As useful as this typology is, by concentrating on the “who investigates?” issue the 
typologies fail to capture the fact that the agencies also have the statutory capacity or 
function for other types of investigation or resolution of complaint matters (Smith G. , 
2001). Both GSOC and IPCC have within their statutory powers different modes of 
investigation which range from the fully independent enquiry to those carried out by the 
police themselves. OPONI, which is often held up as the gold standard of independent police 
oversight investigation (Seneviratne, 2004; Prenzler, 2011) due to its practice of 
independently investigating all complaints and matters referred to it, nevertheless retains 
within its capacity the legislative scope to refer matters back to the police for investigation3.  
2.6 Threats to Accountability: Regulatory Capture and Lack of Political Will 
This section will introduce two concepts central to any discussion of accountability 
mechanisms. The first ‘regulatory capture’ has been identified as an issue of concern in 
police accountability research (Savage, 2012). Regulatory capture has been defined as the 
“techniques by which the group being regulated subverts the impartiality and zealousness 
of the regulator” (Prenzler, 2000, p. 662) and in policing oversight terms this could be said to 
have three distinct forms: identification with the police agency subject to oversight, 
sympathy with the particular problems faced by the policing agency in meeting standards, 
and a lack of toughness of rigour (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992). Makkai and Braithwaite 
define the best regulatory culture in industry as one where, “regulators are tough and 
absolutely committed to maximising the policy objectives that lie behind the law while at 
the same time being flexible- open to ways of achieving those policy objectives that are less 
costly for business” (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 73). These same principles of 
toughness, commitment, maximisation of policy objectives and flexibility could be applied to 
the police oversight mechanisms. In considering the extent to which the policing oversight 
agencies have applied the Article 2 obligations of conducting effective investigations into 
deaths involving the police, this thesis will also consider whether there is any evidence of 
the oversight agencies having been subject to regulatory capture by the police services over 
which they have remit.  
The second threat to the accountability mechanisms that will be considered is that of a lack 
of “political will”. The issue of political will was explored by Luna and Walker (Luna & 
                                                          
3
 Section 54(3)(b) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 1998 allows the Ombudsman to refer any complaint to 
the Chief Constable for investigation by a police officer.  
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Walker, 2000, p. 99) and is used as a construct to examine oversight agencies where there is 
an apparent gap between their powers and resources and their actual activities and where 
as a result failings can be attributed to the processes employed rather than the structure of 
the oversight mechanism. This is of direct relevance to this thesis as the three oversight 
agencies are, as outlined above, aligned to the civilian control model and should, in theory, 
be vested with the necessary independence and statutory power to carry out their oversight 
function. Any gap between their respective powers and resources and their actual activity in 
the investigation of deaths involving the police may be explained by a lack of political will in 
those in charge of the organisations to actually perform the task with which they have been 
charged. Luna and Walker defined ‘political will’ as the “commitment to making oversight 
work effectively” (Luna & Walker, 2000, p. 99) and the extent to which the political will to 
conduct effective investigations into deaths involving the police exists in each agency will be 
examined.  
Although it is accepted that every jurisdiction will be at a different evolutive step towards 
democratic policing, police accountability and human rights compliance (Vaughan & 
Kilcommins, 2007), there is a commonality amongst some of the concepts in relation to 
policing accountability in the three jurisdictions under discussion in this thesis.  Although 
there may be other modes of investigation possible within their statutory powers, all three 
of the agencies have the remit to investigate deaths involving the police using their own 
investigative staff. The analysis in this thesis then will not seek to look through the prism of 
typologies of oversight agencies but will look instead at the practical steps taken in the 
investigations by the oversight investigators, their capacity to meet the standards expected 
of investigations into deaths and to withstand the challenges posed by threats to 
accountability. Each of three oversight bodies will be considered in turn starting with 
OPONI.  
2.7 The Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland: Policing in Context in 
Northern Ireland 
It is common for commentators on Northern Ireland to express the cost of the ‘Troubles’ in 
human terms. McKittrick et al. (2006) have catalogued the details of 3,700 people who died 
as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles. McKittrick et al., have calculated that 87.7% of 
the deaths were caused by either Republican or Loyalist terrorist groupings (McKittrick, 
Kelters, Feeney, Thornton, & McVea, 2006) however three hundred and sixty five deaths are 
recorded as being caused by the security forces of which 50 are credited to the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC). McKittrick et al., recognise that although the security forces were 
responsible for comparatively much fewer deaths than terrorist groupings like the IRA, the 
deaths for which they were responsible “generated sizeable and continuing controversy” 
(2006, p. 1561). These deaths were often caused as a result of the attempts of the police 
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and security services to maintain a form of law and order within the country. These 
attempts could be aligned with either of Brodeur’s high or low policing paradigms (Brodeur, 
1983) as deaths would occur through the deployment of low policing techniques such as 
public order control and through high policing methodology such as the use of informants 
and intelligence led operations. Indeed, the use by police of intelligence led policing and 
sources such as informants would remain controversial throughout the Troubles and 
beyond.  
The Civil Rights movement which emerged in the late 1960s (Mallie & McKittrick, 1997) saw 
Northern Ireland citizens from the minority Catholic population stage public protests in 
relation to inequality of public housing, the unfairness of electoral ‘gerrymandering’ and the 
draconian emergency legislation (Wallace, 1970). These protests were met with hostility 
from the loyalist community and “savage force” from the security forces embodied in the 
British Army and the RUC (Foot, 1996, p. 159; Pringle & Jacobson, 2000). During this time 
policing became what Patten would later describe as “at the heart of many of the problems 
that politicians have been unable to resolve” (Patten, 1999, p. 2). Policing in Northern 
Ireland was seen as biased and partisan. The manner in which a series of public order 
incidents arising from loyalist bands parading through Catholic areas were policed led to the 
conclusion that the RUC were deeply aligned with the Unionist community (Cochrane, 
1997). As Martin stated “The force [the RUC] was seen as either the protector of the state 
and way of life by some residents or as a brutal violator of human rights and corrupt arm of 
a colonial power by others” (Martin, 2006, p. 320). 
Through a series of small incremental steps, commencing in the late eighties with secret 
talks between the main nationalist political parties, Sinn Fein and the SDLP, and the Irish 
government and negotiating a torturous path through paramilitary ceasefires announced, 
broken and renewed, the search for a political settlement to the troubles culminated in April 
1998 with the signing of the Belfast Agreement (Mallie & McKittrick, 1997), which became 
known as the Good Friday Agreement  (McGarry & O'Leary, 1999). The agreement was seen 
as a ‘blueprint’ for peaceful resolution to difficulties that had plagued the North (Mulcahy, 
2006) constitutionally recognising the social truth that Northern Ireland contained both 
British and Irish nationalities and both nationalist and loyalist cultures (McGarry & O'Leary, 
1999). One of the central aspects of the Agreement was the establishment of an 
Independent Commission on Policing to identify a new way forward and to move towards 
policing with the consent of all of the people (Hayes, 1997).  
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2.7.1 OPONI 
O’Rawe and Moore have described the failure of successive police accountability 
mechanisms in Northern Ireland leading up to the creation of the Office of the Police 
Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) as evidence of the government tendency to 
“obfuscate and tinker at the edges of problems rather than act swiftly and decisively to 
transform systems that have been shown to fail” (O'Rawe & Moore, 2000, p. 259). OPONI, 
proposed by Hayes (Hayes, 1997) and endorsed by Patten (Patten, 1999), amounted to a 
resounding move towards independent investigation of police complaints in the fight for 
what Hayes described as the “great prize” of “public confidence in and support for the 
Police” (Hayes, 1997, p.v). The word ‘ombudsman’ consists of two Swedish words: ‘ombuds’ 
meaning representative and ‘man’ which means the people (Fowlie, 2011) and refers to “an 
office occupied by a single individual who is empowered and resourced to investigate citizen 
complaints about the manner in which they have been treated by central and local 
government bodies” (Walsh, 2004, p. 3).  The independence of the institution is seen as its 
most significant feature (Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 2008).  
Walsh stated that OPONI “established itself as a respected police complaints mechanism” 
(Walsh, 2011, p. 326) a success attributed in “no small measure to the calibre and standing 
of the individual appointed to the ombudsman’s office” (Walsh, 2004, p. 3). In fact several 
commentators have referred to OPONI as the “Rolls Royce” of oversight bodies 
(Seneviratne, 2004, p. 340; Prenzler, 2011, p. 285; Savage, 2012, p. 1). OPONI was prevented 
by statute from investigating matters that were over 12 months old unless new evidence 
became available or where the case was considered to be grave and exceptional4 (Bell, 
2003). Due to the country’s history there would prove to be many complaints and instances 
which would fulfil the grave and exceptional criteria and OPONI found itself with a dual role 
responsible for ‘current’ and ‘historic’ deaths involving the police. However, it was to 
become mired in a period of controversy and review in which its independence in the 
investigation of historic matters was questioned. In 2011 concerns were raised as to the 
independence of the office resulting in the extensive external review of its operations 
including its relationship with the PSNI and the Department of Justice. An inspection by the 
Criminal Justice Inspectorate, although recognising the complexities of defining and 
measuring the independence of the office and whilst endorsing both the statutory 
framework of the office and its investigations into current matters, reached the conclusion 
that there had been an overall lowering of “the operational independence of the OPONI” 
(Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2011, p. 34). Following this review the then 
serving Police Ombudsman left his post in January 2012 and a new Police Ombudsman took 
office in July 2012. A follow up review of the office conducted by the Criminal Justice 
Inspectorate reported “substantial progress” had been made and that “new structures and 
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 Regulation 6 Royal Ulster Constabulary (Complaints etc., ) Regulations 2001 
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processes had been developed and implemented with a focus on providing comprehensive 
and robust quality assurance of investigations into historic cases and any subsequent 
production of public reports” (Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2013, p. vi).  
2.8 The Independent Police Complaints Commission 
The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) was introduced in England and 
Wales in 2004 marking an incremental evolutionary step in statutory complaints systems 
that began in 1964 with the enactment of the Police Act, which vested the responsibility for 
complaints and discipline issues in chief police officers, and continued with the Police Act of 
1976 which established the Police Complaints Board (PCB) (Smith G. , 2009). The PCB was a 
step towards the civilianisation of policing oversight through the review of investigation files 
completed by the police but was heavily criticised for its lack of authority and power. 
Following criticism of the police contained in the report of the Scarman (1982) inquiry into 
the riots in Brixton in April 1981, the enactment of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 
1984, introduced the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) which again marked a small but 
further step towards external civilian investigation of the police with provision for “lay 
supervision for serious complaints” (Seneviratne, 2004, p. 125). The PCA operated until it 
too came under significant criticism in the Macpherson Report into the miscarriage of 
justice following the death of Stephen Lawrence (Savage, Grieve, & Poyser, 2009) which 
recommended the establishment of an independent police complaints body (Macpherson, 
1999). Further pressures mounting to establish an independent police complaints body 
came through reports commissioned to review the complaints process (KPMG, 2000; 
Harrison & Cuneen, 2000) and that arising from the ECtHR judgement in the Kelly5 and 
Khan6 cases which criticised the lack of an independent police complaints mechanism (Smith 
G. , 2002).  
The IPCC commenced operations on the 1st of April 2004. It was established by the Police 
Reform Act 2002 which provided for four schemes or modes of investigation of police 
complaints. The IPCC can refer7 matters back to the relevant policing agency for their own 
local investigation and can also both supervise8 and manage9 investigations carried out by 
Professional Standards Departments in the police agencies over which it has remit. In the 
more serious cases it can carry out its own independent10 investigations (Wood, 2012). It is 
clear that from the outset, issues relating to the Article 2 obligations were under 
consideration in the operation of the IPCC. Writing in 2004, Deputy Chair Wadham outlined 
                                                          
5
 Kelly and Others v United Kingdom (2001) (Appl. No. 27229/95, 3
rd
 April 2001) 
6
 Khan v UK (2001), 31 EHRR 45 
7
 Police Reform Act (2002) Schedule 3 Part 3 section 16 
8
 Police Reform Act (2002) Schedule 3 Part 3 section 17 
9
 Police Reform Act (2002) Schedule 3 Part 3 section 18 
10
 Police Reform Act (2002) Schedule 3 Part 3 section 19 
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the IPCC’s ability to meet the Article 2 standards in investigations of death and serious injury 
and stated:  
“...the powers of the IPCC to manage and supervise these cases combined with the 
possibility of using a different police force to carry out the detailed investigation work 
appears to meet the requirements of the Convention. The approach taken by the 
Police Reform Act and by the IPCC in involving the relatives of those who have died in 
the investigation probably goes further than required by the Convention” (Wadham, 
2004, p. 5).  
The IPCC did not have to wait long for a significant challenge to its investigative capacity 
when on the 22nd of July 2005 “an unarmed Brazilian man, Jean Charles de Menezes, was 
shot seven times in the head by plainclothes police officers on a stationary train at Stockwell 
tube station” (Turner, 2008, p. 2). The death of Jean Charles de Menezes led to an 
investigation into the circumstances of the shooting and also into the conduct of senior 
police officers and the release of inaccurate information immediately after his killing. The 
responsibility of both investigations fell to the IPCC. In November 2007, the Office of the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner was convicted of failures under the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974 and fined £175,000. Several other high profile and significant cases have 
fallen to the IPCC since their inception including the death of Ian Tomlinson and Mark 
Saunders (Davies, 2010). Alongside their investigative responsibilities the IPCC has “invested 
its energies” in examining deaths in custody and “can claim to have made a most positive 
impact ... in relation to the number of people dying in or following police custody” (Wood, 
2012, p. 81). The IPCC has also published annual statistical reports and analysis alongside 
detailed examinations of their investigations into deaths (IPCC, 2010). In 2012 the IPCC 
commenced a review of their work in cases involving death including “cases where Article 2 
of the ECHR is engaged” (IPCC, 2012). The IPCC 2012-2015 corporate plan identified six 
priority areas for the organisation, three of them relate to deaths and serious injury 
involving the police (IPCC, 2012).  
Consistently over the years of its operation the IPCC has been criticised for the low number 
of independent investigations it carries out, Prenzler and Porter described the IPCC as “very 
much a mixed model of regulatory oversight, with continued reliance on police for the 
majority of investigations and limited input into disciplinary processes” (Porter & Prenzler, 
2012, p. 154) and in 2010 the Home Affairs Committee starkly pronounced:  
“In 2008–09, less than 1% of all complaints made against the Police were directly 
investigated by IPCC staff and just 10% of “serious” cases referred to the IPCC were 
subsequently managed by the IPCC’s own staff. It is true to say that, 99 times out of 
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100 and despite the existence of the IPCC, the complaints procedure remains the 
‘police investigating the police’” (Home Affairs Committee, 2010, p. 8).  
In January 2013 the Home Affairs Committee published a further report into the IPCC that 
recommended that the IPCC conduct more independent investigations and stated in 
relation to deaths involving the police: 
“The IPCC owes it to the families of those who die in cases involving the police to get 
to the truth of the matter- a botched job is an offence to all concerned. When the 
IPCC does investigate it often comes too late and takes too long.” (Home Affairs 
Committee, 2013, p. 36). 
Under the heading of “A second home for police officers” the committee also criticised the 
make-up of staff in the organisation and recommended that the IPCC move from the current 
levels of 33% to a target of employing 20% or fewer investigators with former policing 
backgrounds (Home Affairs Committee, 2013, pp. 24-26). On the 12th of February 2013 the 
Home Secretary announced a series of measures to expand the IPCC to deal with all serious 
complaints against the police as independent investigations including drawing resources 
from police professional standards departments (Travis, 2013). The IPCC’s powers were 
controversially expanded in 2013 to allow them to compel police officers to attend an 
interview as a witness in managed or independent IPCC investigations (Dodd, 2012). This 
expansion of power and resources came at a time when the IPCC was facing perhaps its 
biggest challenge to date having launched an investigation in October 2012 into possible 
historic police wrongdoing in relation to the 1989 Hillsborough tragedy (IPCC, 2012).  
2.9 The Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission: Policing and Accountability in Ireland 
Although the Garda Síochána have experienced several scandals, including media exposés 
into the operations of a Garda ‘heavy gang’ in the seventies believed to use intimidation, 
physical and mental abuse to coerce or concoct suspect confessions (Kilcommins, O'Donnell, 
O'Sullivan, & Vaughan, 2004; Inglis, 2003), allegations of misuse of Garda powers for  
political purposes (Brady, 2012 c; Joyce & Murtagh, 1983)  in the eighties and the use of 
improper and oppressive interrogation techniques resulting in miscarriages of justice in the 
nineties (Birmingham, 2006) , the force have still enjoyed a high level of public confidence.  
However, the Morris Tribunal established on the 28th March 2002 to enquire into the 
conduct of Gardaí in the Donegal Division in the west of Ireland represented “the first major 
investigation and evaluation of policies, organisation and practices across key aspects of 
policing in the History of the state” (Walsh, 2010, p. x). Unethical and criminal behaviour 
alleged to have been perpetrated by a small number of Garda members in Donegal had by 
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November 2001 caused serious concerns to be expressed by the public, the media and 
eventually the Government (Fitzgerald, 2008). The behaviour to be examined by the Morris 
Tribunal included breaches of almost all of the sections of the Garda code of conduct 
(Conway, 2010, p. 88) and criminality such as extortion, harassment, unlawful arrest and 
detention, the fabrication of weapons finds, the mishandling of informants and ill-treatment 
of persons in custody (Nolan, 2005). Whilst acknowledging other contextual factors such as 
the growing importance of international human rights mechanisms as being relevant 
drivers, Conway rates the policing scandal in Donegal and the Morris Tribunal and its 
negative findings as “monumental driver” of police reform and the primary cause of 
increased police oversight in Ireland (Conway, 2010, p. 124). Indeed it is possible to draw 
parallels as regards the impact on police reform between the Morris Tribunal following the 
scandal in Donegal and the Macpherson Report that followed the miscarriage of justice in 
the case of Stephen Lawrence.  
In Ireland the pattern of policing scandal followed by reform was not an entirely new state 
of affairs.  Up until the 1980s in Ireland allegations of Garda misconduct were investigated 
internally by other members of the Gardaí. However following what has become known as 
the ‘Kerry babies case’, in which there were allegations of police use of “force and 
psychological terror” in the securing of false confessions from a family in rural Kerry in 
relation to the murder of a new born baby during an investigation described as “medieval” 
(McCafferty, 1985, p. 79), the Garda Síochána Complaints Board (GSCB) was established in 
1987. The GSCB had introduced an independent element into the investigation of public 
complaints against the police with a remit largely restricted to overseeing Garda 
investigation of complaints (Mulcahy, 2007) but had been hampered by inadequate 
resources, public criticism of the use of members of An Garda Síochána to conduct almost 
all of the investigations undertaken, a low rate of cases determined in favour of the 
complainant and a high rate of cases found to be inadmissible (Walsh, 2004). The Board 
itself highlighted deficiencies in the complaints system and called for reforms of the process 
in almost all of its annual reports (Walsh, 2004) during its tenure the Committee of the 
Prevention of Torture twice reported that persons detained by the Garda Síochána in 
Ireland ran “a not inconsiderable risk of being physically ill-treated” (Council of Europe, 
1995, p. 14; 1999).  A chapter of The Morris report was dedicated to criticism of the GSCB’s 
failures and “the limited nature of its investigatory powers” (Morris, 2008, p. 321). Morris 
focused on two significant factors “the inadequate structures of accountability; and the 
culture of silence and non co-operation with investigations” (McVerry, 2005, p. 1).  
Demands, made by political representatives and pressure groups including the Irish Human 
Rights Commission that Ireland should look to its Northern neighbours for an example in 
reducing the “democratic deficit” of police accountability (Mulcahy, 2005, p. 203) and to 
emulate the oversight structures that had begun to bed in there, were initially resisted on 
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the grounds that the realities of policing differed substantially across both jurisdictions 
(National Economic and Social Council, 2012).  A draft Bill published in 2003 initially 
proposed a Garda Inspectorate but this was to be replaced by the proposal of a Garda 
Ombudsman Commission by the time it had reached the Seanad in February 2004 and was 
to include both an Ombudsman Commission, for complaints, and an Inspectorate dealing 
with complaints and areas of practice and procedure by the time it reached the Dáil in 2005. 
After what has been characterised as a hurried debate with frequent amendments the 
Garda Síochana Act was signed into law by the president of Ireland on the 10th of July 2005 
(Conway, 2010). As the Gardaí had for so long relied upon self regulation, the creation of 
GSOC represented a “dramatic shift” in the terms and structure of accountability (National 
Economic and Social Council, 2012) and heralded in the new paradigm for the Garda 
Síochána in the 21st century “that of policing to accountability” (Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 4). 
Prior to the commencement of the new accountability structures Walsh predicted the 
factors that would lead to its success or failure:  
“The capacity of the Ombudsman Commission to discharge this onerous task will be 
heavily dependent on matters such as: its status and composition; whether the 
persons appointed to it have the necessary expertise and qualifications; the extent to 
which it can act and be seen to act independently of government; whether it has the 
necessary powers and resources to employ and train investigators independent of the 
Garda; and perhaps, most important of all, whether it will have the necessary powers 
to investigate complaints against Gardaí, and the force as a whole, robustly, fairly 
and swiftly” (Walsh, 2004, p. 2). 
Other commentators felt that the new Ombudsman Commission suffered in comparison 
with the Northern Model, criticising the three person Commission structure, the lack of 
open competition in their appointment and questioning whether government appointees 
could be seen to be sufficiently independent and autonomous of the state (McVerry, 2005; 
Vaughan, 2005). Indeed, before one complaint had been received or one investigator 
employed the new police oversight mechanisms were expected to “fall significantly short of 
their counterparts in Northern Ireland” (Walsh, 2011, p. 326). 
2.9.1 GSOC 
The first three person Garda Síochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) was appointed in 
February 2006 (GSOC, 2007) with the twin statutory objectives of establishing an effective, 
efficient system of investigating police complaints that is fair to all concerned and of 
promoting confidence in that system. As with the IPCC, not all complaints or investigations 
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were to be carried out independently by the Commission, instead the Act provided for four 
types of investigation: independent investigation by GSOC of possible criminal offences11; 
independent investigation by GSOC of possible disciplinary breaches by Garda members12; 
investigation of possible disciplinary breaches referred to the Garda Síochána for 
investigation supervised by GSOC13 and the unsupervised investigation of possible 
disciplinary breaches by the Garda Síochána14. For the purposes of the independent 
investigation of possible criminal offences the designated officers of the GSOC were 
invested with “all the powers, immunities and privileges conferred and all the duties 
imposed on any member of the Garda Síochána15.” Following on from a recommendation of 
the Morris Tribunal the Act created an obligation16 on Garda members when directed by a 
member of a higher rank to account for any act done or omission made whilst on duty. 
Following a legislative amendment the power to direct an account from a Garda member 
was extended so that designated officers of GSOC were also given the power.17 The use of 
the power18 to direct an account is limited due to the right against self-incrimination. Indeed 
the power of GSOC to obtain information from any agency, including the Garda Síochána is 
not as explicitly drafted as in the other jurisdictions. It appears to rest with the investing of 
the powers of a Garda member in its designated officers and a duty lies with the Gardaí to 
preserve evidence relevant to a complaint, however, the explicit terms seen in the 
legislation of other jurisdictions to compel the cooperation of the overseen, is absent.  
In relation to the investigation of death involving the Gardaí, the Act placed a dual 
responsibility on both the Garda Síochána and GSOC legislating that any matter that 
appeared to the Garda Commissioner to indicate that the conduct of a Garda member may 
have resulted in the death of, or serious harm to,19 a person shall be referred to the Garda 
Ombudsman who in turn shall ensure that it is investigated. A further responsibility lies with 
GSOC in circumstances where no referral is made but the Commission believes that the 
conduct of a member may have led to the death of a person. During and at the conclusion of 
an investigation commenced under this statutory responsibility GSOC is obliged20 to provide 
the Garda members whose conduct is subject to the investigation, the Garda Commissioner, 
the relevant Government Minister and any other person that the Commission considers has 
a sufficient interest, for example the family of a deceased or their representatives with 
sufficient information to keep them informed as to the progress and results of the 
investigation. There is no requirement, however, as has been seen in, for example, Northern 
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 Section 98 Garda Síochána Act, 2005 
12
 Section 95 Garda Síochána Act, 2005 
13
 Section 94(5) Garda Síochána Act, 2005 
14
 Section 94(1) Garda Síochána Act, 2005 
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 Section 98(1) Garda Síochána Act, 2005 
16
 Section 39 (1) Garda Síochána Act, 2005 (As Amended) 
17
 Section 96 Garda Síochána Act, 2005 
18
 Section 39 (4) Garda Síochána Act, 2005 (As Amended) 
19
 Section 102 (1) and (2) Garda Síochána Act, 2005 
20
 Section 103 (1)(b) Garda Síochána Act, 2005 
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Ireland that the findings of an investigation into a death referred by the police force be 
made public by laying them before Parliament or in this case the Dáil.  
GSOC would not have to wait long for the first challenges relating to the investigation of a 
death. It commenced operations on the 9th of May 2007 and on the 17th of May GSOC 
commenced its first investigation into a death (Cuzack, 2007). Since then it has been tasked 
with the investigation of a large number of fatal incidents involving An Garda Síochána; in 
2012 GSOC investigated 13 deaths involving the police (GSOC, 2013). In its Annual Report 
for 2012 GSOC reported considerable difficulties in the supply of information from An Garda 
Síochána but also asserted its commitment to meeting the obligations under Article 2 
(GSOC, 2013, p. 9). 
This chapter began with a consideration of the role of police in society and an examination 
of the elements of that role that could lead to fatalities involving the police. The discussion 
then moved to the concept of accountability and its importance in the context of deaths 
involving the police. Typologies of police oversight agencies were discussed highlighting the 
evolution of independent investigation of police services. Finally the chapter introduced the 
three policing oversight agencies that are the subject of this research: OPONI, the IPCC and 
GSOC. In doing so both the origins of the three agencies and the policing context into which 
they were introduced have been examined. The current context in which each of the 
oversight agencies are operating has also been explored. In the next chapter a methodology 
is outlined to analyse the Article 2 ECHR standards to which deaths involving the police must 
be investigated and to examine the capacity and ability of each of the three oversight 
agencies to meet those standards.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the choices made in selecting an appropriate methodology to firstly 
explore the evolution of the Article 2 standards and then to examine the capacity of 
oversight agencies to comply with them. The chapter will begin with the outline of a critical 
analysis structure to identify and highlight the evolution of the Article 2 standards and this 
will then be followed by an exploration of the difficulties in evaluating the work undertaken 
by oversight agencies generally. The chapter will then outline considerations made in the 
selection of the oversight agencies which are the subject of this thesis. It will then look at 
the selection of a mixed methods research strategy, employing semi-structured interviews 
followed by a questionnaire, to gather the primary data in the examination of each of the 
agencies and will outline the difficulties in carrying out this strategy leading to a decision to 
report on the qualitative elements of the research only. The practical application of the 
research strategy will be considered including issues relating to sampling, transcription and 
analysis and finally the ethical considerations of the research will be outlined. 
3.2 Critical Analysis of the Issues Relating to Article 2  
The first part of the research methodology chosen to examine the issues relating to the 
investigation of deaths involving the police is to conduct a critical analysis of the evolution 
of the principle and standards of an effective investigation under Article 2 of the ECHR. This 
analysis will examine the origin of the European Convention itself and the concept of 
positive obligations derived from the text. Next it will explore in detail the Article 2 standard 
of the right to life and the origin and evolution of the positive obligation of an effective 
investigation into deaths involving the state. This section of the analysis will draw on both 
the academic literature on the topic but also the European jurisprudence that caused the 
incremental evolution of the principle of effective investigation into deaths involving the 
police. The analysis will then outline the emergence of the five standards of an effective 
investigation and consider both the law and literature around each of these standards. 
These five standards have been articulated in an opinion of the European Commissioner for 
Human Rights and this document and the standards defined within it in will also be subject 
to the analysis. The meaning and resonance of the five standards will then be dealt with in 
turn again drawing on both ECtHR precedent and academic commentary. Finally the process 
by which the standards migrate from discussion in the ECtHR to practical application by 
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oversight agencies will be analysed using the framework of Europeanization (Borzel & Risse, 
2000).  
3.3 The Difficulty of Evaluating Police Oversight Agencies 
Reiner described the identification and assessment of good police performance as the 
“gaping hole at the heart of debates about policing” (Reiner, 1998, p. 55). Just as the debate 
on how the application of quantitative research methods to policing organisations can do 
justice to the complexity of the activities they perform remains unresolved (Fleming & Scott, 
2008) and raises complex theoretical and practical questions (Brodeur, 1998), the evaluation 
of civilian oversight agencies has been insufficiently considered (Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000). 
The literature instead focuses on descriptions of the development and function of oversight 
agencies as opposed to formal evaluations (Miller J. , 2002).  Where evaluation of oversight 
agencies is considered, there has been a tendency in the literature to evaluate success and 
failure in “stark dichotomous terms without regard to considerations of degree and process, 
or of a symbolic as well as a practical nature” (Goldsmith, 2000, p. 190). Prenzler and Lewis 
concluded that “Measuring the performance of police oversight agencies is not an easy 
matter” (Prenzler & Lewis, 2005, p. 82). 
Further problems arise in assessing the work of oversight agencies in relation to the 
achievement of the Article 2 standards. Firstly, the most common assessment of compliance 
with Article 2 standards is the retrospective examination by the ECtHR following an 
application to the ECtHR in an individual case where there is an allegation that a breach of 
one or more of the standards has occurred. Furthermore, the Article 2 standards includes 
five interlinked elements of independence, adequacy, timeliness, public scrutiny and victim 
involvement which means that any research strategy has to be capable of examining each 
element. Further the obligation to fulfil the Article 2 standards is a state obligation and the 
oversight agencies may not have sole carriage or responsibility for all of the five elements 
for example, in compliance with the public scrutiny element the oversight body may be 
required to liaise with external agencies such as the relevant the coronial authority. As such 
it may be “overwhelmingly difficult to imagine an evaluation research design that could 
encompass the multiagency approach” (Brodeur, 1998, p. 47).  
To commence the task of identifying a methodology to meet my aims and objectives, I first 
sought to identify through the literature what models may be available to assist in my 
examination of oversight agencies. Stenning considers that an effective police complaints 
agency should possess:  
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“a sound legislative foundation; dedicated, competent, experienced and/or trained 
personnel to administer it; a reasonable level of commitment and co-operation on 
the part of the police organisations and personnel to whom the process applies; an 
adequate degree of knowledge of, confidence in, and willingness to use, the process 
and in good faith, on the part of potential complainants; and the commitment of 
political support and adequate resources for full and effective implementation of the 
process” (Stenning, 2000, p. 147).  
Stenning’s detailed structure for evaluating the legislative framework is outlined in 
Appendix 1 below in tabular form but it is clear from the multi layered description of an 
effective oversight agency that any evaluation of the different elements would require a 
complex and non linear approach capable of assessing multiple constructs such as 
independence, impartiality and thoroughness. Stenning’s proposal represents a ‘normative’ 
approach (Stenning, 2000) evaluating the legislative framework that empowers the agencies 
and stressing the importance of balancing the parallel or competing considerations of 
“discipline and remedy, police management and external oversight, formality and 
informality, the individual complainant and the public interest” (Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000, p. 
8).  
Walker proposed that developing appropriate performance measures to indicate the 
effectiveness of the work undertaken was one of the most important challenges for 
oversight agencies (Walker, 2006). However, Prenzler and Lewis in researching performance 
indicators for oversight agencies and having considered measures such as complaint 
substantiation rates, disciplinary sanctions applied, timelines in investigations, changes in 
police procedures, case file audits and stakeholder confidence found that no single measure 
or even a group of measures “provides an objective demonstration of the effectiveness of 
an agency in preventing corruption or effectively adjudicating allegations of misconduct” 
(Prenzler & Lewis, 2005, pp. 77-78). Filstad and Gottschalk suggested five performance 
indicators “quality and quantity of complaints received, complaints completion process and 
time, conviction rate from complaints charges, learning and advice for police agencies and 
confidence in the police oversight agency” (Filstad & Gottschalk, 2011, p. 108) but found 
that the ability of police oversight agencies to provide support to police agencies through 
lessons learning was limited. The attempts by oversight agencies to report on complaint 
trends and to analyse complaints data as a tool for organisational learning indicates a 
withdrawal from a legalistic sanctions based approach to police misconduct and a move 
towards improving police organisational effectiveness through feedback to police 
management (Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000).  
The concept of learning lessons from the investigations of police involved is at the centre of 
the Article 2 standards. Smith has stated:  
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“The task facing investigators and analysts it to identify all the factors that result in 
failure, rather than presume human error, and then implement the lessons learned... 
as a reflective endeavour lesson learning has the capacity to enhance regulatory and 
accountability effectiveness” (Smith G. , 2009, p. 424). 
This echoes the comments of both Baroness Hale21 and Lord Bingham22 as to the purposes 
of the investigation into deaths involving the police including an element of the prevention 
of future incidents.  
It is clear then that any methodology undertaken to examine the capacity and performance 
of the oversight agencies in undertaking investigations into police involved deaths cannot 
rely on simple or single indicators such as disciplinary or criminal sanctions. Stenning’s 
model, whilst attractive, deals with the powers afforded to an oversight agency but would 
not serve to indicate the manner in which the powers are implemented or used by the 
actors within the organisations such as the investigators and senior investigators. A case 
study analysis of an actual investigation or investigations could serve to examine the 
response by one oversight agency to a specific set of circumstances but would inevitably be 
case specific and limited by its retrospective nature (Turner, 2009).  Analysis of Annual 
Reports including the published Performance Indicators would also provide only the 
approved public narrative of the oversight agencies themselves A wider scope again could 
be taken by researching the viewpoints of other stakeholders in the investigation process 
for example the families of the deceased or police officers subject of investigation. 
Necessarily, therefore I had to attempt to narrow my focus. My consideration of the 
evaluative models above led to the conclusion that my intention through this thesis was not 
an evaluation of performance or outcomes but instead amounted to an examination and 
assessment of the issues relating to investigating deaths involving the police from the 
viewpoint of the investigators tasked with the practical application of the Article 2 
standards. This would provide an insight into the work of policing oversight investigators 
and an examination of their perception of the issues relating to the investigation of deaths 
involving the police. This would mean that I was approaching the examination of the 
oversight agencies not from a standpoint of what the oversight agencies should do, what 
they are empowered to do or what they say that they do but instead gathering data from 
key oversight practitioners, i.e. the investigators themselves, as to what they actually do.  
 
                                                          
21
 Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74, [2009] per Baroness Hale at [76] 
ibid at p. 37 
22
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Amin [2003] UKHL 51; [2004] 1 A.C. 653 per Lord 
Bingham at [32] ibid at p.37  
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3.4 Selecting a Methodology 
In order to approach the selection of research methodology it was necessary to take the 
question back to first principles and consider the aims of the research. Bachman categorised 
the four purposes of social research as descriptive, exploratory, explanatory and evaluative 
(Bachman, 2003, p. 13). Having considered Bachman’s model, I concluded that primarily this 
thesis was an examination of oversight agencies from the perspective of the investigators 
charged with achieving the standards of an effective investigation. There would be some 
descriptive elements to the research in that it would describe the investigative mechanisms 
in place in each of the agencies, some exploratory elements to the research in that it would 
explore the meanings given by the investigators to concepts such as independence and 
finally the research would have a narrow evaluative or assessment function in that it would 
seek to identify whether the oversight structures had the capacity to meet the Article 2 
standards. However, whilst the European Courts are required to retrospectively analyse a 
single investigation against the contention put forward by an applicant that specific 
breaches of the convention have occurred the aim of this research was broader in that it 
would examine the ongoing capacity of oversight agencies to undertake the investigations 
of deaths involving the police as they occur. Further the research would attempt to examine 
to what extent the standards set in Europe had actually made their way from the ECtHR to 
those responsible within the selected oversight agencies for applying the standards in their 
investigation and in that regard the evaluation would move beyond the means and statutory 
powers of the organisations and in to less quantifiable areas such as culture and attitudes. 
In relation to evaluating oversight agencies and their capacity to achieve the Article 2 
standards, Mowbray has cited the McKerr Case23 stating “the duty to undertake effective 
investigations into killings is ‘... not an obligation of result, but of means’, thereby 
recognising that a State may have provided adequate resources for the investigation to be 
characterised as effective even if it was unable to result in the identification/punishment of 
persons responsible for an unlawful killing” (Mowbray, 2005, p. 78). This would indicate that 
any examination of a state’s ability to attain the standards should not seek to assess the 
results of the investigations undertaken on the limited scope of prosecutions or disciplinary 
outcomes arising but should look instead at the ‘means’ employed in the investigation itself 
by those investigators who had control over the investigation and made the choices as to 
how they were conducted. The research would then examine the capacity of the 
organisations from the perspective of those in charge and control of decision making and 
therefore the ‘means’ of the investigations undertaken.  
The next question was which research method was the most appropriate to undertake the 
examination process. Mixed methods research either combines, integrates, or mixes 
qualitative and quantitative methods (Morgan, 2007) and has been defined as “an approach 
                                                          
23
 McKerr v United Kingdom (2001) 28883/95 4
th
 May 2001 at 96  
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to knowledge (theory and practice) that attempts to consider multiple viewpoints, 
perspective, positions and standpoints (always including the standpoints of qualitative and 
quantitative research” (Burke Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2001, p. 113). Such an 
approach that would encompass multiple viewpoints would be better placed to examine the 
complexities and subjective nature of some of the concepts that had emerged from the 
literature review such as independence and the culture of the oversight agencies which 
would not be readily susceptible to numeric quantification. Also appealing was the assertion 
by Burke Johnson et al., (2001, p. 113) that the “primary philosophy of mixed research was 
one of pragmatism” as this was felt to be in keeping with the insider element of the 
research in that I was a senior investigating officer in an oversight agency seeking to 
examine the practical application of standards set by courts but applied by fellow senior 
investigating officers or SIOs. 
In seeking to further refine the choice of research method I considered the models of mixed 
methods research described by Creswell et al.., and initially selected the “Sequential 
Exploratory Design” as the most appropriate to fit the aims of the research (Creswell, Clark, 
Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003, p. 223). The ‘Sequential Exploratory Design’ is a five phase 
design model consisting of Qualitative Data Collection and then Qualitative Data Analysis, 
followed by Quantitative Data Collection and then Quantitative Data Analysis and ending 
with the Interpretation of the Entire Analysis. In applying this model I would seek to collect 
qualitative data through interviews with senior investigating officers in the oversight 
agencies which would then be analysed to assist in the development of a quantitative 
instrument that would be used to gather further quantitative data from investigating 
officers. This would be in keeping with the rationale of mixed methods research referred to 
as “development” i.e. using the results from one method to assist and inform the use of the 
other method (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989, p. 259). It would also arguably assist in 
‘triangulation’ through seeking an “increased validity” of the results across the mixed 
methods (Moran-Ellis, et al., 2006, pp. 47-48).  
Although it was my intention to follow the Article 2 standards all the way to their practical 
application by the investigators who have the front line responsibility for executing the 
investigative strategy. When it came to drafting the thesis the ambitious scale of the project 
and the limited word count availability meant that ultimately I reported only on the 
qualitative research undertaken in the interviews with the Senior Investigators. The 
quantitative instruments and data are reproduced in Appendices 5, 6 and 10 and the 
following discussion of the methodology considerations relate only to the qualitative 
elements of the research.  Although this limits the ability of the research to connect with the 
on the ground application of the Article 2 principles as the thesis deals with complex and 
subjective constructs such as independence and thoroughness the qualitative interviews is 
where the richest data lay.  
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3.5 Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis 
3.5.1 Interviews 
For the qualitative data collection I selected semi structured interviews, defined as where 
“the interviewer has a general area of interest and concern but lets the conversation 
develop within this area” (Robson, 2002, p. 270) as the appropriate methodology for 
gathering the data. This was primarily because I did not wish to overly restrict the interviews 
and to be open to the areas regarding the investigation of deaths that may prove to be 
important to the interview subjects. I did, however, wish to explore some specific aspects so 
a flexible semi structured interview process was considered the optimal solution. I was also 
conscious that I was interviewing senior investigators who had been trained in investigative 
interview techniques, would be comfortable with a more structured approach to interviews 
and would recognise any clumsy attempts to “do rapport” (Knapik, 2006, pp. 82-89). For the 
semi structured interviews, I decided to follow the five stage model put forward by Robson 
as Introduction, Warm-Up, Main Body of Interview, Cool Off and Closure (Robson, 2002). I 
then prepared a schedule of questions that would provide a loose structure for the 
interview (Appendix 2).  For the Introduction section of the interview I would explain the 
purpose of the research and go through preliminary requirements such as the Interview 
Information Sheet and the Participant Consent Form, this would also serve to allow me to 
lead into the Warm Up questions which were generally phrased questions about the 
experience of the interviewee of the concepts surrounding Article 2. Although intended to 
be general open ended questions, I hoped that the responses to these general questions 
might provide some interesting scope for what Kvale called the “descriptions of the life-
world of the interviewee” (Kvale S. , 1994, p. 149). I divided the main body of the interview 
into sections and subsections covering the five standards as well as questions relating to the 
capacity of the organisation to undertake an investigation of a death involving elements of 
what Brodeur described as ‘high policing’ (Brodeur, 1983) and what Luna and Walker (2000) 
described as the ‘political will’ of the oversight agencies. I also selected some general 
questions as the Cool Off section that would cover the interviewees’ opinion as to whether 
the Article 2 standards were realistic and attainable and for the Closure section of the 
interview I would enquire as to whether the interviewee had any questions and explain the 
probable timescale for the completion of the research. 
3.5.2 Qualitative Sampling Issues 
Theoretically any oversight agency operating in a country that was a signatory to the ECHR 
could be evaluated to establish whether capacity existed to meet the Article 2 standards. I 
chose to examine three oversight agencies. These were the Office of the Police Ombudsman 
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for Northern Ireland (OPONI), the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) and 
the Garda Síochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) in the Republic of Ireland. The reasons 
for selecting these three agencies were due to their place in the evolution towards 
independent police oversight. All three agencies had the statutory power to independently 
investigate deaths involving the police. As such each had arguably reached the ‘end game’ 
of the evolution of policing accountability mechanisms and were intended to be capable of 
Article 2 compliance in investigation. There were other, primarily pragmatic factors in the 
selection of these agencies, such as my previous experience of the organisations, their 
geographical proximity and their use of English as a primary operating language, but the 
main factor in their selection was their ability to independently investigate deaths involving 
the police.  
For the qualitative phase of the research the population that I wished to study were those 
people within the rank structures of the organisation that may be called upon to ‘lead’ the 
investigations into deaths involving the police. Although the terminology and titles differed 
across the organisations these people could be referred to as senior investigators (SIs). The 
definition of a senior investigating officer when used in policing terms is: 
“The lead investigator of a serious crime [who] makes the principal decisions within a 
serious crime investigation and takes primary responsibility for its outcome” (Smith & 
Flanagan, 2000, p. 12). 
This can be readily adapted to police oversight terms when it is considered that an 
investigation into a death involving the police is equitable to a serious crime investigation.  
The next sampling issue was how I would select which SIs that I would interview. In order to 
get a representative sample, the approach necessarily differed across each of the 
organisations. This was due to the fact that each of the oversight agencies was of a different 
size and structure and had a different number of SIs. The approach was also made more 
difficult by the fact that each of the organisations were in a period of flux in that all three of 
the agencies ran both promotion and recruitment campaigns over the life time of the 
research meaning that the population of SIs in the oversight bodies remained in flux.  
In GSOC over the course of the research there were only seven SIs in their staff structure. 
Although I was aware that a large sample size was not always necessary due to the 
“information rich” nature of qualitative interviews (Holloway, 1997, p. 142) and that the 
ideal sample size for a qualitative study was instead one that “adequately answered the 
question” (Marshall, 1996, p. 523) I considered the population of senior investigators in 
GSOC was relatively small and therefore I was able to interview all of them thus allowing me 
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to study the “complete population” (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 7). In OPONI at the time the 
interviews were conducted there were 18 investigators holding the rank of Senior 
Investigator or Deputy Senior Investigator. Again I considered that this was not an 
unreasonable number of interviewees and I attempted to interview the entire population. 
Of the 18, two declined to be interviewed and two were unavailable through leave or 
sickness which meant that I was able to conduct interviews with 14 or 77.77% of the 
population within OPONI. The IPCC presented different difficulties. OPONI and GSOC are 
based over relatively small geographical areas and the distances involved presented no real 
difficulties in attending their offices for interviews. The IPCC, however, cover a much wider 
area and at the time of conducting the interviews had offices in Sale, Cardiff, Wakefield and 
London and were in the process of opening a fifth office in Warrington. It also has a much 
larger staff than the other two organisations with over 400 employees of which around 100 
are investigators. 
Financial and time constraints meant that I would be unable to attend at all of the sites; 
however, I was aware that each of the offices could present a different environment in 
which to gather data. I elected then to interview as many of the SIs as I could in three of the 
IPCC offices, Cardiff, Sale and London. I did this knowing that if I was to interview too small a 
sample I risked being unable to make “statistical generalizations” (Kvale S. , 1994, p. 164) . I 
selected these offices as when attempting to arrange the interviews I discovered that the 
highest number of senior and deputy senior investigators would be present on the days 
selected for interviews. As a result I was able to interview nine senior investigators from the 
IPCC across the three offices. I was conscious that if these interviews did not garnish the 
necessary degree of “saturation” in that “new interviews are conducted to a point where 
further interviews yield little new knowledge” (Kvale S. , 1994, p. 165) I could return to the 
population at a later date and arrange further interviews although this would prove to be 
unnecessary.   
Organisation OPONI IPCC GSOC 
Total Number of SIs 18 22* 7 
SIs Interviewed 14 9 7 
Percentage 77.77% 40.90% 100% 
Table Three: Percentage of Senior Investigators Interviewed *This is the total number of SIs in three IPCC offices 
at London, Sale and Wakefield. 
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My approach to the sampling of the senior investigators was different then in each of the 
three organisations. Using Marshall’s typology of the three sampling models as 
convenience, judgemental and theoretical (Marshall, 1996, p. 523), the sampling model for 
the three organisations was aligned to the convenience model. This was particularly so for 
the IPCC. I was aware that convenience sampling of a population could be considered as the 
least rigorous but I was restricted by time and financial constraints and the difficulties of 
attempting to examine a population that by its nature was reactive and fluid to the 
demands of its role. In making these decisions I was buoyed by Marshall’s guideline that 
“qualitative sampling usually requires a flexible, pragmatic approach” (Marshall, 1996, p. 
524) and upon analysis of the data I was satisfied that I had managed to gather qualitative 
data that was representative of each of the three organisations and that could build towards 
answering the aims of the research. 
3.5.3 Ethics 
In considering the ethical concerns in relation to the research I considered various sources 
of guidance in dealing with research in an ethical manner. I considered the ethical guidelines 
of the British Society of Criminology website and the Ethical Self Assessment Form provided 
by Portsmouth University as well as reading the academic literature on the subject. 
Considering Bryman’s discussion of the topic I considered that there was no danger of 
physical harm to the participants in the research and any risk of loss of self esteem or stress 
would be negligible (Bryman, 2001) . The next issue was one of ensuring that informed 
consent had been given by all participants. Upon the advice of the Research Ethics 
Committee for Portsmouth University I drafted a Participant Information Sheet (See 
Appendix 3) which set out the voluntary nature of participation, the purposes of the 
research, the safeguards around any data gathered. Each interviewee was also required to 
complete a Consent Form (See Appendix 4) which indicated that they had been provided 
with the information sheet, had given voluntary consent for their participation and agreed 
to being audio recorded and quoted verbatim in the research. Although I was aware that 
there is no “legally recognised privilege of confidentiality” in research (Hagan, 2003, p. 43) I 
was able to provide the assurance that I would endeavour as far as possible to keep the data 
obtained in the study confidential but that the confidentiality could be breached should I 
discover significant malpractice or on foot of a legal or moral obligation. I also assured the 
SI’s that they would each be allocated a code made up of SI and a two digit number and that 
any quotations in the thesis would be referenced to this code and not by their identity. Due 
to the small number of SIs in GSOC extra care had to be taken in the selection and 
presentation of direct quotations to avoid inadvertently identifying their author. The 
research was considered by the Ethical Approvals Committee and approval was granted. 
This was later confirmed in writing on the 25th of April 2013 (See Appendix 8).   
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3.5.4 Reflection on Interviews 
Upon reflection the interviews conducted for the research went well. I made the choice to 
interview in the workplace of the interviewee and arranged for a room to be set aside for 
this purpose. I avoided using the actual office of the interview subject where possible to 
promote a more comfortable atmosphere. I digitally recorded each interview and chose to 
take as few notes as possible to avoid the disruptive practice of writing extensively and 
instead listen to the interviewees responses (Bachman, 2003).  
Another issue that had to be considered was the impact of my own role as an oversight 
Senior Investigator on the research being undertaken. As previously stated I had 
commenced my oversight career with OPONI and at the time of the research I was 
employed with GSOC. I was therefore conscious that my status as a practitioner researcher 
may serve to skew the responses I would obtain from the interview subjects. As such I 
attempted to leave my conceptual baggage (Coy, 2006) behind to present a neutrality 
towards the issues under examination in the interviews and allow the subject to express and 
expand upon their own viewpoint (Fox, Martin, & Green, 2007). Although I knew all of the 
interview subjects within GSOC and a number of the subjects within OPONI the interviews in 
the IPCC were conducted with senior investigators that I had not previously met. I could 
therefore be more confident that my role as practitioner researcher was less likely to affect 
their responses but I also tailored my introduction to these interviewees to encourage both 
their engagement with the interview and a strong “interviewer-participant” relationship 
(Knox & Burkard, 2009, p. 569).  
The interviews ranged in length from around 35 minutes to an hour and twenty minutes but 
on average an hour was sufficient to explore the themes but not make unreasonable 
demands on the interviewees (Robson, 2002). Several of the interviewees had ‘on call’ 
responsibilities so it was common for interviews to be interrupted by mobile telephone calls 
or visitors to the interview room in relation to active and ongoing investigations. Although 
this may have interrupted the flow of the interview on some occasions it provided a brief 
respite to allow me to take stock and refocus the interview where necessary.  
Upon reflection on the research undertaken, the aim of the research was perhaps too 
ambitious as it required a larger commitment of time and resources than perhaps focussing 
on a single oversight agency or a single element of the article 2 standards may have 
required and by the end of the interview process I had conducted thirty interviews, in five 
offices, in four different countries, across three oversight agencies. As referenced above the 
ambitious scale of the research also meant that the results of the quantitative research 
phases undertaken are not reported in this thesis.   
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3.5.5 Transcription 
Conscious of the depth and range of the approaches and methodology of transcription 
referenced in the various literature on the topic (Ochs, 1979; Greene, Franquiz, & Dixon, 
1997; Jaffe, 2000; Duranti, 2007) I chose to align my approach to the transcription of the 
interviews to two descriptions that I had found in the literature. The first was a description 
by Davidson of a process that was “theoretical, selective, interpretive, and representational” 
(Davidson, 2009, p. 37) and the second by Rapley (Rapley, 2001) which proposed that the 
question that prompted the response was as important as the response itself thus 
emphasising both text and context. In following these two descriptions I sought to use the 
transcription process as a pre-analysis phase and as I transcribed the thirty interviews and 
listened repeatedly to the interviews, I made notes of common themes and issues, use of 
language and phraseology and other pertinent elements that flowed through the interviews. 
I transcribed as closely as possible to the spoken word including pauses and verbal 
inflections where appropriate, however, due to the predilection of some senior 
investigators to discuss actual investigations of cases I chose not to transcribe any response 
that could serve to identify the interviewee or contained a reference to an actual 
investigation. The transcription process was long but necessarily so and at its conclusion I 
had produced thirty transcripts each of several thousand words that accurately reflected the 
scope and scale of the interviews with hopefully as little as possible having been “lost in 
transcription” (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 622).  
3.5.6 Analysis 
The data gathered in the qualitative interviews was to be used in two ways. Primarily the 
mixed methods research was to be “qualitatively driven” (Mason, 2006, p. 9) with the rich 
experiential data provided by the interviewees to make up the bulk of the findings of the 
research. For this reason I felt that the analysis of the interview transcripts leaned more 
towards the “imaginative work of interpretation” rather than “coding, indexing, sorting, 
retrieving or otherwise manipulating data” (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 6). In analysing the 
data I used a grounded theory approach defined as “the discovery of theory from data 
systematically obtained from social research” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 2) and examined 
the transcripts for the messages that emerged and then attempted to ‘code’ them. I 
followed the methodology put forward by Wincup (Wincup, 1997; Noakes & Wincup, 2004) 
and read through the transcripts firstly highlighting themes as they emerged from the data 
and then secondly focusing on these themes in a more detailed way. To assist me with this 
analytical process I created a matrix (see Appendix 7) based on the semi structured 
interview schedule which allowed me to classify each of the interviews by way of responses 
to the areas explored in a simplistically general way under the categories of ‘mostly 
negative’, ‘mostly positive’ and ‘neutral’. This was to be used as the first layer of analysis 
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and the matrix incorporated a section to capture emerging themes and recurrent language 
or emphasis. Following this I revisited all of the interviews and selected the sections that 
either best evidenced the emerging themes or made points directly relevant to the aims of 
the research. In doing so I was mindful of Kvale’s warning against reading the interview 
material like “the devil reads the Bible” (Kvale, 1983, p. 190) and not selecting and 
interpreting the data in a preconceived or prejudiced fashion but instead presenting the 
research findings in a fair and unbiased fashion.  
The findings of the research are set out in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Four: Article 2, the Five Standards of the Positive Obligation and the 
Europeanization of Human Rights 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a critical analysis of the origin and evolution of the five standards of the 
effective investigation of a death involving the police derived from the right of life under 
Article 2 of the ECHR. The analysis will draw on both jurisprudence in the form of ECtHR case 
law regarding deaths involving the police and the academic literature. The chapter will 
introduce the European Convention and the right to life under Article 2. It will then map the 
development through the jurisprudence of the ECtHR of the positive procedural obligation 
on all signatories to the Convention to hold an effective investigation into any police 
involved death and the five standards that define an effective investigation. The chapter will 
examine each of the five standards of independence, adequacy, promptness, public scrutiny 
and victim involvement outlining both the relevant literature and jurisprudence in relation 
to the concepts. These standards will later form the focus of the research undertaken in 
each of the policing oversight agencies. The articulation of these standards as guidelines 
produced by the European Commissioner for Human Rights will also be examined. The 
chapter will then outline issues in relation to the practical application of the five standards 
in European jurisdictions and explore how and to what extent the application of Article 2 in 
the ECtHR has caused what has been referred to as the ‘Europeanization’ of human rights as 
common standards migrate from state to state.  
4.2 The European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention for the Protection on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(the ECHR) was signed on the 4th of November 1950 by representatives of thirteen 
countries24 (Modinos, 1962; Bates, 2011) and entered into force on the 3rd of September 
1953. The ECHR created a “a binding international code of human rights, with safeguards 
against abuses of power and effective remedies for victims of violations by Contractive 
States” (Lester A. , 2011, p. 99). Convention provisions include the right to life (Article 2), the 
prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3) and the 
right to privacy (Article 8) (Spielmann, 1999, p. 757). The articles are not merely a list of the 
entitlements of citizens protected by the ECHR but represent a “challenge to states to 
promote the realization or enjoyment of those rights” (Ackerly & Cruz, 2011, p. 3). The 
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 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Saar, 
Turkey and the UK signed on the 4
th
 of November 1950. Greece and Sweden signed on the 8
th
 of November.  
63 | P a g e  
 
Convention has since been ratified by all forty seven25 member states of the Council of 
Europe (Hathaway, 2007) and it is estimated that over 800 million people fall under its 
protection (Harris, O'Boyle, Bates, & Buckley, 2009). 
The ECHR was the first international instrument to “aspire to a broad range of civil and 
political rights both by taking the form of a treaty legally binding on its High Contracting 
Parties and by establishing a system of supervision over the implementation of the rights at 
the domestic level” (Gomien, 2000, p. 6). To that end Article 34 of the ECHR creates the 
right of “any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be 
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this 
Convention” to bring a petition before the ECtHR. The right of individual petition has been 
described as “one of the most effective means of protecting human rights” (Gomien, 2000, 
p. 142) and as the “Crown jewel of the Convention” (Christoffersen, 2011, p. 182). Only 
two26 inter-State applications have reached the ECtHR for determination (Mowbray, 2004); 
and it has been argued that countries take little interest in human rights violations in other 
countries unless they or their citizens are affected (Neumayer, 2005). The ECHR is clearly 
then not as concerned with mutual relations between member states as it is about the 
protection of citizens from their own governors (Hathaway, 2007). Indeed its articles 
“proclaim solemn principles for the humane treatment of the inhabitants of the 
participating States” (Mowbray, 2005, p. 60) and act as a conscience (Christoffersen & 
Madsen, 2011) or a “constitutional bill of rights” for Western Europe  (Kruger, 2000, p. 4). It 
is purported that the system of protection afforded by the ECHR and the ECtHR has now 
embedded in western European legal culture (Bates, 2010) and is the cornerstone of 
transnational protection of human rights (Hennette-Vauchez, 2011).  
4.2.1 “A Law Making Treaty”27 
The evolution of the ECHR has occurred through the ECtHR’s role as a transnational 
constitutional court, addressing cases where individual breaches of rights enshrined in the 
convention are alleged against member states (Harris, O'Boyle, Bates, & Buckley, 2009). 
Once a member state has been found in breach, the state is obliged to remedy the cause of 
the breach and the Court’s judgements have caused significant changes in state practices 
(Shapiro, 2002) such as legislative amendments and administrative reform (Moravcisk, 
2000).  In cases brought before the ECtHR, in which a breach is alleged, the interpretation of 
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 Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine and the UK. 
26
 Cyprus v Turkey (2002) 35 EHRR 731 10 May 2001; Ireland v UK A.25 (1978) 2 EHRR 25 
27
 Golder v UK A 18 (1975); 1 EHRR 524 PC citing Wemhoff v FRG A 7 (1968) p 23; 1 EHRR 55 at 75 
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the Convention is governed by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
1969, which states that a treaty, “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.” This indicates a ‘teleological’ approach to interpretation which can be 
defined as an approach that seeks to realize the object and purpose of the Convention as an 
effective instrument of human rights protection (Bates, 2010; VanHoof & VanDijk, 1998). 
Voeten contends that the reality of judicial interpretation of abstract rights issues allows 
“judges to create compounds brewed from a motley crew of ingredients including legal text, 
statutes, precedent, judge’s policy preferences, judges’ perceptions of what society values, 
and collegial norms” (Voeten, 2011, p. 61).  
In the landmark case of Golder28 the Court outlined the teleological approach to 
interpretation of the Convention stating that it was necessary:  
“... to seek the interpretation that is most appropriate in order to realize the aim and 
achieve the object of the treaty, and not that which would restrict to the greatest 
possible degree the obligations of the parties.” 
 In another case29, the Court stated that the Convention must be treated as a “living 
instrument” and “interpreted in light of present-day conditions” and “be influenced by the 
developments and commonly accepted standards” of the member States. Harris et al., state 
that this means that the ECHR is given a dynamic or evolutive interpretation where the 
determinative standards are those currently accepted in European society and not those 
prevalent when the Convention was adopted (Harris, O'Boyle, Bates, & Buckley, 2009). 
Harris et al., (2009) also suggest an almost cyclical approach in that the Court will look to the 
prevailing human rights standards of the member states and indeed towards other 
international human rights treaties and other human rights institutions such as the United 
Nations, thus increasing the potential for a uniformity of approach in human rights issues30. 
For example in one case involving a fatal shooting by agents of the state the Court made 
reference to the “United Nations Force and Firearms Principles” (United Nations, 1990) and 
the “United Nations Principles on Extra-Legal Executions” (United Nations, 1989) in 
assessing the security operation that led to the death31.   
It can be argued then that as the European Court’s decisions influence the common law of 
human rights across Europe, the increased awareness and compliance of human rights can 
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in turn then influence the ‘consensus’ of European human rights standards taken into 
account by the court when interpreting the application of the Convention treaty. This means 
that the Court takes cognizance of evolving national and supranational architecture for the 
protection of rights and therefore avoids applying 1950’s standards, becoming a “formalistic 
anachronism” (Mowbray, 2005, p. 63) or a “bar to reform or improvement”32 and instead 
ensures the Convention remains a dynamic doctrine (Madsen, 2011) whose guarantees are 
“more than illusory and empty rhetoric” and are “effective and tangible” (Wildhaber, 2011, 
p. 213). This demonstrates the ability of Human Rights Law to initiate process, dialogue and 
debate which over time changes common held beliefs and standards and in turn raises the 
ethical temperature of the state (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007).  
In relation to the research undertaken here the practical application of the standards of an 
effective investigation as evolved in the European court will be examined to establish to 
what stage the procedural architecture of each of the states i.e. the policing oversight 
agencies has evolved. This is particularly relevant when, as has been argued above, the 
European court will consider the normative standards in its member states when judging 
applications before it. First though the evolution of the positive procedural obligation and 
the standards of an effective investigation will be explored.   
4.2.2 Positive Obligations 
The Court of Human Rights’ evolutive interpretation of the ECHR has developed significant 
positive obligations upon state parties which require the state to undertake specific 
affirmative steps (Mowbray, 2004) as opposed to restricting the actions of the state in 
respect of its subjects. It can be argued that the creation of positive obligations under the 
Convention involves the ECtHR interpreting the Convention in such a way as to create a new 
right that was not intended for inclusion when the treaty was drafted. However, one can 
also view the positive obligations under the Convention that have developed since its 
adoption as “the discovery of obligations that were always implicit in the guarantees 
concerned or as the addition of new obligations for states” (Harris, O'Boyle, Bates, & 
Buckley, 2009, p. 8). Compliance with these positive obligations requires more from a State 
than mere passivity (Mowbray, 2005). Indeed the burden on the State is not in recognising 
and respecting the rights of its citizens but instead in “fostering of the enabling conditions of 
rights enjoyment” (Ackerly & Cruz, 2011).  The positive obligations are seen as the defining 
element of the ECHR which set it apart from other human rights instruments (Starmer, 
2001). The foundation of the positive obligations are that they seek to ensure that the 
Convention rights and freedoms are applied in ways that are practical and effective 
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(Mowbray, 2005) and not “theoretical or illusory”33. The principle of effectiveness was first 
established in the case of Marckx v Belgium34 and has since been used in the development 
of many different positive obligations including those under Article 2 of the Convention. One 
of the questions to be addressed by this research is how the evolution of this positive 
obligation of the ECHR through the ECtHR is ultimately implemented by practitioners in 
member states to ensure compliance with the object and purpose of the Convention. 
4.3 Article 2, the Right to Life and the Positive Obligation 
Article 2 (1) of the ECHR, the right to life, imposes three different obligations on the state. 
The first of these is the ‘negative duty’ to refrain from taking a life except in the restricted 
circumstances set out in Article 2(2) which states that it will not be considered a breach of 
Article 2 where a state deprives someone of their life using force which is no more than is 
absolutely necessary in defence of someone from unlawful violence, in order to effect a 
lawful arrest or prevent the escape of someone lawfully detained or in action lawfully taken 
for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. Article 2(1) also imposes the positive duty 
on the state to take steps to protect the lives of their subjects for example in relation to 
detained persons or hospital patients. Finally, as Mowbray stated the jurisprudence in 
relation to Article 2 of the ECHR has created a “category of procedural obligations requiring 
effective official investigations into killings ... with the objective of securing effective respect 
for the right to life” (Mowbray, 2005, p. 77).  Thus the Convention imposes a further 
‘positive’ or ‘procedural’ obligation on its signatories to “properly and openly to investigate 
deaths for which the state might be responsible” (Lester, Pannick, & Herberg, 2009, p. 
4.2.4).  
The purpose of the investigation into a state caused death has been considered by Lord 
Bingham35 as follows: 
“The purposes of such an investigation are clear: to ensure so far as possible that the 
full facts are brought to light; that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and 
brought to public notice; that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is 
allayed; that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified; and that those who 
have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons 
learned from his death may save others.”  
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Or as Baroness Hale 36succinctly noted:  
“There is not much point in prohibiting police and prison officers... from taking life if 
there is no independent investigation of how a person in their charge came by their 
death.” 
The Bingham explanation emphasises both the accountability and regulatory aspects of the 
investigation in that it calls those responsible to account but also serves to regulate against 
further occurrences and to reassure the public as to the status quo. Mowbray sees a further 
regulatory purpose for the creation of the effective investigative obligation in that it is 
designed to “buttress the express right to life enshrined in Article 2 by deterring public 
officials from carrying out unlawful killings through the fear of subsequent inquiry” 
(Mowbray, 2005, p. 77). The creation of the positive procedural obligation to investigate 
deaths caused by state agents and the ensuing expectation that an effective and thorough 
investigation will always follow a state caused fatality should then act to deter state agents 
from using excessive force, acting outside of their powers towards their citizens or acting in 
neglect of a duty of care.  
The European jurisprudence relating to Article 2 is considered to be “the most coherent 
body of Strasbourg law” (Mowbray, 2002, p. 448) and also amongst “the richest and most 
dynamic” in all of the ECtHR’s case law (Interights, 2008, p. 1). The jurisprudence has 
established that compliance with the procedural obligations of Article 2 requires “a 
thorough, diligent and comprehensive inquiry conducted in a prompt and expeditious 
manner in which the victim’s relations may participate, carried out by a body independent 
of the persons implicated in the events and in manner guaranteeing sufficient public 
scrutiny.”37 Whilst the Court does not specify the procedures, practices or processes that 
are necessary to ensure compliance with Article 2 nor does it dictate that the obligations 
should be the remit of a single “unified procedure”, the Court does identify the crucial, 
indispensable features necessary “for maintaining public confidence in the rule of law and 
helping prevent suggestions of official collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts” (Interights, 
2008, p. 37). 
The case of McCann v UK 38 has been described as “seminal” (Chevalier-Watts, 2010, p. 
702), a “landmark decision” (Palmer, 1996, p. 1) and as representing a “sea change” (Ní 
Aolain, 2002, p. 574) in the consideration of Article 2 cases. Although the issue of effective 
investigation had been considered in other jurisdictions39 the case of McCann is widely 
                                                          
36
 Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74, [2009] per Baroness Hale at [76] 
37
 McCann and Others v United Kingdom (1995)(Appl. No18984/91, 27
th
 September 1995) at para 161 
38
 McCann and Others v United Kingdom (1995)(Appl. No18984/91, 27
th
 September 1995) 
39
 Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (1988) Inter American Court of Human Rights July 29, 1988 
68 | P a g e  
 
credited as being the first European case that articulated the procedural obligation on a 
state to carry out an effective investigation following a death caused by agents of the state 
(O'Neill A. , 2009). Surprisingly, perhaps, but the consideration of the actual investigation 
into the deaths by the courts could be considered in hindsight as modest. In McCann v UK 
the court was required to examine the circumstances around the fatal shooting by British 
soldiers in Gibraltar of three IRA members. In their judgement the court held that while the 
use of fatal force in itself did not constitute a breach of Article 2: 
“ lack of care in terms of evaluating and providing information to the soldiers 
involved in the shooting and the failure to allow for other contingencies was held not 
to be in conformity with Article 2” (O'Neill, 2009, p. 313).  
In relation to state investigation into the deaths, Chevalier-Watts (2010, p. 704) has noted 
that by the time the application was heard, a public inquest had already taken place into the 
deaths “where the applicants, the deceased’s relatives had been provided with legal 
representation, and the killings were the subject of detailed scrutiny, including examination 
and cross examination of key personnel.” The ECtHR confined itself to noting that a: 
“general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the State would be 
ineffective, if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of 
lethal force by State authorities” and that Article 2 “requires by implication that there 
should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been 
killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State” (Interights, 
2008, p. 70).  
The Court did not go so far as to outline the form that any such investigation should take40 
and did not find a breach of the procedural obligation despite the applicant’s criticism of the 
investigation into the deaths and the coronial process. Instead, the Court took what has 
been seen as a pragmatic approach in considering the “novel concept” of the effective 
investigation principle (Chevalier-Watts, 2010, p. 706).  
Nevertheless, once the duty on a State to undertake an effective investigation into the 
death of a subject was established by the ECtHR a series of cases followed that built upon 
the protections (Ní Aolain, 2001) of the judgement in McCann to augment and develop the 
principles of effective investigation, broaden the circumstances in which the obligation 
arises and to ultimately define five constituent standards necessary for compliance with 
Article 2 (Mowbray, 2004). 
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4.4 The Evolution of the Standards of an Effective Investigation 
If the McCann case is seen as the watershed moment in which the positive procedural 
obligation began to evolve, several other key cases can be considered as major evolutionary 
steps. In Ergi v Turkey 41 the ECtHR found that the investigation into a death following a 
security forces operation had failed to take statements from the victim’s family and other 
significant witnesses and had failed to examine the planning of the operation. The Court 
found that there had been a breach of Article 2 in relation to the procedural obligation thus 
emphasizing the “shift in jurisprudence towards stringent accountability at all stages of an 
operation, not just prior to the death of the individual” (Chevalier-Watts, 2010, p. 706). In 
Kaya v Turkey 42 the Court held that for investigations to satisfy the requirements of the 
positive obligation under Article 2, they must be “genuinely rigorous, and not merely 
ritualistic charades” (Mowbray, 2011, p. 132). 
In 2001 the ECtHR delivered judgement in four cases frequently referred to as the 
“conjoined cases” (Chevalier-Watts, 2010, p. 710); Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom43, Kelly 
and Others v United Kingdom44, McKerr v United Kingdom45 and Shanahan v United 
Kingdom46. The ECtHR attempted in these judgements to combine and consolidate the 
elements of the procedural obligation and to set out a blueprint for the effective domestic 
investigation of state caused deaths. The Court acknowledged that the investigations had to 
be “capable of leading to a determination of whether the particular use of force was 
justifiable in the circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those 
responsible” (Chevalier-Watts, 2010, p. 711). The judgements also found a violation of 
Article 2 where there was a lack of independence of the officers investigating the death 
from the officers involved in the incident itself. The judgement in the Jordan case found 
specifically that even though the investigation was supervised by an independent police 
monitoring authority, this did not provide a sufficient independent safeguard for compliance 
with Article 2. The Court held that there must be “hierarchical, institutional and practical 
independence” between those responsible and those investigating the death (O'Neill M. , 
2009, p. 313).  In the Kelly judgement the court held that the family of the deceased had 
been disadvantaged by lack of access to the evidence, including witness statements, prior to 
their appearance at the inquest. The Court held that the next of kin of the deceased had a 
right to participate in the proceedings and that the procedures adopted should be such to 
allow them to protect their legitimate interests. In the Jordan case, the family of the 
deceased were not informed of the reason why a prosecution of the persons responsible for 
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the death was not initiated. The Court also held that the failure to inform the family of the 
reasons behind the decision in circumstances where the independence of the decision may 
be in question was not conducive to public confidence and was not compatible with Article 
2. Finally, the Court imposed a requirement that the investigations be conducted in a timely 
manner. In the Kelly case a span of eight years from the death to the commencement of the 
inquest meant that the Court found that the investigation was neither prompt nor 
expeditious and that a violation of Article 2 had occurred. 
In relation to the elements of an effective investigation, the Court stated in the McKerr47 
judgement:  
“This is not an obligation of result but of means. The authorities must take whatever 
reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including 
inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an 
autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective 
analysis of clinical findings.”  
It is noted that this distinction means that lack of prosecution or a conviction does not 
automatically equate to a breach of the procedural obligation as long as the authorities 
have taken reasonable steps to investigate and secure evidence (Reid, 2007).  
Since the conjoined cases judgement the elements of an Article 2 compliant investigation 
have been considered and expanded in other European Court cases most importantly 
Ramsahai v the Netherlands 48 which represents the high watermark of Article 2 
jurisprudence and can be considered a significant case in the evolution of the effective 
investigation obligation. The case, which related to the fatal shooting of an armed man, 
found that a period of fifteen and a half hours before an independent agency commenced 
investigating the circumstances was sufficient to amount to breach of the Article 2 
requirements. Further failings identified were failure to test the officers’ hands for firearms 
residue, failure to conduct ballistic testing of the firearms, failure to undertake a 
reconstruction of the incident and failure to adequately photograph the injuries to the 
deceased. The interviewing of the police officers was also criticized on a number of fronts. 
The interviews took place three days after the shooting and this was deemed to be an 
excessive amount of time. Also, although there was no evidence to indicate that the 
members had colluded in their accounts, the investigation was criticised for failing to keep 
the officers separate following the incident. The Court also found that the subsequent 
involvement of an independent body in the investigation of a death was not sufficient to 
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remove the taint caused by enquiries initially being undertaken by the same force as the 
officers involved in the death.  
Although the Court has provided for the development of standards defining an effective 
investigation, the Court has stopped short of prescribing the nature and structure of any 
enquiry to allow for flexibility to be dictated by circumstance and the practical reality of the 
investigative apparatus of the member states. In Velikova v Bulgaria49 the court held that 
the degree of scrutiny required to satisfy the threshold of an effective investigation 
depended on the circumstances of the case and could not be reduced to a simple check list. 
The Court recognised that no simple investigative procedures criteria can be developed that 
will ensure an effective investigation in each case. The Court also recognised that each of 
the jurisdictions has different structures and capacity for investigating deaths. This means 
that a realistic approach must be taken in assessing the investigations undertaken but also 
that it falls to each state to ensure that mechanisms are in place to ensure that an effective 
investigation occurs into any incident involving state agents where a death occurs. The 
standards of an effective investigation developed over a relatively short period of time but 
were incrementally evolved over numerous ECtHR decisions. These were brought together 
by the European Commissioner for Human Rights in a document of significant importance to 
policing oversight which is outlined in the next section.  
4.4.1 The Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights  
In May 2008 the Commissioner for Human Rights conducted two expert workshops on 
police complaints mechanisms in which the principles of effective complaints investigations 
were identified and discussed. Representatives of the three oversight agencies subject of 
this research OPONI, GSOC and the IPCC all contributed to the workshops which explored 
best practice in complaints investigation (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008). Following 
this in 2009, the Commissioner for Human Rights published an ‘opinion’ document which 
articulated the principles of an effective ‘police complaints investigation’ as developed in 
the ECtHR in consideration of Article 2 and 3 of the ECHR (Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2009). It listed the five principles of an effective investigation as  
 independence,  
 adequacy,  
 promptness,  
 public scrutiny and  
 victim involvement.  
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The principles are designed to have a dual purpose, firstly “to ensure that an individual has 
an effective remedy for an alleged violation of Article 2” and secondly, “to protect against 
violation of these fundamental rights by providing an investigative framework that is 
effective and capable of bringing offenders to justice” (2009, p. 8). 
The principles were defined by the Commissioner as follows: 
“Independence: there should not be institutional or hierarchical connections between 
the investigators and the officer complained against and there should be practical 
independence; 
Adequacy: the investigation should be capable of gathering evidence to determine 
whether police behaviour complained of was unlawful and to identify and punish 
those responsible; 
Promptness: the investigation should be conducted promptly and in an expeditious 
manner in order to maintain confidence in the rule of law; 
Public Scrutiny: procedures and decision making should be open and transparent in 
order to ensure accountability; and 
Victim Involvement: the complainant should be involved in the complaints process in 
order to safeguard his or her legitimate interests.” (2009, pp. 8-9) 
It should be noted that while the language used in the Commissioner’s opinion refers to 
complaints and complainants the standards set out refer to the minimum standards 
expected when Article 2 or 3 is engaged as well as providing guidelines for the handling of 
complaints generally. 
4.5 The Five Standards of an Effective Investigation 
This section will deal with each of the five standards in turn and explore both the law, in 
terms of European and domestic jurisprudence and the relevant literature.  
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4.5.1 Independence 
Savage has noted that “Discourses of ‘independence’ permeate much of the debate and 
analysis of complaints systems and processes” (Savage, 2012, p. 2). Independence, however, 
is a simple aspiration that can sometimes be elusive to achieve, define or to measure 
(Lumina, 2006). Indeed the main difficulty with establishing actual independence in an 
investigation is that independence is almost exclusively related to subjectivity. It appears 
more important that an investigation be seen to be independent through the background 
and identities of the personnel that undertake it rather than any attempt being made to test 
the quality of the investigation and the independence of the investigative decision making. 
Independent investigation of policing agencies by civilian agencies was a “controversial 
development” but one that can make “a major contribution to overcoming the problem of 
bias when police investigate the police” (Prenzler & Ransley, Preface, 2002). However whilst 
the concept that investigations into complaints against the police should be conducted by 
non police investigators may be “intuitively attractive” (Harris F. , 2012, p. 2)  as a “strategic 
issue in the emerging accountability model” (Ní Aolain, 2001, p. 37), Stone and Ward neatly 
capture the core of the issue asking:  
“Is it more important for the oversight body to be truly effective at identifying, 
investigating and punishing police misconduct? Or is it more important for the 
oversight body to be fully independent of the police organization?” (Stone & Ward, 
2000, p. 38).  
The perception of independence appears to be the solution proposed in many jurisdictions. 
It is suggested however that an independent investigation is one where all decisions are 
made on a fair and accurate assessment of the evidence without fear or favour and the 
reduction of the oversight issue to one of merely ‘who investigates?’ belies a more complex 
problem. Independence when reduced to this simplistic formula can be given 
disproportionate weight in the quest for effectiveness in investigation. It is important not 
only to reach the end game of independent investigation but also to “interrogate that ‘end 
game’” (Savage, 2012, p. 2) and assess the actual and practical independence of the 
investigation.  The independence of an investigation alone is not a magic wand that can 
bring about redress and police institutional reform (Neild, 2000); the investigations 
themselves must be able to withstand the scrutiny that they will no doubt attract.  
Whilst the ECtHR does not provide any simple steps as to how the investigating authority 
can achieve independence in the investigation of police involved death, it has been 
emphatic as to what does not amount to independence in an investigation. In Gulec v 
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Turkey50 an investigation into a fatal shooting in which the investigators were from the same 
police force as the gendarmerie officers who had fired the fatal shots and were also their 
hierarchical superiors was found to be in contravention of the procedural obligation of 
independence. In Kelly and Others v UK51 despite the investigation having been supervised 
by the Independent Commission for Police Complaints, the forerunner to OPONI, the court 
held that there was still sufficient proximity between the investigating body and those 
whose actions were under investigation to constitute a breach of the procedural obligation 
of independence. The Court went on to advocate the establishment of a “fully independent 
investigating agency [that] would help to overcome the lack of confidence in the system.52” 
The Ramsahai53 judgement sets the independence bar particularly high in that it was found 
that enquiries undertaken in a period of fifteen and a half hours by the same force as the 
police officers involved in the death were sufficient to amount to a breach of Article 2 and 
that the subsequent investigation by an independent body was not sufficient to remove the 
taint caused by the initial lack of independent inquiry. The Court, therefore, “demands a 
strict institutional independence of investigators from those state agents implicated in the 
killing” (Mowbray, 2004, p. 33). The judgments of the European Court would therefore serve 
to prevent the members of any police force from investigating a death caused by their 
colleagues. A degree of institutional separation has to be introduced in each European 
jurisdiction to allow for the independent investigation of deaths involving the police. 
4.5.2 Adequacy 
In considering the adequacy or otherwise of an investigation it should be noted that it has 
proven difficult to create a framework for the measurement of the quality of an 
investigation or of obtaining an accurate assessment of the investigative function (Tong, 
2009). Reiner suggests a move away from assessing the investigative process by its 
outcome, e.g. whether or not the investigation results in a criminal prosecution or 
conviction. Instead he stresses an emphasis on the quality of the processes involved in 
investigation (Reiner, 1998). This is resonant of the ECtHR’s comment that the responsibility 
to investigate state caused deaths involving the police was not one of results but one of 
means suggesting that a true evaluation of the adequacy of the investigations undertaken 
by police oversight agencies must look at the processes undertaken in the course of the 
investigations. Whilst it may be difficult to accurately assess the adequacy of an 
investigation it is easier to establish when an investigation has been inadequate through 
failure to perform key investigative steps or mismanagement. Smith (2009, p. 431), for 
example, cites the research into deaths in custody undertaken by Leigh et al. (Leigh, 
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Johnson, & Ingram, 1998) as revealing that some of the investigation reports following a 
death amounted to “no more than one side of paper”.   
One of the difficulties in assessing the investigative function is that a mystique has built up 
around the skills involved in investigating offences and investigation is variously classified as 
an art, a craft and a science (Repetto, 1978; Tong, 2009). This mystique serves to bolster the 
argument that only the police can investigate the police but it is far from agreed that 
criminal investigation requires skills that are solely within their gift (Bayley, 2009).  Police 
oversight agencies have experienced difficulties in hiring good quality investigators with the 
necessary skill sets to conduct complex investigations into incidents where death has 
occurred and most agencies have recruited former police officers who, it is argued, may 
have the necessary skills but not the independence of mind to challenge former colleagues 
or employers (Manby, 2000; Perez T. E., 2000).  Aside from identifying the skilled personnel 
necessary to conduct the investigations, it is also possible to identify other barriers that may 
exist that could prohibit or frustrate such investigations. The Christopher Commission 
following the LA Riots in response to the videotaped beating of Rodney King by LAPD 
officers found that the code of silence was “perhaps the greatest single barrier to the 
effective investigation and adjudication of complaints” (Christopher, 1991, p. 168).  Skolnick 
states that the “blue wall, curtain or cocoon of silence” is “embedded in police subculture ... 
across continents” (Skolnick, 2002, p. 7). This secrecy serves to protect officers from 
oversight and the demands of public accountability (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). The blue 
wall may extend beyond the silence of individual members; in deaths involving elements of 
covert surveillance, the use of informants, telephone intercepts and other methodology 
consistent with the ‘High Policing’ paradigm, the investigating body must be confident that 
they can access all the material that will allow them to properly assess the circumstances to 
investigate the death. This means that they have to have been provided with the legislative 
basis on which to gain access to the material, the ability to properly and safely receive and 
store the information and the skills to properly analyse it when received. It will be necessary 
in such cases for the investigative body to be able to look beyond the circumstances of the 
death itself but also to examine the wider context such as policing systems, training, 
equipment and standing orders that may have contributed to the occurrence. It is not 
enough to look at the narrow focus, for example, of the decision of an officer to use lethal 
force, in order to be adequate the investigation must examine the circumstances that led to 
the officer being in the position where force was required. “While officers make individual 
decisions about using deadly force during field encounters, preparing them for these highly 
challenging encounters is an organizational responsibility” (Morrison & Garner, 2011, p. 
342) or as Reiss suggested the police must be held accountable for all their actions and not 
just the final violent act or confrontation (Reiss, 1980).  
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Encounters between the police and the public are notoriously difficult to investigate and 
rarely lead to sanction or conviction. Newburn and Reiner identified a number of factors 
that contribute to the low substantiation rate of complaints including the low visibility of the 
incident that gave rise to the complaint, the lack of independent evidence and the fact that 
witness testimony is frequently restricted to that of the complainant and the officers 
complained of (Newburn & Reiner, 2004). Whilst some deaths involving the police could be 
considered ‘high visibility’ including for example firearms incidents that evolve into a siege 
situation, some police involved deaths such as deaths in custody take place almost entirely 
behind closed doors. The impact of these factors means that irrespective of who 
investigates the incident many are still left with a sense of grievance (Newburn & Reiner, 
2004). Another factor that Skolnick has identified as a barrier to conducting an adequate 
investigation is the disparity between the police and vulnerable elements of the population 
with which they interact. In relation to the allegations of excessive force Skolnick stated, “It 
is difficult to convict police who are accused of assaulting persons of low social character” 
(Skolnick, 2002, p. 13). Indeed Box and Russell purport that investigations into police 
misconduct can wilfully engage in what they term as the “politics of discredibility” and 
employ techniques such as stigmatising the complainant to prevent a finding against a 
police officer (Box & Russell, 1975, p. 321). These same methodologies could easily be used 
by those with nefarious intent in the investigation of a death to ensure that a negative 
finding against the police is unlikely.  
In its consideration of the principles of an effective investigation the ECtHR has not been 
prescriptive as to what steps have to be taken in an investigation in order to meet the 
requirement of adequacy. Each investigation into a death may present evidential 
opportunities unique to the circumstances in which the death occurred and the 
investigation process does not marry well with a ‘tick box’ approach. Clearly, the ECtHR does 
not wish to overly encroach upon the decision making of the domestic state’s independent 
investigators. Citing the cases of Gulec v Turkey54, Kaya v Turkey55  and Kelly and Others v 
UK56 Mowbray (2002, pp. 440-442) argues that the European Court “expects investigators to 
take reasonable steps to obtain full testimony from all primary witnesses”, to obtain 
evidence “through the utilisation of forensic science” and from “conducting a full autopsy of 
the deceased ... undertaken by experts who are versed in contemporary best practice ... and 
who will not overlook or inadvertently destroy irreplaceable samples.” 
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4.5.3 Promptness 
In assessing whether an investigation has been conducted in a timely fashion, the European 
Court will consider “the timing of the start of the investigation57, any delays in taking 
statements58 and the length of time taken during initial investigations59” (Open Society 
Justice Initiative, 2010).  The court held in McShane v United Kingdom 60 that, periods of 
unexplained delay within an investigation of a death could lead to a breach of Article 2. In 
that case the investigation took nineteen and a half months, the length of time in and of 
itself was not enough to constitute a breach but the unexplained periods of inactivity in the 
enquiry led to the conclusion that the investigation was not conducted with reasonable 
expedition; whereas in the case of Edwards v United Kingdom 61 due to the complicated 
nature of an enquiry, which included investigations across numerous public services and a 
large number of witnesses, three and a half years to conclude the proceedings was not held 
to be unreasonable.  
However, the issue of promptness or timeliness of an investigation is not as simplistic a 
measure as it may first appear. It may be difficult in fact to accurately ascertain as to when 
an investigation has actually commenced and when it can be said to have been completed 
and as, for example, some investigations may result in a criminal trial with the possibility of 
an appeal mechanism, followed by a Coronial inquest, the length of an investigation may be 
measured in years and not months. The ECtHR has established that the commencement of 
an investigation must be prompt and the state should not rely on the family of the deceased 
to complain in order for it to commence an investigation62. Therefore, there has to be a 
proactive mechanism to trigger the commencement of the investigation and the 
empowering of the investigative agency with the necessary statutory and other capacity to 
conduct the investigation. The ECtHR has also established that there should be ‘timeliness’ 
to individual aspects of the investigation, for example, that the interviewing of principal 
witnesses including potential suspects should be carried out expeditiously63. It has been 
acknowledged that police officers under investigation can deliberately draw out the gap 
between the incident under investigation and the provision of an account as part of a 
deliberate strategy to undermine the enquiry (Chemerinsky, 2000) and therefore the 
attempts to take early accounts must be robust and proactive. As has been noted, the 
responsibility for the conduct of elements of the investigation may fall to more than one 
agency. For example, an investigative agency may rely upon the services of the state 
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pathologist to conduct a post mortem and to provide a report that will ultimately be 
included in a file of evidence that will be sent to a prosecuting authority for a decision as to 
whether there is sufficient evidence to support criminal proceedings. The opportunity for 
delay does not lie within the control of a single agency and therefore it is more difficult to 
minimize. The court has recognised that the investigation of complex deaths may result in 
longer enquiries64. There is also recognition by the Court that what is required is a 
continuous effort or momentum in the investigation which avoids periods of inactivity or 
unwarranted delay65.  
4.5.4 Public Scrutiny 
The two remaining standards of public scrutiny and victim involvement are inherently linked 
and both were “designed to safeguard against the dangers of introducing introspective 
investigations leading to secret reports” (Mowbray, 2002, p. 442) in that the ECtHR 
demands that the decision making and findings of any enquiry into a death are made public. 
For many jurisdictions this represents a challenging move towards increased transparency 
which is seen as an essential element of accountability (Marenin, 2005; Koppell, 2005; 
Dryberg, 2003).  This can represent a significant shift as some areas of policing, such as the 
use of covert techniques and informants may not easily or comfortably be exposed to 
daylight. Lumina sees the provision of public information concerning the police as one of the 
most important functions of police oversight especially with regard to those police services 
historically seen to govern by secrecy (Lumina, 2006). This can provide a significant 
challenge for an oversight agency to find a balance between providing information into the 
public domain whilst maintaining the confidence of the police service that they investigate 
and also acting wholly within the law. 
There are two main avenues by which the investigation of a death is scrutinized by the 
public. The first is by way of a public hearing which can take various forms including a 
criminal trial, a coronial inquest or even a public disciplinary hearing and the second is by 
way of public reporting. It can be seen therefore, that control of the nature, form and 
processes of the public hearing lies elsewhere than with the policing oversight body tasked 
with the investigation. Additionally, such a hearing, irrespective of whether it may be 
adversarial or inquisitorial in nature, may involve a different intent or perspective than 
publicly airing the circumstances of the death. For example, in a criminal trial it might suit 
the defence of the accused to actively seek to repress information from being considered 
that would have been released in a coronial inquest. Also the family of the deceased in a 
criminal trial are not entitled to representation, whilst some European jurisdictions allow for 
representation in coronial proceedings to a range of interested parties. The purpose of the 
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public hearing must be considered and thought given as to whether it is sufficiently aligned 
to the intentions of Article 2, Hegarty has stated that the “demands for public inquiries are 
driven by a need for an accounting of the events and a desire to see the rule of law 
restored” (Hegarty, 2002, p. 1155).  
Whereas the investigating agency relinquishes control of the accounting of events in a 
public inquiry, they do retain control when publicly reporting the conclusions or findings of 
an investigation. Not all oversight bodies have a public reporting function included in their 
statutory powers and the accuracy or otherwise of the reports has been the subject of 
controversy and debate. What is required, however, is that the conclusions are aired and 
the public allowed to analyse and respond to the findings. This transparency plays an 
important role in the investigative oversight process mandated by the Article 2 
jurisprudence and it may encourage society to have renewed confidence in its policing 
arrangements and in the legal and judicial process following the trauma of a fatality 
(Hegarty, 2002). This allows for the investigative process to evolve through public review 
and criticism and allows for public and community commentary to influence the procedures 
under investigation (Blakely, 2012).  
4.5.5 Victim Involvement 
The European Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that the involvement of the 
victim, or in the case of a fatality the family of the victim, must be “meaningful and 
effectively applied and not empty and rhetorical” (2009, p. 14). When the police investigate 
a murder or a suspicious death they deploy a dedicated Family Liaison Officer or FLO to liase 
between the investigation and the family. Althought there are numerous ways in which 
those in charge of an investigation can liaise with a family, the FLO role has been adapted by 
some policing oversight agencies to liaise with bereaved families in line with the victim 
involvement principle. Family liaison has been described as a “moral or ethical 
responsibility” in an investigation (McGarry & Smith, 2011, p. 3). For many years the liaison 
between an investigation and the bereaved family of the victim lacked “a label”, “guidelines 
or specific training” (McGarry and Smith, 2011, p.3) and was seen as “an investigative task 
but not a specialism” (Grieve, 2009, p. 114). Both McGarry and Smith (2011) and Bending 
and Malone (2007) trace the evolution of family liaison in policing with reference to 
tragedies and scandals such as the Lockerbie air crash and the Marchioness disaster; an 
evolution closely aligned to what is referred to as reform by crisis (Roycroft, Brown, & Innes, 
2007). However, a “pivotal” (McGarry & Smith, 2011, p. 7) moment in the development of 
the role came from the report of Sir William Macpherson into the police investigation into 
the murder of Stephen Lawrence on the 22nd of April 1993 (Macpherson, 1999). The 
Macpherson report included six individual recommendations relating to family liaison. These 
recommendations established the FLO in murder investigations as a designated, dedicated 
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and trained role. The training would include racism awareness and cultural diversity 
(Macpherson, 1999) and placed a positive duty on Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) and 
FLOs to ensure the satisfactory management of family liaison and the provision of all 
possible information about the crime and the investigation. McGarry and Smith (2011, p7) 
credit the Macpherson report with creating the core principles of “openness and 
accountability” that “sit at the heart of family liaison work” and Grieve states that family 
liaison had a “deep significance to the whole Lawrence agenda” (Grieve, 2009, p. 113).  
However, the deployment of an ‘overt investigator’ into a bereaved family does present the 
risk that the family may feel more investigated than informed. Doreen Lawrence is quoted 
in the Home Affairs Committee report ‘The Macpherson Report: Ten Years On’ as stating 
that in her opinion FLOs “are more there to collect information and evidence rather than 
communicate to the family how the investigation is happening” (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee, 2009, p. 4).  
Research into the experience of families dealing with deaths by homicide (Malone, 2007), 
suicide (Wilson & Marshall, 2010), natural disaster (Kristensen, Wiersaeth, & Heir, 2010) and 
other mass fatalities such as terrorist attacks (Goodman & Brown, 2008) has developed our 
understanding of the needs of families bereaved in such circumstances. Wilson and Marshall 
cite the research of Clarke and Goldney (2000) and state that there is an increased 
recognition that people bereaved through suicide “grieve differently and have different 
needs from those bereaved through other modes of death” (Wilson & Marshall, 2010, p. 
626). The terms “traumatic grief” (Victim Support, 2006) or “traumatic bereavement” 
(Rynearson & McCreery, 1993, p. 132) are used to describe the “unique blend of trauma and 
grief” (Armour, 2002, p. 110) when the “sudden, unexpected and violent nature of death 
often leads to a more difficult course of bereavement” (Kristensen, Wiersaeth, & Heir, 2010, 
p. 138).  Victim Support found that “traumatic grief is complicated by involvement in the 
criminal justice system whose processes can inhibit and hamper grief reactions, and 
exacerbate feelings of rage and powerlessness” (Victim Support, 2006, p. 9). They identify 
specific needs that can arise following bereavement by homicide such as being informed of 
the death in a sensitive way and an ongoing need for support and crisis management. 
Failings in this regard by the criminal justice system such as “poor communication, 
insensitivity and lack of information” (Victim Support, 2006, p. 15) can serve to both 
exacerbate the traumatic experience and interfere with the grieving process. Several 
researchers (Brown, 1993; Riches & Dawson, 1998; Rock, 1998) have echoed Malone who 
stated “lengthy and often frustrating involvement in the criminal justice process can 
significantly disrupt and protract the grieving process, as well as fuelling some of the 
emotional difficulties” (Malone, 2007, p. 384). 
The challenge to civilian oversight bodies is to take the role of the FLO from the policing 
context and to apply it to their independent investigations into police caused deaths and 
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deaths in custody. Shaw and Coles argue that this has not been a good fit; echoing the 
earlier comments of Doreen Lawrence they state, “The role has not transferred smoothly 
into working with families bereaved by deaths in custody... The tension has given rise to 
families describing that they felt they were being investigated rather than the circumstances 
of their relative’s death” (2007, p. 59). Shaw and Coles’ research involved interviewing the 
families and reporting on their experiences following custody deaths. They state, “The role 
FLOs play in the aftermath of deaths in police custody is often confusing and at worst 
intrusive ... FLOs need a clearly delineated remit to avoid confusion about whether they 
perform an investigatory role” (Shaw & Coles, 2007, p. 60). They recommend that “those in 
family liaison roles need to be trained to understand the specific needs of families bereaved 
by deaths in custody” (2007, p. 61).  Shaw and Coles stated that half of the families 
interviewed felt that were not kept informed and concluded that the openness required 
under Article 2 was not being reached. There is potential for the role to produce a positive 
contribution to the family of the deceased. Eyre’s research into police FLOs identified that 
where family liaison works well the liaison officers can provide “support at a difficult time, 
being a professional conduit of information and making a difference” (Eyre, 2007, p. 3). Eyre 
also recognised, “the difference that good and effective family liaison work can make to the 
public’s perception and experience of professionalism and the police force” (Eyre, 2007a, p. 
333). The challenge to the oversight investigation agencies is to manage the liaison with 
families of the deceased to ensure their involvement to the standard requirement by the 
Article 2 jurisprudence. Later in this thesis the extent to which the oversight agencies have 
adopted the concept of involving the families of the deceased in investigations into deaths 
involving the police will be explored.  
4.5.6 The Practical Application of the Article 2 Standards  
The Article 2 standards are an international bench mark against which the investigation of 
state caused death can be judged. The ECHR has created a “set of nation transcending 
human rights ideals” (Levy & Sznaider, 2006, p. 659) which a citizen can use to assess the 
adequacy of state action in these circumstances and by extension the legitimacy of the state 
itself (Vaughan & Kilcommins, 2007). The European Court judgements have a dual role. They 
analyse the circumstances of the application brought before them and find whether a 
violation of an established right has occurred, but they also set the ‘objectives’ that each 
member state must aspire to for future compliance with the ECHR (Bruggeman, 2002). 
Reports such as that of the European Human Rights Commissioner represent a more 
positive step towards the integration of Human Rights in state policing oversight 
mechanisms (Alston & Weiler, 1999). 
Whilst it is accepted that a multi agency approach to the investigation of state caused death 
is neither prohibited nor criticized in the European judgements, the policing oversight 
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agencies have the front line responsibility for the commencement of the investigations into 
any death that occurs and may be ultimately held to the standards of the procedural 
obligation. Starmer has stated that, “Evidence of human rights breaches tends to be easier 
to find than evidence of human rights compliance” (Strarmer, 2007, p. 97). The challenge 
then is to examine the policing oversight models in each of the jurisdictions to assess how 
far each state has gone towards meeting the requirements and whether there are sufficient 
mechanisms in place for an effective investigation, as defined in the jurisprudence and the 
opinion of the Commissioner, to take place when the police are involved in an incident in 
which a death occurs.  Firstly, however, it is necessary to examine the process by which a 
standard set in the ECtHR in response to a contravention of the procedural obligation by a 
member state might migrate its way into the policy and practice of an oversight agency in 
the UK and Ireland.  
4.6 The ‘Europeanization’ of Human Rights 
The discussion of the Article 2 standards of an effective investigation into a death involving 
the police thus far has outlined the origin and evolution of the standards primarily within 
the context of the ECtHR and the opinion of the European Commissioner for Human Rights. 
A central concern of the thesis is whether these standards have a practical relevance to the 
investigation of deaths involving the police as conducted by the three oversight agencies 
that are the subject of this research. Bell and Keenan have stated that the process of 
incorporating the European jurisprudence on the procedural obligation into domestic 
arrangements “involves a fascinating completing of the circle” (Bell & Keenan, 2005, p. 72). 
The process is essentially a transfer of policy from the ECtHR to each of the ECHR signatory 
states. Bulmer and Padgett define this type of transfer as a “coercive form of transfer” in 
that the “hierarchical governance” of the Court of Human Rights exercises a “supranational 
authority” delivering judgements that redefine domestic “policy space” and then compelling 
its signatories to comply with the rulings of the court or risk sanction or expulsion (Bulmer & 
Padgett, 2004, pp. 104-105).  Bulmer and Padgett see the transfer by hierarchy as the most 
productive form of policy transfer in the European context noting that, “Court judgements 
have far-reaching potential for transforming public policy” and “Judicial rule making is rich 
in transfer potential” (Bulmer & Padgett, 2004, pp. 112-115). 
This transfer of European human rights policy to domestic states process has been referred 
to by Vaughan and Kilcommins as the “Europeanization of Human Rights” (Vaughan & 
Kilcommins, 2007, p. 437) by which they mean that “growing interconnectedness between 
European nations has produced an increasingly significant human rights discourse” and that 
this “Europeanization of Human Rights has had a significant impact on the development of 
oversight mechanisms” (Vaughan & Kilcommins, 2007, p. 440). However, this is not to 
suggest that the process is uniform across member states as the implementation of any 
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policy is reliant on each state’s legal and administrative processes and agencies (Menon & 
Weatherill, 2003). Therefore across the signatories of the European Convention given the 
different societies within which the police may enjoy varied roles and “modes of action” 
(Kaariainen, 2007, p. 410) different responses to the Article 2 obligations in the form of 
oversight mechanisms, processes and statutory instruments can be observed to have 
evolved.  
Europeanization has been given different definitions and can manifest itself in different 
ways (Olsen, 2002). A general definition is “domestic change caused by European 
integration” (Vaughan & Kilcommins, 2007, p. 444) whereas Risse et al., conceptualize 
Europeanization as: 
“the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance, that is of political, legal and social institutions associated with political 
problem solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy 
networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules” (Risse, 
Caporaso, & Green Cowles, 2001, p. 3).  
Borzel and Risse (2000, p. 1) state that two conditions must exist for expecting domestic 
change in response to Europeanization. Firstly, there must be an element of incompatibility 
between European processes, policies and institutions and the domestic level processes. 
This constitutes “adaptational pressures”. The second condition is that there must be 
“facilitating factors be it actors or institutions- responding to the adaptational pressures” 
(Borzel & Risse, 2000, p. 1). The ECtHR operates as a ‘Triadic’ Dispute Resolution Model in 
that a dispute between two parties is brought to a third party who “assists in finding or 
authoritatively determining, resolution of the dispute” (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 2004, p. 
247). Thus the ECHR identifies the ‘misfit’ between existing domestic practices and the 
international standards expected by the Court. Further, in the triadic dispute resolution 
model the decisions of the triadic dispute resolution mechanism can “contain materials for 
consolidating existing or building new, norms” (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 2004, p. 248). Also 
“the body of rules that constitutes normative structure steadily will expand, becoming more 
elaborate and differentiated; these rules then will feed back onto dyadic relationships 
structuring future interactions, conflict and dispute resolution” (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 
2004, p. 248). Therefore, the member states in incorporating the rulings of the ECHR into 
their domestic policies and institutions in the ‘adaptational process’ create a new structural 
norm within the state with the potential to decrease or prevent the need for resort to the 
ECtHR as the triadic model to identify breaches or contraventions of the Convention and 
instead work in closer alignment to the dyadic form of dispute resolution. 
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Borzel and Risse (2000, p. 10) argue that Europeanization can cause three different degrees 
of domestic change. These are “Absorption” in which member states experience a low 
degree of domestic change and European policies are incorporated into existing institutions 
without substantial modification, “Accommodation” in which the degree of domestic 
change is modest as member states adapt by patching on new processes onto existing ones 
without fundamentally altering their meaning and finally “Transformation” where member 
states replace existing policies, processes and institutions with new ones to the extent that 
there is a fundamental change in collective understandings at a domestic level (Borzel & 
Risse, 2000, p. 10).  These definitions of absorption, accommodation and transformation will 
be used later in the thesis to measure the scale or degree to which Article 2 has been 
adapted into the policing oversight jurisdictions under consideration.  
4.6.1 Measuring Europeanization in Relation to the Investigative Obligations under Article 
2                                      
The rulings of the ECtHR whilst binding have no automatic transformative effect on the 
states to which they apply (McBride, 2003) instead it falls to the state to take remedial 
action in relation to any breaches and to periodically report to the Council of Europe as to 
the nature and impact of any action taken. As has been seen above the state responsibility 
goes beyond getting its own house in order following an adverse finding. It is each state’s 
responsibility to recognise the aspirational nature of the standards set by the jurisprudence 
and work towards creating and maintaining structures that will allow future compliance. 
These structures in turn then have the opportunity to raise the ethical temperature of the 
state if they attempt to meaningfully engage with the human rights discourse and apply the 
standards objectively. Olsen has described two forms of change as “rule following” and 
“arguing and persuading” (Olsen, 2002, p. 927). In rule following change is normative driven, 
obligatory and quasi-mechanical following application of stable criteria to pre-defined 
situations, for example the following of clear instructions or obligations following a judicial 
ruling. In the second form of change, the underlying process is one of debate in which the 
common standards of truth and morals are argued and change occurs as the normative or 
factual beliefs change. There is a cyclical manner in which the European Courts take the 
ethical temperature of member states in reaching their judgements as to breaches of the 
convention, judgements which in turn may effectively raise the ethical ground temperature 
of the states themselves through the Europeanization of the impact of the judgements and 
allow for the creation of higher normative values within those states. It is also wholly 
possible, however, for the changes made by a state in compliance with either the finding of 
a breach of Article 2 or towards the aspirational objective setting of the ECtHR to be solely a 
cosmetic exercise.   
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This chapter has traced the evolution of the positive procedural obligation on a state to 
conduct an effective investigation into a death involving the police to the five standards 
developed by the ECtHR jurisprudence and subsequently elucidated by the European 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Consideration has also been given as to the 
Europeanization process by which these standards have migrated from the ECtHR to each of 
the signatory states to the Convention. The policing oversight agencies with which this 
thesis is concerned the IPCC, OPONI and GSOC have all been involved since their 
commencement in the investigation of deaths involving the police. This research will seek to 
assess whether they have the capacity to fully adhere to the positive investigative obligation 
and as to whether the decisions of the ECtHR in relation to the obligations have resulted in a 
practical application of the five standards in the investigations undertaken by each of the 
agencies. The next section will set out the findings of the qualitative interviews conducted 
with Senior Investigators in each of the oversight bodies.  
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Chapter Five: Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the findings from the interviews conducted with Senior Investigators 
(SIs) in OPONI, the IPCC and GSOC. In presenting the findings of the thesis I will first examine 
the knowledge and awareness of the Article 2 standards in each of the three organisations. I 
will then look at each of the five standards of the Article 2 procedural obligation in turn and 
present the findings of the qualitative interviews.  I will also outline the responses from the 
interviewees in relation to the ‘political will’ (Luna & Walker, 2000) of their respective 
organisations to investigate deaths involving the police and also examine the views of the 
SIs as to the capacity of their organisation to deal with deaths involving the police that may 
included elements of ‘high policing’ (Brodeur, 1983). To maintain the anonymity of 
interviewees, they have each been assigned an SI or Senior Investigator number when 
quoted. As discussed above, each of the organisations have differing rank structures and 
different titles to denote level of investigative or managerial responsibility. All of the 
persons interviewed, however, either have been or could at some time be called upon to act 
as lead investigator into a death following police contact.   
5.2 General Awareness of Article 2 and the Five Standards 
The interviews of SIs across all of the organisations revealed that they had almost 
universally a high level of experience in the investigation of deaths involving the police and a 
high level of awareness and understanding of the five procedural standards. Many of the 
investigators brought experience of Article 2 investigations from their previous careers in 
law enforcement agencies, primarily from careers as police officers. Several of the SIs 
displayed in depth knowledge of the topic and had direct experience of investigations in 
which Article 2 issues arose having been involved in the investigation of some of the most 
high profile police involved deaths in their jurisdiction. Almost without exception the SIs 
across each organisation displayed a serious consideration of the issues surrounding the 
investigation of police involved deaths. For example several of the SIs cited ECtHR cases 
which had led to the development of the positive obligation and outlined their impact upon 
the investigative processes of their respective oversight agency whilst others cited the 
statute that had incorporated the Human Rights Act into their jurisdiction. Although the 
level of knowledge in relation to Article 2 was high across most of the SIs a few SIs who 
came from a non European jurisdiction expressed concerns at their level of knowledge 
whilst simultaneously displaying a grasp of the issues at hand. The importance and 
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relevance of the Article 2 standards was expressed by SIs in each of the organisations. In 
OPONI SI14 described the Article 2 standards as “the bedrock of what we’re doing”, in GSOC 
SI17 described them as the “benchmark” of the investigation of deaths and in the IPCC by 
SI27 as being “at the heart” of what they do.  
The data from both the interviews would indicate therefore that a high level of knowledge 
and awareness of the Article 2 standards existed in each of three organisations. 
5.3 Independence 
There were similarities across each of the organisations in the way in which the SIs viewed 
and described their capacity to undertake independent investigations. Several distinctions 
were also revealed between the oversight agencies due to the differing remits and statutory 
frameworks. By way of example, within OPONI the Article 2 standards were primarily 
viewed through the filter of their experiences investigating ‘historic’ cases arising from the 
period known as the ‘troubles’. This meant that the issue of independence in investigation 
was not just an issue for incidents that could happen in the future but the independence of 
the investigative staff was viewed through the entirety of their careers to date.  
Independence was explained in several different ways by the SIs. An SI in OPONI SI04 
described independence as a “state of mind” and described the difficulties of keeping true 
to your own values and “having to balance the position you are in relation to the 
investigation versus what’s right and what’s wrong and come up with a balanced view now.” 
Independence was also frequently described in practical terms in terms of conducting 
investigative steps. In GSOC SI15 set out the investigative steps required to achieve 
independence: 
“...the analysis of the scene and the seizure of evidence, interviewing of key 
witnesses, meeting with the family concerned, etc., etc., trying to make sure as much 
as is possible, as much as is realistic, we, as in the Garda Ombudsman take control of 
that aspect...” 
This evidence based approach to independence was also elucidated by OPONI SI06: 
“... to me it is very simple, you are trying to find out what happened, you are trying to 
establish the facts, establish the evidence and if you focus on doing that the rest sort 
of falls into place as regards independence.” 
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Each of the three organisations had created on call response teams to deal with critical 
incidents such as deaths to ensure a prompt response to any incident and to enable the 
organisation to deal with the investigations independently. The on call functions of the 
three agencies then were specifically aligned to fulfilment of the Article 2 standards.  
5.3.1 The Value of Independence 
It was common across the three organisations for the SIs to assign significant value to their 
independence. In OPONI it was described by SI02 and SI06 in the same language as being, 
“at the heart of everything we do”. OPONI SI12 described staff being “focussed on ensuring 
the independence” and referred to a “drive by the people here to ensure that there is 
independence”. OPONI SI09 described the agency’s independence in the investigation of 
police caused deaths as being “critically important for our credibility, the confidence of the 
public and also the confidence of policing.” In the IPCC, SI30 discussed the considerable 
investigative effort employed in “ensuring our independence”.  
Several of the SIs across the organisations referenced that ‘independence’ formed part of 
the vision, mission or organisational architecture of their agency. In OPONI SI08 stated, “You 
know it says so on the door, ‘impartial, independent, investigation’, wholly independent role 
that goes down the middle.” In GSOC SI15 stated that there was “a very strong culture of 
independence within GSOC” and commented that it was represented by one of the three 
pillars that made up the organisational logo. IPCC SI24 described the importance of 
demonstrating the independence of an investigation into a death from the outset but also 
outlined the limits that could be placed on independence through resourcing: 
“There are always going to be elements of that independence that we can’t do, crime 
scene investigators, we don’t have our own so you have to rely on the force’s crime 
scene investigators and if you stick to the vehicle side, if it was a fatal road traffic 
collision we don’t have in house road traffic investigators, collision investigators so 
you have to rely on that resource as well. I think right from the start of any 
investigation to deem it as being independent and compliant with Article 2 you need 
to show that as an oversight body you have had a grip of that investigation right 
from the sort of onset.” 
This theme was also identified by SIs in GSOC who outlined that complete independence 
was difficult and that on occasions other resources had to be relied on. GSOC SI15 stated as 
follows:  
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“I’m not aware anyway of any jurisdiction that can claim to have full and total 
independence of this type of work ... There is a reliance on resources from other 
agencies and including the cops themselves. It doesn’t sit right with me if we were to 
take a purist view of Article 2 and what the courts lay down, the standards are, it 
wouldn’t sit right with me at all, but a pragmatic view which is the view I have to 
take in order to get the job done would be, I do what I can with the resources 
available to me and if it leaves me open to criticism for failings or whatever it might 
be then so be it.” 
5.3.2 The Nature of Independence 
Interestingly SIs spoke of independence as being an evolving process characterised by the 
ability to both ebb and flow. Several SIs spoke about the independence of their organisation 
improving or declining at identifiable stages in their history. By way of example the IPCC 
SI26 stated in relation to the investigation of deaths involving the police: 
“I think we’ve got better at investigating them independently. I still think we have 
problems where we haven’t got the expertise in certain areas where we have to use 
police resources but I think we’ve got much better at getting independent police 
resources to undertake those.” 
The SIs frequently described the independence of their organisation as a changeable and 
fluid entity. It was common for an SI to explain that their organisation had achieved varying 
degrees of independence throughout its existence. Practical independence was also not 
seen to be a passive value but instead was described in kinetic terms as a value that had to 
be “managed” SI01 or “proved” SI06. Independence was not then described in static, 
passive terms but instead was to be monitored and kept in positive balance. Independence 
was not achieved simply by the statutory framework of the organisation and its place on the 
scale from police internal investigation to civilian oversight. Instead maintaining 
independence required vigilance and monitoring.  
OPONI SI06 described the need to assert the agency’s independence: 
“I’m going out and meeting families and their legal representatives and 
intermediaries we would be very proactive in stressing to them that we do conduct 
independent, impartial investigations, we don’t take sides, we are evidenced based, 
we are independent from the police service and we are there to really answer their 
questions, their concerns in a fair and impartial manner, so independence is at the 
heart of everything we do, and it is a daily battle...” 
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The interviewees frequently spoke in terms of working at or improving both the practical 
independence and also the perception of independence of the organisation giving both 
equal weight. The importance of independence both as a constituent of an effective Article 
2 investigation and also as a facet of the oversight agency was repeated and emphasised. 
The external assessment of independence and its importance to the success of the agency 
was frequently commented on.  
 5.3.3 Ex-officers 
Each of the three agencies had a mixture of SIs from both policing and non policing 
backgrounds. Each of the interviewees were asked as to whether the involvement of 
investigators with a policing background impacted upon the Article 2 requirement of 
independence in the investigations of deaths involving the police. There were a range of 
responses. In OPONI this issue had particular relevance to the investigation of the ‘historic’ 
cases which meant that a decision was taken that ex RUC officers would not be involved in 
those investigations. OPONI SI03 spoke of needing a balance of ex police officers: 
“How many is too many? How many ex-police officers do I have before the 
organisation effectively loses its independence or certainly loses the perception of 
independence?” 
OPONI SI04 outlined the benefit of having ex-police officers in terms of their ability to 
actually enhance the independence of investigations rather than detract from it through 
what they referred to as the “poacher turned gamekeeper scenario”:  
“You could have a police officer being more independent because of his knowledge of 
where to look ... how to get under the skin than you would have of someone who’s 
fiercely independent but doesn’t have that edge because he doesn’t really know 
where to look and where to go to expose those sorts of investigations.” 
This issue was echoed by the interviewees from both a policing and non policing background 
in the IPCC who had recently been criticised by the Home Office Affairs for the number of ex 
police officers employed. IPCC SI26 stated:  
“I can honestly say that during my nine years here, during an investigation I have 
never come across anybody from a police background that has not investigated 
something thoroughly, because of their leaning towards the police. I think we need to 
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limit the amount of police officers but their skills and their knowledge of policing is 
invaluable and I think the benefits outweigh the negatives...” 
In GSOC SI15 described the issue of employing ex-police officers as a “threat” to the 
organisation but one that could be managed. SI15 further stated that a lot depended on the 
individual concerned and the choices they made in investigations.   
5.3.4 Culture 
Each of the SIs were asked for their views as to whether the oversight agency in which they 
worked had developed a policing culture. There were a range of viewpoints expressed. 
Some of the SIs in all of the organisations identified their tendency to mirror the jargon and 
use of language of the police which they investigated. 
OPONI SI01 stated: 
“I’ve being doing this for years now and it is a daily battle to stop us from using 
jargon ...so my view is if I am speaking to a police officer I use their jargon and if I’m 
speaking to a member of the public I say something different and I think we need to 
be aware of that and that’s part of managing people’s view of your independence 
and impartiality.”  
Interestingly some of the SIs who came from a non policing background were more likely to 
equate the culture within the oversight agency with that of a police service whilst the SIs 
with policing backgrounds were emphatic that the oversight agencies did not have a policing 
culture. IPCC SI25 stated: 
“... There is nothing that you can remotely mirror what goes on in the police culture 
here. I think that comes down to the IPCC core values which you know is important to 
the organisation...” 
IPCC SI30 stated: 
“I think culture is a developmental thing and probably within the police service now 
the culture is a lot different than it was 8 years ago and 20 years ago, and ... I see the 
culture here as being very, very different from being a police culture because of the 
different types of individuals that we employ.” 
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In OPONI, SI12 whose career in policing was in a police service outside of the UK, stated: 
“It’s very different from a policing culture... You have to consider the people you are 
dealing with on a regular basis, more often the majority of your work is with people 
who on a regular basis are in contact with law enforcement, not in a positive way.”  
IPCC SI26 who did not have a policing background stated that they had never come across a 
pro police bias amongst the IPCC staff, however, they saw the issue of the oversight agency 
adopting a police culture from a slightly different perspective:  
“I think there would be a danger of that if our percentages of police officers or ex law 
enforcement got too high but whereas the IPCC at the moment, it recruits young, 
fresh intelligent people into the investigations directorate and I think they are 
essential because they might not have the experience of law enforcement they might 
not have the experience of criminal investigations but what they do is that they 
provide that balance between the police because they’ve got other ideas, they’ve got 
other points of view.” 
OPONI SI12 felt that certain aspects of the policing culture had made their way into the 
office: 
“I think there are certain facets of it that are because you have so many ex-police and 
ex-military here and police and military have a certain kind of similar kind of outlook 
on life, in that you know, we are in splendid isolation from civil society so therefore 
we view civil society in a disdainful view in a way because it’s like we are the 
gatekeepers and they are the thundering herd, the hordes...” 
OPONI SI06 described the evolution of the culture within the organisation:  
“I think in the early days there was a bit of a police culture in the Ombudsman but I 
think the reason for that was we had a lot of seconded senior police officers ... plus I 
think our investigators were less confident then of their own abilities so it was very 
easy to become part of that culture and to go with it. I think that now we have 
stronger civilian investigators and less of a seconded police family within us... I now 
think that we have our own culture... it’s an investigative culture so therefore it is 
going to be similar in some respects to police investigators culture...” 
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5.3.5 Regulatory Capture 
The SIs were asked their views as to whether they had any experience of regulatory capture 
occurring in their organisation and any steps that were taken to avoid it. The interviews 
revealed that each of the jurisdictions faced unique difficulties in managing their 
relationship with the force or forces within their remit for the investigation of deaths 
involving the police. The IPCC investigates all of the police forces across England and Wales 
and through the different modes of investigation catered for in their legislation they had the 
possibility that they could be managing an investigation with a force or conducting the 
investigation of that force independently. Several of the SIs were clear that the relationship 
with the police in these investigations had distinct boundaries, IPCC SI24 stated, “We don’t 
work with [the police force] we work alongside”, and this was echoed by IPCC SI29 who 
made the distinction between working with a police force and “focusing upon”. IPCC SI29 
also challenged the use of language stating that the term “working with” sounded like 
collaboration. 
The threat of regulatory capture was seen as a reality. IPCC SI28 stated that they had 
experienced regulatory capture in the past due to reliance on information from police 
services in managed investigations. The same danger was also present in Article 2 
investigations:  
“When you get a death which is an Article 2 death and you are getting that at two 
o’clock, three o’clock in the morning and they are phoning that through to you, there 
is a reliance that some of the aspects of what they are telling you is actually the 
circumstances that actually occurred... but that is incumbent on whoever is actually 
taking the call to actually draw those out.” 
Perhaps inevitably, the oversight agency has to rely on a certain level of cooperation from 
the police service under investigation in order for the investigation to be conducted. One SI 
in OPONI SI10 spoke of the frustration that this can bring: 
“... the bureaucracy, the memorandums of understanding sometimes you listen to 
that and you think in many ways they are impacting on us having to be patient, 
overly polite and almost subservient to the organisation which we rely on.” 
 Other SIs spoke of the need to maintain a healthy relationship with the PSNI but for the 
relationship to be monitored as SI02 said, “the PSNI, regarding our relationship we do have, 
we do stand a risk of becoming very much cozying up with the PSNI, we have to be careful.”  
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The relationship with the PSNI and therefore the risk of regulatory capture could, however, 
be managed, as SI08 stated:   
“Well first of all I don’t work closely with the PSNI because I don’t work with 
them...The cooperation is nice to have and often it meets an investigative need, but I 
do quite bluntly hold the principle that if you are not going to cooperate with me, 
then I do have the powers to do certain things, for example, seize documentation, 
gather evidence, arrest suspects if need be.” 
OPONI SI03 described the need to maintain professional working relationships: 
“...you have to have relationships with individuals of the PSNI but they should be 
professional and people, I think sometimes potentially don’t see the dangers as 
regards how other people will see relationships if it is seen to be too close... 
potentially how they could leave themselves vulnerable to criticism...” 
The historic investigations undertaken by OPONI centre on the investigation of a police 
force, the RUC, that no longer exists thus reducing or negating the possibility or regulatory 
capture. However, due to their involvement in ‘historic’ enquiries they were also called 
upon to conduct investigation in relation to allegations of RUC and civilian collusion that 
required ‘parallel’ investigations by both bodies. This required the delicate management of 
relationships. As OPONI SI13 explained:  
“...because there are allegations of criminality by non police officers alongside 
allegations of criminality by police officers, there are two parallel investigations 
which ... if for example you are dealing with an alleged conspiracy between both 
parts there has to be a kind of cross fertilisation of the investigation, it is impossible 
for there not to be...”  
GSOC has the responsibility for investigating a single national force. GSOC SI15 described the 
need for vigilance in monitoring the relationship with the Garda Síochána: 
“I’ve found, it’s very difficult to relax and take your eye of the ball for a second... it’s 
that constant vigilance that things aren’t getting to cosy if I can put it that way, there 
is always that sort of professional tension that healthy tension between the two 
organisations.” 
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GSOC SI18 described the need for a “healthy tension” to exist between the oversight body 
and force that they oversee stating in regard to the risk of regulatory capture, “I am very 
conscious of it because I think it is something real and I constantly have to keep reminding 
myself of the requirement not to let that happen.” 
5.3.6 Independence through Specialist Knowledge 
Several of the SIs across the organisations made reference to the fact that the 
independence of their investigations could be improved or bolstered through increased 
professional knowledge, expertise or specialism. Each of the three agencies had worked 
towards creating in-house specialist in technical and forensic areas. OPONI SI14 explained:  
“So from an independence point of view, we are fairly self sufficient now with the 
training now. We can do a lot of the simple stuff ourselves.”  
One particular difficulty raised by several of the IPCC SIs was the need to rely on police 
forensic collision investigators in fatal road traffic collisions. IPCC SI25 stated: 
“... for instance Road Traffic Pursuits, deaths we’ve not got the expertise in relation 
to the investigation at the scene where it’s specialist work and for that what we insist 
upon is that another force comes out to look at the work being carried out by the 
force that’s actually doing it or the other force does it...”  
GSOC had attempted to mitigate against this risk by developing small pockets of expertise 
among their staff. GSOC SI19 explained the concept behind it:  
“Recently we’ve got the ... trained Collision Investigators who can attend the scene 
and liaise with the Garda person and because they have a good or a reasonable 
understanding of forensic collision investigations, they can speak to them intelligently 
about what has happened here and look at the evidence and get an idea of it, so that 
way we do put our independence into it a bit more...” 
Although the oversight agencies are often defined by their independence, it is difficult to 
evaluate. Independence is not a simple linear construct, but is instead a multi-factorial and 
evolving entity. Each of the SIs in the agencies valued and defended the independence of 
their investigations and their organisation. It was clear, however, that the need to maintain 
independence was a constant. Several of the SIs expressed the view that independence had 
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been lessened or strengthened by events. This reflected Herzog’s model of the evolution of 
independence in accountability measures (Herzog, 1999).  
5.4 Adequacy 
The SIs were asked their views as to whether their organisations conducted adequate 
investigations into deaths involving the police. The use of language in relation to the 
adequacy of an investigation presented an issue for several of the SIs in all three of the 
oversight agencies. Several SIs challenged the use of the word ‘adequacy’ which they saw as 
a “difficult term” SI23 preferring instead to refer to the ‘thoroughness’ or ‘robustness’ of an 
investigations or instead referring to the investigation being considered as “proportionate” 
SI17. For the SIs the word adequacy did not capture the level of investigative effort put into 
the enquiries. OPONI SI13 summed up the position: 
“...just make it adequate? I know there is a much, much wider context in using that 
term. I think they are great principles and my understanding is that if you adhere to 
all five and replace the adequacy with ‘thorough’... then you have an effective 
investigation.” 
SIs outlined the practical requirements of meeting an adequate standard of investigation. 
OPONI SI12 listed the requirements as “the skill set”, “the resources”, “the basic 
knowledge”, “the drive to look at everything” and the “courage to say when you see 
something that is not right.” 
5.4.1 Resources 
The issue of resources was common to each agency and each of the SIs made reference to 
difficulties in resourcing enquiries. Whilst the majority of the SIs were concerned about the 
need for more resources some of the SIs expressed this in particularly stark terms. In GSOC 
SI18 stated: 
“... we have insufficient numbers, our staff aren’t adequately trained and because of 
the way we are structured we never have sufficient resources on the ground at any 
given time to investigate a major incident ... equal to an investigation of the same 
event and set of circumstances being conducted by an Garda Síochána so I think we 
are very vulnerable in that area.” 
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The continuing investigative workload that still had to be serviced while an Article 2 
investigation was ongoing was also an issue for the agencies. In OPONI internal team 
structures had developed so that a Significant Case Team would take over and deal with the 
investigation of serious incidents such as cases where Article 2 might engage, with the other 
work being undertaken by Core Investigation Teams. The OPONI SIs had also developed a 
regimented system of reviews of their investigations whether into historic or current cases 
to ensure that lines of inquiry were being followed. OPONI SI06 outlined the benefits of 
their system: 
“In the early days we were maybe a bit lax around review but ... there are very clear 
review processes in place now as part of the investigative process so you shouldn’t be 
at the end of an investigation going this hasn’t been properly reviewed as it went on 
because the processes are in place to do it.” 
A similar regimented system of review was also present in the IPCC with the SIs describing a 
structured and “exhaustive” (IPCC SI25) review process bolstered with Dip Sample and 
Thematic reviews. The IPCC SIs also described a team based approach to investigations 
involving others outside of the investigations directorates. IPCC SI30 stated that the 
adequacy of investigations had improved: 
 “It is now more, much more of a team with the Commission being involved, with the 
lawyers being involved, and there will be critical incident meetings similar to police 
gold groups set up now, probably two or three of those will take place on the day of 
the incident being referred and there is a lot more sort of internal oversight now to 
ensure adequacy.” 
Several of the IPCC SIs reflected on previous investigative performance of the organisation 
and spoke about an improvement in the standards of the investigations that they carried 
out, many of them conceding that the quality of investigations may not always have been at 
an appropriate level. IPCC SI28 spoke about the IPCC having previously been “found wanting 
in relation to the quality of the investigation” which was also echoed by IPCC SI26 who also 
spoke about the need for the organisation to reflect and learn from past mistakes. IPCC SI27 
felt that the investigations did meet the required standard: 
“I think we do a good job and I think I can look families in the eye after wards and 
say... and that’s what the majority of families want, they just want to know what 
happened so if we can line the ducks up and tell them and they may not necessarily 
like our conclusion and we may argue about that but they just want to know what 
happened.” 
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The geographical area which needed to be covered by the different agencies’ on call 
function was also an issue. This was less of a concern for OPONI whose SIs described a 
comfortable geographical area of responsibility. Similarly in GSOC the geographical area 
covered by their response team was not seen to cause insurmountable problems. Within 
the IPCC, however, the sheer span of the area that was required to be covered had led to 
serious implications for their ability to perform the on call function to the standards that 
may be required in an Article 2 compliant investigation. IPCC SI28 described the difficulties 
in relation to their on call teams, “generally speaking we can’t get there in a reasonable time 
because of the geography of the whole of the UK. We’ve got five offices and we’ve got an on 
call team, but the on call team is quite small, it’s based North and South so to actually 
provide an Article 2 cover out of hours is extremely difficult.” 
As IPCC SI27 described the provisions made for an immediate investigative response:  
“... I’ve got forty investigators to do more than half of England... You can only do with 
what you’ve got ... we’re basically at something is better than nothing but only just.” 
Despite these concerns the interviews with the SIs would suggest a confidence amongst the 
SIs that thorough investigations into deaths involving the police were being conducted and 
that the Article 2 standard of adequacy was being met.   
5.5 Promptness 
The issue of timeliness or promptness in investigations caused some consternation amongst 
the SIs. All had been involved in inquiries that could be considered to be protracted. 
Common themes identified by the SIs were the need to be thorough, the challenges of 
interacting with other agencies and outside bodies and the need for improved resourcing to 
achieve a timely investigation. GSOC SI15, when asked if they could satisfy the obligation to 
investigate in a timely fashion, stated that they felt that the timeliness standard was GSOC’s 
“biggest area of exposure or weakness” in relation to compliance with Article 2. The reason 
for this was the difficulties they had encountered in securing Garda information. SI15 
commented on the impact that resources could have on timeliness of investigation but 
attributed most of the delays to Garda cooperation and the manner in which GSOC 
conducted inquiries. SI15 summarised the position as follows: 
“We have a set of protocols with Garda management that they have signed up to 
that stipulate information will be provided within 30 days of the request. If it is 
provided within thirty days of the request then in my experience some the cause for 
celebration ... I don’t think we do meet the standards on promptness due to the 
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manner in which we go about our enquiries. We’re not the sort of outfit that goes 
around daily putting doors in, executing warrants, seizing stuff.”  
GSOC SI16, whilst expressing that they thought GSOC investigated deaths involving the 
police both promptly and to a high standard, presented a practical viewpoint in relation to 
what could be achieved by a small oversight organisation: 
“I think there has to be a reality check in regards to the fact that we are an 
investigating body of approximately twenty six investigators covering the whole 
state, covering fourteen thousand members of AGS.” 
OPONI SI12 queried that the definition of timeliness may differ amongst the persons 
involved in the investigation and was a relative term depending on your viewpoint: 
“... my perception of timeliness within the organisation working wise, might not be 
the victim’s family’s perception of timeliness, you know... the victims are the families 
or anyone who is impacted by it, the police officers who are impacted by the 
investigation into a death, everybody that’s impacted by that, what’s their 
timeliness? What is their mindset of timeliness? Because for them that’s all there is, 
that death.” 
Once again the remit for historic investigations undertaken by OPONI also presented unique 
challenges for investigators attempting to investigate in a timely manner due to the fact that 
responsibility for investigating all of the incidents from 1968 to 1998 arose at the same time. 
This has led OPONI to review and prioritise which of the investigations it has been able to 
undertake as the resources do not exist to allow the organisation to investigate all of the 
cases at once. SI04 explained the problem stating, “...we have some cases still on our books 
that are twelve years old. We have taken on far too much and we are not capable of 
delivering on timeliness because we have taken on too much.” OPONI SI13 described 
timeliness as the one Article 2 standard that they had a problem reaching. 
 Several SIs spoke of improvements in achieving timeliness in investigations. OPONI SI01 
stated:  
“I think we’ve got better at it as the years have gone on... we’re being as quick as we 
can and I think we’ve got quicker at it because the processes are now in place for us 
to get the information to move it forward...” 
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IPCC SI28 agreed with several of his colleagues in relation to the impact of resourcing on 
timeliness in investigations but also referenced the need to conduct thorough 
investigations: 
“It is difficult...we agreed to do investigations within 157 days, currently 60% but we 
are struggling with that because we are short of resources... We try and do them as 
quick as we can, but they have to be thorough, but they have to be proportionate as 
well.” 
IPCC SI27 expressed frustration at the issues that could prevent an inquiry being conducted 
in a timely fashion including the cooperation of the officers involved in the investigation: 
“Justice delayed is justice denied and we are very conscious of that ...and just the 
problems of getting officers with their lawyers, with their federation representatives 
with the modern shift patterns it can take weeks just to arrange one interview, we 
can get and we’re starting to play a bit more hard ball now with compelling, we can 
actually tell them to come here within five days, we can’t make them talk.” 
Common amongst the SIs was the expressed desire to investigate the cases in a prompt 
manner and examples were cited of the speedy completion of investigations, however, 
several of the SIs across the organisations were keen to point out that timeliness should not 
come at the cost of thoroughness. OPONO SI07 recalled responding to a question from a 
family in relation to how long the investigation into their loved one’s death was going to 
take, “it’s going to take as long as it’s going to take because I want to be as thorough as I can 
but there have to be milestones and checks along the way to make sure that you are dealing 
with things.” GSOC SI17 expressed a similar sentiment, “I would rather have to explain why 
it took as long as it did than have to explain why it was inadequate. I don’t think that 
inadequacy is acceptable in any investigation.” 
Timeliness or promptness was clearly an issue of concern then for SIs in all three 
organisations and one which had not been adequately resolved. This signified that more 
work was required in all three agencies around ensuring the timeliness of investigations into 
deaths involving the police. 
5.6 Public Scrutiny 
All of the SIs were asked for their opinions on the Article 2 standard of achieving public 
scrutiny in the investigation. The two main avenues for achieving this standard are public 
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hearings, such as those of the coronial process, or the public reporting of the progress and 
findings of the investigation. The SIs had similar experiences with the coronial processes 
across the jurisdictions, but in relation to the public reporting, there was a marked 
difference among the three agencies SIs as to their responses to the questions in that 
several SIs in OPONI and GSOC spoke of the need to ‘do more’ in making their findings 
public and spoke of frustration of what had been done in the past. Significantly, however, all 
of the SIs of the IPCC were satisfied that the level of public reporting was appropriate.   
GSOC SI17 outlined doubts that enough was being done to make the findings of the 
investigations public:  
“...I don’t think we should be in the news every day, I don’t think we should be 
touting for business so to speak but I do believe that it is in the public interest to 
know what is going on in relation to some systemic issues that we come across on a 
regular basis.” 
GSOC SI16 expressed his frustration at the level of public reporting undertaken by the 
organisation: 
“...there are so many things that we do well, we do very good investigations, but I 
don’t think we have inspired public confidence in ourselves by the very nature of the 
amount of information that has been retained within these four walls and that has 
not been given to the public.” 
SI16 concluded by stating that the new Ombudsman Commission had undertaken to publish 
its findings more, this was echoed by GSOC SI18 who felt that there was a “more progressive 
view” in relation to putting information into the public domain. GSOC SI15 indicated a 
contrary opinion in that they felt that the organisation had a good record in making its 
findings public, but felt that more could be done in following up on the public reports: 
“I think we do enough on reporting, I don’t think that we do enough on follow up. I 
think where things need to be said, we have said them and then it withers on the vine 
and then we move on to the next big thing so I don’t think we are strong enough on 
follow up...” 
Several of the SIs spoke about the usefulness of the external and public scrutiny that the 
coronial process and other judicial proceedings can provide in determining the adequacy of 
the investigation. OPONI SI01 described it as follows: 
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“...my view is if I am standing up in the Coroner’s court am I quite happy with what 
I’ve done? Or if I’m sitting in the High Court being judicially reviewed can I stand over 
the sustainability and robustness of what I’ve done? And that’s the benchmark for 
me.” 
Other SIs in OPONI also commented on the quality of the coronial hearings in the 
jurisdiction. Whilst OPONI SI09 found that the level of scrutiny varied from case to case and 
SI14 described the coronial process in a death involving the police as a “difficult playing 
field”, SI10 described the inquests as “challenging” and “fairly robust”. OPONI SI03 
expanded on this saying: 
“...they are robust, they are rigorous, they will hold you to account, you will be 
scrutinised, your work will be scrutinised, your decision making, your rationale etc., 
will be scrutinised but rightly so, but those are the sort of tests to ensure that your 
investigations are thorough.” 
A similar viewpoint was expressed by IPCC SI26: 
“If we know that that product, that investigation is going to be there for the public to 
see, not just at inquest but on the website then it makes you more professional, it 
makes you think about what you are doing and it makes you have sound rationale for 
what you are doing so it is a good thing and we are getting better.” 
However whilst SIs in both GSOC and the IPCC cited examples of thorough, probing and 
lengthy inquests several of the SIs made similar observations in relation to the coronial 
process and a lack of consistency between the different coroners across their jurisdictions. 
IPCC SI23 commented that the coroners could be “very, very different” in their decision 
making but that each was “masters of their own court” while IPCC SI28 stated, “they are 
quite a unique bunch all over the country and they have different approaches to the police. 
My experience of the coroners has been varied depending on the coroner.” The IPCC SIs 
almost universally agreed that the coroners in their jurisdiction were fully aware of Article 2 
and were conducting their coronial inquests in compliance with it. IPCC SI31 described the 
coronial process as follows: 
“It definitely is sufficiently rigorous because I think coroner’s defend their position 
very well and they want to get to the bottom of what happened and the fact that for 
any Article 2 death you will have a jury ... so it’s got to be reasonably thorough.”  
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GSOC SIs had a similar view of the coronial process indicating that knowledge of the Article 
2 obligations differed among coroners. GSOC SI19 commented that some inquests were 
conducted very quickly and felt that the part time nature of the coroners in the jurisdiction 
may impact upon the level of scrutiny given to inquiries. GSOC SI18 gave a graphic 
description of the range of Article 2 awareness amongst the coroners in their jurisdiction:  
“The degrees range from the man who wrote the book in this jurisdiction to ...“yes, 
yes, Article 2 what is that again?” so there’s the range from no knowledge 
whatsoever to a man who has written the book and everywhere in between. So yes a 
huge difference between coroners.” 
5.7 Victim Involvement 
Of all of the Article 2 standards, the one that attracted the greatest consistency of viewpoint 
across the organisations was the need to engage with the family of the deceased to ensure 
that they are fully informed of the progress and findings of the investigation. Each of the 
three organisations had developed specialist roles amongst their investigative resource to 
deal with the issue of engaging with families of the deceased. GSOC had established a 
compliment of trained FLOs, whilst the IPCC, in recognition of the slightly different emphasis 
in liaising with a family bereaved due to a death following police contact as opposed to a 
homicide, had titled the specialist role as Family Liaison Managers. Again OPONI’s remit for 
the ‘historic’ enquiries had required an adaptation of their approach. OPONI had almost 
since their inception created a FLO resource having sent some of their investigative staff on 
police FLO courses with Avon and Somerset Police. Faced with the challenges of liaising with 
families in investigations whose loved ones may have died as far back as 1968, OPONI had 
created a special Communications Unit to update families, explain investigative progress or 
the lack of it and manage expectations. Each of the organisations therefore had developed a 
capacity to potentially fulfil the Article 2 requirement, the interviews with the SIs the 
questions explored their attitudes to the implementation of these liaison structures and 
whether they thought their organisation did enough to meet them.  
 In all three jurisdictions the oversight agencies SIs could be seen to have recognised the 
need for families to be involved in the investigations and for them to be provided with 
sufficient information. Although this was not universal amongst the SIs, the SIs who 
expressed that family members should not be provided with information or indeed should 
not be placed at the centre of the investigation were in the minority. In GSOC only one of 
the SIs interviewed expressed any reservation in relation to the information that should be 
provided to the family. GSOC SI18 stated that during an investigation the family should be 
provided with “the very minimum” and only at the end of the investigation should the 
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family be given “all of the facts and all of the information.” SI18 explained their rationale for 
this viewpoint in the risk that disclosure to the family may present to the investigation: 
“I am somewhat concerned that at some stage if an Article 2 type investigation were 
to proceed to a trial that we might have compromised evidence or contaminated or 
shown a pre-judgement or a bias in the form of an update given to a family that 
could be used by a person who is the subject of a charge to defend that charge.” 
The prevailing view across the GSOC SIs was that they had established a suitable liaison 
function and that it was intended to provide families with as much information as they were 
lawfully able to provide. 
GSOC SI17 stated:  
“I do believe that we have the legislation and policy and procedures to allow us to 
properly engage with families. I believe that we also have the proper training and the 
properly trained staff and enough of them to properly meet that victim involvement 
and public scrutiny aspect of it... on paper we are good and when it comes to the 
victim involvement we are very good especially when it comes to the Article 2’s” 
GSOC SI19 was of the view that the Family Liaison aspect of investigations was something 
that GSOC did “really well” stating:  
“...I try to give them enough so they understand what has happened and what is 
going to happen without giving them the outcome of it during the investigation prior 
to a court or an inquest. I would give them a lot more information.” 
SI15 similarly described their test for how much information was provided to the family in 
open terms:  
“I have to have a reason for not telling them, that’s what I’m getting at rather than a 
blanket, tell them nothing and then go through each individual but and go well, they 
can have that, they can have that. I work the other way around, they can have 
everything but let’s have a look at it first.” 
Similar attitudes prevailed in the IPCC, with several SIs commenting on the importance of 
the family of the deceased in the investigative process. SI28 emphasised family liaison as 
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being “extremely important” to the IPCC whilst SI27 described involving the family as 
“prime, prime, prime”, and SI24 described it as “vital”. The SIs were also complimentary of 
those tasked with performing the liaison with the families. SI26 stated that they do a 
“fantastic job” and SI30 described how measures had been put in place to monitor 
compliance in family liaison saying, “in terms of updates that is taken very, very seriously, 
we’ve got performance measures in place to ensure that updates of all interested parties 
including the families are rigorously complied with, as managers we check the quality of the 
update letters to make sure that they are meaningful and they are not just, ‘the 
investigation is progressing satisfactorily’”. 
The importance of creating a meaningful liaison with the family was also emphasised by 
SI24 who described it in strong terms:  
“...you’ve got to let them know that they are forming part of this investigation... their 
involvement in it is vital, they are a key element of searching for the truth, what 
happened in the death of this particular person or what happened in this collision 
that led to the death of this particular person or some police shooting.” 
SI25 outlined their view that liaising with the families of the deceased was the “most 
important part” of the investigation but stated that it was not always possible to establish a 
successful liaison with the family stating,  
“We have had failures. We’ve got it wrong with families and where we’ve got it 
wrong we’ve gone out and identified that and we’ve said we’ve got it wrong and 
we’ve recognised that fact, touch wood we haven’t got a bad record here, my team 
haven’t got a bad record but they know how I feel about engaging with families.”  
In OPONI there was evidence of a similarly family centric approach to the investigation of 
deaths involving the police. SI08 expressed his view as to the information that was to be 
supplied to families was to “tell them everything” and when information could not be 
released to explain the reasons behind that decision. This viewpoint echoed those of other 
SIs in the other organisations. OPONI SI05 expressed the common view that “you have to 
give families enough information that they are update and they know exactly what is going 
on” and SI03 stating that OPONI were “proactive on that point because we see the benefit 
of it, because if you lose the family or their representatives it’s just going to make it more 
difficult.” OPONI SIs also expressed favourable opinion on the work carried out by the family 
liaison officers with SI02 describing it as being “as good as it can be” and SI05 stating that 
OPONI had “more than enough people trained and adequately trained.” SI08 outlined that 
the contact with families of the deceased in Article 2 investigations had been made a Key 
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Performance Indicator within OPONI which measured the “regularity of contact with 
families” which was “recommended and considered organisationally for every six weeks.” 
As with other standards under Article 2, the remit of OPONI to investigate ‘historic’ cases 
had led to the creation of a ‘communications team’. As SI05 explained: 
“... onto the historical side, we’ve got the Communication Team that is a separate 
entity... a self contained department within our team that deals with the families ... 
that point of view that has improved dramatically, really good standards of IOs, good 
people in there doing it.” 
Also similar to comments made by IPCC SIs SI07 reflected that OPONI had occasions where 
they were not as “family centred and victim centred” as they should be. SI06 accepted that 
the function of family liaison had not always been implemented properly but saw an 
improvement in how the role was deployed saying:  
“We have made mistakes in the past but we are going to get it right now ... you 
know, we can do the world’s greatest investigation but if we don’t have the family on 
board, it’s not worth a hill of beans so I think mistakes have been made in the past, 
we have failed families in the past but I’d like to think... those mistakes won’t be 
repeated.” 
As with the previous standards it was clear then that the three organisations had developed 
constructs and attempted to comply with the Article 2 requirements. The SIs had also 
engaged with the standards in this regard. There was evidence of a will to engage with 
families and a common theme amongst the SIs was the importance of such engagement. 
Whilst this was not universal it was clear that the majority of SIs were working towards 
reaching the Article 2 standard of victim involvement.  
5.8 High and Low Policing 
As was explored earlier in this thesis Brodeur’s theory of high and low policing (1983)  can 
be applied to deaths involving the police in that whilst some deaths occur during an 
interaction with the police that involve elements more aligned with the low policing 
paradigm such as public order arrests or deaths in custody others involve elements of the 
high policing paradigm such as the fatal shooting of a person following a pro-active 
intelligence led operation. In such circumstances the importance of the Article 2 standards 
108 | P a g e  
 
comes to the fore as the case law, starting with the McCann66 judgement, dictates that any 
investigation carried out into the death must examine the planning and preparation of the 
operation and examine whether suitable steps were taken to reduce the risk of a loss of life 
occurring. This will inevitably require that the oversight agency tasked with the investigation 
of such a death must develop and maintain the capacity to undertake the necessary 
enquiries to probe the planning of policing actions that result in a death and the facility for 
accessing and maintaining the kind of intelligence product that is used by the police in the 
planning and running of such operations. Each SI was provided with an explanation of 
Brodeur’s theory and asked if a ‘high’ policing death such as the Stockwell shooting took 
place within their geographical area and remit, would they have the capacity to undertake 
all aspects of the investigation. The answers across the three oversight agencies were 
varied, but SIs in all organisations expressed concerns as to whether they would get access 
to all of the intelligence in a ‘high’ policing death involving the police.  
The IPCC, who had faced the challenge of investigating the high policing death of Jean 
Charles de Menezes in 2005, were confident that they could cope if such circumstances 
were to arise again. Several felt that they had learned from the 2005 investigation and that 
structures had improved since then. IPCC SI26 stated: 
“I think there would be less resistance now than there was back in 2005. In 2005 we 
were a very new organisation and you know the Commissioner of the Met and 
several of the high ranking officers had not quite got used to the fact that we were 
there... we would get much more cooperation and free access now I am sure to that 
material... I think it would be quicker now and I think our investigation now would be 
more thorough due to that. I think the public would demand it as well.” 
This viewpoint was echoed by IPCC SI29 who stated: 
“... it was still a young organisation, it was still finding its feet and that would 
probably have been the first major investigation or first investigation of that 
magnitude where these issues were brought to bear or teased out. Since then the 
organisation has matured, the body of knowledge both internally and externally is 
much greater now as to what’s expected, what’s required, what needs to be done so I 
think it is well positioned in that sense to deal with it.” 
Similarly most of the IPCC SIs were confident that they would get access to the intelligence 
surrounding a ‘high policing’ death. SI29 continued, “I think there will always be a tension 
                                                          
66
 McCann and Others v United Kingdom (1995)(Appl. No18984/91, 27
th
 September 1995) 
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about access to intelligence. I think we are positioned to get it and the onus must be on 
other agencies, other parties to have the confidence to share it.”  
Typical of the responses in OPONI was SI13 who stated: 
“Well, we could deal quite effectively and efficiently with the low policing end. The 
difficulty with the high policing end is that national security and responsibility for 
national security now rests with Mi5, security service, so they may well be in 
possession of intelligence or sensitive information that they do not wish to share with 
us.” 
OPONI SI08 was similarly confident in the capacity of the organisation to deal with the ‘low’ 
policing aspects of such an incident saying: 
“I think there is the capacity and the knowledge and the skill within this organisation 
to investigate that and that’s because I’m aware of some of the personalities and 
some of the individuals and some of their backgrounds and abilities.” 
When asked whether they would get access to the intelligence product that may be 
required to be evaluated in such an investigation, SI08 gave a considered response which 
demonstrated the resilience of the oversight agency: 
“...I am not one hundred percent confident that I will readily get access to the 
information but I am confident enough in my own abilities to recognise from what I 
have, what I’ve asked for and the circumstances that pervade that I can identify gaps 
in what I’ve got and then I’ll go back and ask again.” 
OPONI SI03 described how the public interest in such an incident would ensure that the 
oversight agency would be able to fulfil its investigative function: 
“If something like that happened I would be probably fairly confident that we would 
get all the material, I think there would be such scrutiny over that there and such 
media and political interest, I think that it would be extremely difficult and extremely 
foolish for police to withhold something any significant information about that...”  
SI10 was also confident that the material would be provided but stated that “it would take 
far too long”, “would require too many niceties” and would impact upon the confidence of 
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the family of the deceased. SI07 was also expressed a surety that the intelligence would be 
provided saying, “I think this organisation has gone through too much pain in respect of 
concerns that maybe some senior staff had in respect of the accessing of intelligence not 
to.” SI04 was “absolutely confident, one hundred percent confident” that OPONI would get 
access to all of the intelligence behind such a policing operation and also stated that OPONI 
would investigate it with “vigour”.   
In GSOC the youngest and smallest of the three oversight agencies, the prevailing mood was 
not one of confidence on the issue of investigating a ‘high’ policing death. Whilst most of 
the SIs expressed the view that the investigative function could cope with the demands of 
the ‘low policing’ elements of a death, both GSOC SI16 and SI15 raised the issue of 
difficulties in terms of “information exchange” with the Garda Síochána whilst GSOC SI18 
stated bluntly:  
“We don’t have the capacity to investigate a high policing death and we don’t have 
the necessary cooperation with AGS even to allow us to begin an investigation into a 
high policing death. They are even reluctant to cooperate with a death in low 
policing.” 
GSOC SI19 was equally as sanguine about access to intelligence:  
“...well we don’t have the power to demand it and we wouldn’t get it, so we couldn’t 
investigate something like that, the Article 2 would fail from the start. We wouldn’t 
have enough people to respond to it for a start and then we wouldn’t get what we 
need to investigate it thoroughly or adequately anyway...” 
It is clear then that in the more mature organisations of the IPCC and OPONI there is more 
confidence amongst the SIs in the investigation of a high policing death and in the access of 
sensitive information from the police services under investigation. GSOC SIs would not share 
the same confidence that the organisation was adequately resourced or statutorily 
empowered or that they would receive the cooperation of the police necessary to conduct 
such an enquiry. 
5.9 Political Will 
The SIs in each of the oversight agencies were asked to comment on whether the ‘political 
will’ as defined by Luna and Walker (2000) to investigate deaths involving the police existed 
in their organisation. One GSOC SI expressed some reluctance to comment stating, “I have 
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to take the fifth on that one. I don’t want to incriminate myself and I do want to keep my 
job.” It was common amongst the GSOC SIs to describe the importance of the ‘political will’ 
for the agency to investigate with SI’s using the terms ‘vital’ and ‘paramount’. It was also 
common for the SIs to state that the leadership of the organisation was an important factor 
in establishing that will. GSOC SI15 stated:  
“We’ve experienced since we came into being three different commissions, led by 
three different personalities ... three different bearings on the way we do 
business...but the three different chairpersons, the three different personalities, I 
would suggest had a different political will to achieve our objectives.” 
SIs in the IPCC across the organisation all said that the ‘political will’ existed in their 
organisation to investigate Article 2 deaths. Some saw this as part of the IPCC’s evolution; 
SI26, for example, spoke about the will improving over time whilst SI25 saw the political will 
internally reflected externally by increased budget and portfolio. The SIs also spoke about 
the importance of their Commissioners in relation to the ‘political will’ of the organisation, 
with SI30 stating that the Commissioners serve to “drive investigations” and SI28 stating:  
“It’s got to be the cornerstone of the investigation. If there is no political will then 
they can be manipulated, they can go for an easy ride and so on, they can do what 
they feel is the political answer as opposed to what’s right or wrong. And I have 
worked for some people who I would say, as long as the thing was right evidentially 
and they believed that what they were doing was right they didn’t care which side it 
was.”  
Finally in OPONI, the SIs described a changing landscape of political will. SI01 described the 
early days of the office and “fighting to get it going and running” stating “our blood is on the 
walls of this place”. SI10 described their being “watersheds” in the history of the 
organisation where the political will was transformed. SI03 described the political will as 
“absolutely crucial” explaining that the change in ombudsman created a “new will” in the 
organisation. Describing the will in the organisation SI03 went on to say:  
“Some people ... believe passionately about it, believe passionately about what they 
do and they believe that people have a right to know these things, that these matters 
should be thoroughly investigated, other people don’t.” 
OPONI SI07 was particularly confident that the will existed in the organisation to investigate 
incidents involving death stating:  
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“I think if we had someone who, a member of the public shot dead by police officers 
today, there most certainly is that political will to investigate and to leave no stone 
unturned.” 
5.10 The Purpose of the Investigation into Deaths Involving the Police 
It is clear from the evolution of the Article 2 standards themselves and from the comments 
of Judge Bingham67 and others that the Article 2 compliant investigation into a death can 
have many competing and complimentary purposes. These could be classed as punitive, 
informative, restorative and preventative in nature as they relate to disciplinary and 
criminal processes, the provision of information to the bereaved, the restoration of 
confidence in policing and the learning of lessons to prevent future deaths. Each of the SIs 
were asked what they saw as the purpose of the investigations into state caused deaths 
carried out by their respective oversight agencies. Their answers showed a universal 
recognition of the multi-functionality of their investigations. None of the SIs in any of the 
organisations were restricted in their viewpoint to a singular punitive purpose. Almost all SIs 
included some element of providing information to the families of the deceased and it was 
common for elements of public confidence to be expressed. In OPONI for example the 
purpose of an Article 2 investigation into a death was described by SI01 as having a dual 
purpose: 
“One I think it’s about truth and honesty for the families. And two, I think it’s about 
public confidence in the systems and the structures and the organisations and that’s 
not just us that would be the PSNI and what have they done and the judicial 
proceedings that go through the whole thing. I think it has a bigger impact than just 
us.” 
OPONI SI02 captures the four purpose of punitive, informative, restorative and preventative 
in their response: 
“I think it’s really important for public confidence, for improving policing and I think 
it’s really important for society to know what’s occurred. So by us doing our 
investigation, society as a whole, led by the press who will then filter all the 
information down to society as a general rule, we need to be showing that... society 
needs to be looking at us and thinking if my son or daughter was to die tomorrow as 
a result of police contact would I get justice, would justice be done. If there was 
culpability would it be identified and would it be dealt with correctly.” 
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In OPONI the historic cases also provided for a parallel discourse into the purpose of 
investigating historic deaths which centred more on the need for a ‘truth telling’ 
mechanism. SI14 captured the purpose of investigating the historic cases involving deaths as 
being straightforward: 
“... they just want closure, to know where they stand and a line drawn in the sand 
and that’s what it is I think, just bringing closure to the victims that’s what it is and I 
think it’s as simple as that.” 
In GSOC SI16 described the purpose of the investigations in a single sentence in that it was 
to ensure, “that the state has given a full and thorough account for what has happened to 
their citizen.” SI17 also summed up the purpose in stating, “Why did this happen and could 
it have been avoided?” SI17 later expanded on this answer to state: 
“Could this be avoided and can we learn anything from this? ...but it has to be able in 
my view to identify areas that can be improved, to take a critical view of itself 
because people shouldn’t die as result of a police operation unless it’s absolutely 
necessary.” 
In the IPCC SIs also had a wider view of their investigative function than simple criminal or 
disciplinary enquiry. SI26 provided a family centric viewpoint: 
“...it’s important that these families get the answers that they need to move on and 
god forbid get over the tragedy, try to get over the death of a loved one and I think 
that they get greater comfort and better answers and are less sceptical about those 
answers because it’s come from an independent body than it would have been if it 
had come from the police.” 
SI23 found the basis for investigation in the restoration of public confidence and applied the 
Article 2 standards directly to the purpose of the investigation: 
“... Article 2 investigations and the requirements are important in terms of it being 
independent for that reason for public confidence. I think that the elements of family 
involvement and public scrutiny are important for the same thing, at the end of the 
day the family of the person who died has a right to know how they died and again 
how trusting they can be when just provided with information from the agency that 
had, that were looking after the person at the time of death is always going to be a 
concern.” 
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5.11 Are the Article 2 Standards Realistic and Attainable? 
Although some of the SIs expressed doubts as to whether their organisation had managed 
to meet the standards in the investigations that they had undertaken all but one of the SIs 
viewed the Article 2 standards as realistic and attainable standards. The SI15 who did not 
see them as realistic still viewed the standards positively describing them as a “worthy 
burden” and “aspirational”. Indeed, across the SIs the five standards were seen as a useful 
model for benchmarking investigations and for holding their own investigations to account. 
SI31 summed up the thinking of many of the other SIs stating:  
“I think it’s something to aim for ... at the end of the day we have to be happy that 
we have been independent, we’ve been thorough and as far as possible we have got 
to the truth about what has gone on.” 
This chapter has outlined in detail the findings of the research undertaken in the three 
policing oversight agencies. The findings have included consideration of the awareness of 
the Article 2 standards in the three agencies and the practical application of the five 
standards of independence, adequacy, promptness, public scrutiny and victim involvement. 
The perceptions and views of senior investigators on concepts such as the value and nature 
of independence in investigations, the culture of policing oversight, regulatory capture and 
the importance of political will have also all been explored in the context of the 
investigation of deaths involving the police. The next chapter will seek to analyse these 
findings with reference to both the relevant literature and case law.  
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Chapter Six: Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will seek to analyse the findings of the research. In doing so it is necessary to 
return to the primary aim of the thesis which was to evaluate the extent to which GSOC, 
OPONI and the IPCC have evolved and adapted their investigative practice, performance and 
capacity to meet the five standards of the positive obligation of conducting an effective 
investigation into a death involving the police under Article 2 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR).  In order to do so I will examine each of the five standards in turn and 
analyse the research findings with reference to both the relevant law and literature. I will 
then examine the research findings as regards High and Low Policing and Political Will. 
Finally, I will look to the question of the Europeanization of human rights and, using the 
framework put forward by Borsel and Risse (Borzel & Risse, 2000) will seek to establish the 
extent to which the Article 2 standards have been adopted in each of the three jurisdictions.  
6.2 Independence 
Just as the issue of independence is seen as both central and controversial to the question 
of police accountability so it can be said to have permeated much of the research carried 
out in this thesis (Savage, 2012). Throughout the examination of the five standards the topic 
of independence can be seen to be the most important, the most contentious and the one 
which invited the richest data from respondents. I will first examine the rulings of the ECtHR 
and the Opinion of the Human Rights Commissioner in relation to the topic and I will then 
consider some of the most significant themes arising from the literature.  
The Human Rights Commissioner has stated that in any investigation there should be 
“practical independence” (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009, p. 8). The ECtHR has 
demanded a strict institutional independence in the investigation from the police officers 
involved in any death. In the case of Ramsahai68, seen as the high watermark in the 
jurisprudence, a fifteen and half hour delay before the commencement of the independent 
investigation of the death was deemed to be excessive and the investigative actions 
undertaken in that time period by officers from the same force as those involved in the 
death was seen to be in breach of the requirement for independence. The ECtHR case of 
Ramsahai could be said to have had a significant impact on the three oversight agencies. Of 
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the European Court cases referred to by the SIs in the interviews it was the case mentioned 
most frequently and in contexts where it was used almost as shorthand for the Article 2 
standards themselves. SIs from the IPCC mentioned that the case had led to an 
organisational decision to investigate more cases independently. The case had also led to a 
reorganisation as to how the IPCC ran on call arrangements to ensure that an investigative 
capacity existed should an incident arise involving a fatality.   
The SIs in the three organisations viewed the investigations undertaken into deaths 
involving the police as independent in the hierarchical and institutional sense. The SIs 
referred to their organisational ability to respond quickly to investigate incidents involving 
deaths, the experience both they and their staff had gathered in the investigation of 
fatalities and the safeguard of independence brought to the investigation by the fact that it 
was undertaken by the oversight bodies rather than the police themselves. Due to what 
Savage refers to as the “mix” of personnel from policing and non policing backgrounds in 
each of the oversight agencies (Savage, 2013, p. 2), the issue as to whether employing 
former police officers in any way detracted from the independence of the investigations 
undertaken was explored with the SIs. Whilst some reservations where expressed in relation 
to specific cases, the most frequently expressed attitude was that that the former police 
officers brought much needed investigative and policing experience and were an asset to 
each of the three organisations. The independence of the investigations undertaken by the 
organisations and indeed, independence as a core value in each of the organisations was of 
central importance to the SIs and was something that was seen to both protected and 
asserted. Independence was a key element of the identity of each of the organisations. 
The research found that the three organisations had the capacity to conduct investigations 
that would meet the Article 2 standard of independence in terms of hierarchical, structural 
and practical independence. From an external perspective it could be argued that due to 
their alignment to the “civilian control model” (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001, p. 152) the 
organisations were already in a position to be viewed as independent. However, as Savage 
has stated there is a need to “interrogate that ‘endgame’” of independence (Savage, 2012, 
p. 2) and to look at how the SIs viewed and articulated the independence of their 
organisation. The independence of the investigations undertaken by the organisations and 
indeed, independence as a core value in each of the organisations was of central 
importance to the SIs and was articulated as something that was seen to be both protected 
and asserted. To the SIs independence was a key element of the identity of each of the 
organisations. However, such was the pervasive nature of independence; SIs from the three 
organisations expressed a wide range of variables that could impact upon the practical 
independence of any investigation such as resources, expertise, statutory powers and staff 
training. It was clear that the SIs considered that there were barriers to independence in 
investigations and some spoke of the need to compromise. Although, it was further clear 
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that the organisations had actively worked to negate these compromises where possible for 
example, GSOC had trained several of their staff as Forensic Collision Investigators for 
deployment alongside police specialists in deaths involving the police. However, achieving 
actual independence was not neatly done but instead involved what Savage called, 
“compromise, negotiation, settlement and ...frustration” (Savage, 2012, p. 15). Resources 
and the training of staff were recurring themes and the SIs expressed frustration at the 
limitations of their staffing levels. It was commented on in all three organisations that in 
order to carry out all the roles required in the investigation of a death involving the police 
would require more staffing resources than were available and therefore some level of 
assistance was required from the policing agency under investigation. This was seen as a risk 
to be managed but that independence could be asserted into the investigation where 
required.  
 
 
Figure Five: The Factors Influencing Practical Independence in Investigations 
Although some of the staff who came from a non police background indicated that they 
thought elements of a police culture may have existed within their organisations those from 
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a policing background were particularly emphatic in denying that this was the case. Several 
of the SIs expressed the view that the organisation had developed or was developing its 
own culture. Some of the SIs stated that their organisation shared an element with policing 
culture in that they necessarily used a similar technical vocabulary. This is what Sackmann 
referred to as “dictionary knowledge” which would provide the labels and definitions of 
constructs and things within an organisation (Sackmann, 1991, p. 21). The SIs, however, 
viewed this as a tool for communicating professionally with the police agencies under their 
remit and a different level and form of communication was seen as necessary when 
communicating with non-police personnel.  
It was common for the SIs to refer to independence as a fluid and evolving entity rather 
than something that was fixed or static. The SIs appeared to recognise that independence 
was their greatest strength as an oversight agency and often expressed their independence 
as a defence to criticism. However, the SIs also recognised that independence was 
potentially a source of vulnerability (Savage, 2012) and expressed the reputational damage 
that any compromises in relation to independence could present. Just as Herzog had 
represented a cyclical process for the evolution from police internal investigation to civilian 
control based models of oversight (Herzog, 1999) in which scandal is followed by reform and 
a move towards greater independent oversight, the SIs in each organisation indicated that 
events internal to the agency could result in internal reform and increased focus on 
independence. This was expressed in some cases as a change in management or as a change 
in policy or resources. For example the IPCC SIs expressed that following the Home Affairs 
Committee criticisms further resources would be allocated that would allow them to 
independently investigate more cases. Similarly, in OPONI the view was expressed that the 
Criminal Justice Inspectorate review, following a public challenge to their level of 
independence, would ultimately bolster their independence. It is clear then that the cycles 
of reform and enhanced independence put forward by Herzog continue even after the end 
game of civilian control has been reached and that as the independence of an organisation 
can ebb and flow, vigilant monitoring is required.  
One such area where vigilance is required is that of regulatory capture. Perceived to be an 
issue of central concern to police oversight (Prenzler, 2004; Smith G. , 2009; Savage, 2012) 
the SIs were universally of the view that regulatory capture was not currently an issue 
within their organisation and that neither their independence nor their “zealousness” 
(Prenzler, 2000, p. 662) had been compromised. Indeed, although several of the SIs cited 
examples as to how regulatory capture may have occurred in the past and that constant 
vigilance was required to fend off the risk, the sense of mission amongst the investigators 
was undaunted. SIs spoke of a professional relationship with the police but that no 
encroachment was made or expected into the ability of oversight to be critical or to 
prosecute wrongdoing. Interestingly, the SIs in GSOC found that the tensions that existed 
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between their organisation and the Garda Síochána had effectively negated the risk of 
regulatory capture. 
To conclude the section on independence, although the topic will arise again throughout the 
chapter, it should be stated that independence is a complex and “messy” (Savage, 2012, p. 
15) construct. Independence is not static and the evidence would indicate that the 
independence of an oversight agency, even one based on the civilian control model, can ebb 
and flow due to internal and external factors. It is easy therefore to conclude that the three 
oversight agencies have the capacity to meet the Article 2 standard of independent 
investigation, however, to state that in any instance whether a truly independent 
investigation has occurred would require greater analysis.  
6.3 Adequacy 
The Human Rights Commissioner has stated “the investigation should be capable of 
gathering evidence to determine whether police behaviour complained of was unlawful and 
to identify and punish those responsible” (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009, pp. 8-9) 
whilst the ECtHR cases of Gulec v Turkey69, Kaya v Turkey70 and Kelly and Others v UK71 
would indicate that investigators should take reasonable steps to obtain accounts from all 
witnesses, that a full post mortem should be conducted and that evidence should be 
gathered using forensic science techniques where possible (Mowbray, 2002). SIs in all three 
organisations challenged the use of the term ‘adequate’ and felt that it did not accurately 
reflect the standard of investigation achieved by the agencies and the level of investigative 
effort. The SIs spoke of their use of modern investigative technique and of the efforts 
undertaken to obtain witness accounts. The SIs would contend then that the investigations 
undertaken would meet the standard of adequacy. Almost universally the SIs did not seek to 
equate the quality of the investigation with whether or not a criminal or disciplinary 
sanction had resulted but instead emphasised the quality of the processes undertaken in 
the investigation (Reiner, 1998); in both the IPCC and OPONI structured review processes 
were outlined as a means of ensuring quality of investigations. Further to the quality of the 
investigations, SIs frequently commented on the ability and quality of their investigative 
staff and indicated that they had developed the skills, knowledge and specialism necessary 
to conduct investigations to the necessary standards (Bayley, 2009; Tong, 2009).  
The difficulties encountered in relation to the “Blue Wall of Silence” (Christopher, 1991, p. 
168; Skolnick, 2002, p. 7) were discussed with the SIs in all three organisations. Interestingly 
three different perspectives were obtained from the SIs. In GSOC the SIs cited a general 
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difficulty in obtaining basic information from the Garda Síochána in relation to non death 
related matters, but that a greater level of cooperation was experienced in the more serious 
cases. In OPONI whilst it was generally felt that PSNI members cooperated with their 
enquiries, some SIs were critical of structures put in place for obtaining an account from 
police officers involved in fatalities as overly bureaucratic and placing a barrier between the 
investigators and those under investigation. The IPCC, at the time the research interviews 
took place, had just had their powers in this area enhanced with the ability to require a 
member to attend for interview, whilst GSOC had since its inception had the power to 
demand an account from a Garda member. SIs across all three organisations expressed 
reservations about the benefits of such statutory powers on the basis that they either did 
not go far enough, in case of the IPCC duty to attend was not seen as duty to account and in 
GSOC’s case the account provided under obligation was inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings. In OPONI there was a commonly held view that retired police officers should 
be compelled to assist in investigations, although some of the SIs expressed an 
understanding as to why they may not wish to revisit the troubled past. Interestingly, the SIs 
generally did not wish to have expanded powers to compel the cooperation of members or 
to undermine the right of the members to silence in a criminal interview. Some SIs 
expressed that this would lead to an inequity between the rights afforded to oversight 
investigators as opposed to those afforded to the police. The SIs, however, did not afford 
the Blue Wall of Silence, the same degree of kudos as a barrier to an effective investigation 
as expressed in the literature (Chemerinsky, 2000). The SIs view stated that whilst it could 
create a challenge to their investigation and perhaps encroach upon timeliness the Blue 
Wall was not surmountable. In fact of the potential challenges to the adequacy of 
investigations that were outlined by the SIs, the main challenge identified was resourcing 
and, in particular to the IPCC, the resourcing of an effective on call response to a large 
geographical area.  
6.4 Promptness 
The promptness standard has been defined as “the investigation should be conducted 
promptly and in an expeditious manner in order to maintain confidence in the rule of law” 
(Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009, pp. 8-9). The European Case Law has established 
that this requires promptness in all aspects of the investigation including its 
commencement72 and the interviews of witnesses and suspects73. The use of delaying 
tactics has also been recognised as a method used by police officers to subvert and 
prejudice oversight inquiries (Chemerinsky, 2000; Box & Russell, 1975) . Of the five 
standards of an effective investigation, the issue of promptness was seen as the element 
that caused greatest concern across all three organisations. Again the delivery of timely 
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investigations was not seen as a constant throughout the life cycle of any of the oversight 
agencies with SIs frequently commenting that they had improved as regards timescales 
since their inception and had enhanced on call mechanisms to respond to critical incidents. 
Resources again were raised as an issue by SIs in all three organisations. OPONI’s 
investigation of ‘historic’ cases was seen as a significant challenge as regards the delivery of 
prompt and Article 2 compliant investigations into deaths involving the police that could 
date from in excess of thirty years ago (Campbell, 2010; Lundy, 2009). Whilst no easy 
solutions presented themselves in the course of the research, the SIs frequently and 
consistently expressed their wish to investigate deaths involving the police in a timely 
fashion but also maintained that a quality investigation should not be compromised due to 
concerns of timeliness. The SIs also recognised and expressed the effects that any delay in 
investigations could have on the family of the deceased or the officers involved (Malone, 
2007).  
6.5 Public Scrutiny 
The literature on the concept of accountability stressed the importance of transparency as a 
method of enhancing accountability mechanisms (Dryberg, 2003; Koppell, 2005). It was 
recognised, however, that the provision of public information in relation to police functions 
historically seen to be governed by secrecy could be problematic (Lumina, 2006). The 
Human Rights Commissioner explained the public scrutiny standard stating, “procedures 
and decision making should be open and transparent in order to ensure accountability” 
(Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009, pp. 8-9). The public element to the investigation of 
a death involving the police is intrinsically linked to the concept of accountability and 
designed to prevent the dangers of investigations taking place behind closed doors and 
resulting in reports that are not disclosed (Mowbray, 2002). As was seen earlier in the 
thesis, two main avenues for inviting public scrutiny of an investigation were identified; the 
public reporting on investigations at their conclusion or as they progress or through public 
hearings such as coronial inquests or criminal or disciplinary proceedings.  
In relation to the public reporting of the findings of the investigations into deaths involving 
the police, none of the SIs challenged the concept of making their investigations accessible 
to the public. Instead the need to make the findings public was almost universally seen as a 
positive by the SIs. The SIs in the IPCC felt that their organisation did enough by way of 
public reporting and indicated that they had reviewed their processes in this regard and 
intended to increase the number of reports released having set a goal of reporting on all 
deaths investigated by the IPCC. Interestingly, the SIs in both GSOC and OPONI felt that they 
could improve in the area. The benefits of public reporting of the findings of the 
investigation were expressed by SIs in both accountability and regulatory language (Smith G. 
, 2009) in that the reports were designed both to point out where mistakes had been made 
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and the police held to account but also to remedy systemic issues and prevent further 
reoccurrences of the incidents that had led to the death. Although concerns were expressed 
as to the consistency of practice across jurisdictions, the importance of coronial hearings 
was also expressed by the SIs. Again the public hearings of the circumstances were seen in 
retrospective and prospective terms in that the hearing providing for the events leading to a 
death to be recounted but also to remedy any failing that may have led to the fatality 
(Hegarty, 2002). Interestingly the public scrutiny standard served a cyclical function as 
several SIs expressed the opinion that the knowledge that the process and findings of the 
investigation were to be both made public and scrutinised in the coronial forum meant that 
there was a pressure to ensure that the investigation had been carried out thoroughly and 
to the highest possible standards. In that regard, the public scrutiny element ensured that 
the oversight agencies themselves were accountable to the public.  
6.6 Victim Involvement 
The Human Rights Commissioner stated that the families of the deceased “should be 
involved in the ... process in order to safeguard [their] legitimate interests” (Commissioner 
for Human Rights, 2009, pp. 8-9) and further that the involvement of the families should be 
“meaningful and effectively applied and not empty and rhetorical” (2009, p. 14).  The 
European Court74 requires that the procedures adopted in the investigation ensure the 
protection of the family of the deceased’s interests even when those interests are in direct 
conflict with the police who may have been involved in the death. In the interview of the SIs 
in the three oversight agencies, the concept of the interests of the police service under 
investigation impacting upon their liaison with the family was not raised. In fact the only 
issue that was raised that would impact upon the flow of information to the family bereaved 
by a death involving the police was possibility of prejudice to the investigation itself. Almost 
universally, the SIs spoke, sometimes in passionate terms, about their investigations being 
focused on the needs of the bereaved family. The importance of keeping the families ‘on 
side’ was expressed time and time again. Most of the SIs stated that they would provide the 
families all of the information that they were lawfully permitted to do and in the limited 
circumstances where information could not be provided a reason for withholding the 
information would be given. In doing so the SIs echoed the concepts of accountability and 
openness that have been said to be at the heart of the concept of family liaison in the 
investigation of deaths (Grieve, 2009; McGarry & Smith, 2011). Some of the SIs praised the 
professionalism of their FLOs all of which had undergone training to perform what was seen 
as a specialist role (Macpherson, 1999).  The need to adapt the role from a policing 
perspective to an oversight or accountability perspective was also reflected by the SIs. In the 
IPCC and OPONI for example the terminology surrounding the role had been adapted to 
reflect the differing needs of an oversight investigation and to separate the function from 
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that performed by police FLOs (Shaw & Coles, 2007). The SIs also expressed an 
understanding of the trauma associated with the types of death which they investigated and 
several had examples of difficult situations that had arisen with families during the course of 
the investigation. The SIs frequently outlined in empathetic terms the difficulties 
experienced by families during investigations (Malone, 2007) and some of the SIs also had 
cause to comment that they felt that they had failed families in the past.  The SIs across all 
three organisations, however, expressed the desire to include the families of the deceased 
in their investigation and a will to meet the standards set under Article 2.  
6.7 High/Low Policing and High/Low Control 
In exploring the range of circumstances in which deaths involving the police may occur 
reference was made in the interviews of the SIs to Brodeur’s High and Low Policing 
paradigms and the need for High and Low Policing control mechanisms (Brodeur, 1983). As 
an example of a death involving the police that had elements of the High Policing paradigm 
reference was made to the fatal shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005 in that it 
resulted from a planned intelligence led operation using specialist trained officers to 
preserve the societal order from perceived threats (Turner, 2008). The SIs were asked how 
they felt their organisation would cope with a similar investigation should a pre-planned 
intelligence led operation result in the fatal shooting of a civilian.  
The majority of the SIs interviewed were cognisant of the scope of investigation that would 
be required should a pre-planned policing operation result in a death. The SIs almost 
universally expressed an awareness of the responsibility on any oversight agency 
investigating a death to examine the planning of the police operation that may have led to 
the fatality and several cited the McCann judgement that contributed to the development 
of the investigative obligations75. The SIs across all three organisations were also aware of 
the burden that accessing intelligence of this nature may place on their organisation. SIs in 
all of the organisations expressed some level of concern that they may not gain access to all 
of the material and would only access intelligence if they were successful in asking the right 
questions rather than the police service under investigation voluntarily providing 
information or having the confidence to share material that they held.  It was common for 
SIs to refer to demanding access to material and exercising statutory powers in order to 
access intelligence held by the police in terms.   
Confidence was highest amongst the SIs in the IPCC who had previously had carriage of the 
investigation into the death of Jean Charles de Menezes. Interestingly they felt that they 
were better placed to investigate such an incident now than in 2005 and cited that there 
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would be less ‘political’ resistance to their investigation. The IPCC SIs outlined that their 
organisational experience and ability had grown and that the organisation had matured 
since the original investigation into the de Menezes shooting. Several of the SIs expressed 
that this increased skill set enabled them to be more challenging and robust as 
investigators. The IPCC SIs also discussed the existence of practical mechanisms to allow 
them to access intelligence material held by the police services they are tasked to 
investigate and although the SIs had varying degrees of confidence that they would be able 
to access all of the intelligence that may have been used in planning such a policing 
operation all of the IPCC SIs were confident that they would be able to investigate a high 
policing death to the standards dictated by Article 2.  
In OPONI the SIs were confident that they could adequately deal with the low policing 
elements of an investigation into an incident similar to the shooting of Jean Charles de 
Menezes but described the challenge that such an investigation would present to the 
organisation. The OPONI SIs felt that due to their experience of similar investigations into 
fatal shootings of both a current and historical nature that they had built up the knowledge, 
skills and resilience to undertake such inquiries to the required standard. Several of the SIs 
expressed their confidence in emphatic terms that they would gain access to any 
intelligence material linked to high policing activities. Confidence was lowest amongst the 
GSOC SIs as to whether access would be given to the intelligence material necessary to 
properly probe the planning of any police operation that may have led to a death. Several of 
the GSOC SIs cited the lack of cooperation of the police in what could be seen as 
investigations into low policing activity as evidence of the difficulties that would be 
experienced in the investigation of a death arising from high policing activity. It was also 
common for GSOC SIs to argue that their statutory powers fell short of what was required in 
relation to demanding the provision of material from the Gardaí. The lack of cooperation of 
the Gardaí in providing material of both a low and high policing nature was frequently 
commented upon and the GSOC SIs were not confident that they would be able to 
investigate an incident such as the de Menezes shooting to the standards required under 
Article 2. 
The SIs in all three organisations recognised the challenge that an investigation into a death 
involving the police following high policing activity such as a pre-planned intelligence led 
operation. All of the SIs described structures and processes that had been put in place to 
accommodate the accessing of intelligence held by the police. The language used in relation 
to these provisions was common across the three organisations with reference made to 
firewalls, intercepts and intelligence products. The SIs in the three organisations also spoke 
of their own resources to analyse and interrogate intelligence material once it had been 
provided. Each of the organisations had clearly engaged with the issue of exerting high 
control over police intelligence activities (Brodeur, 1983). However GSOC SIs were not 
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confident that they would receive the cooperation from the Gardaí and would be allowed 
access to the level of intelligence material required to meet the investigative standards 
required by Article 2. This accountability gap could lead to the conclusion that if the 
functions of the police are not wholly transparent to the oversight agency tasked with the 
investigation of the death involving the police, then they are also not wholly accountable as 
a police service (Marenin, 2005; Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000; Perez T. E., 2000).  
6.8 Political Will 
The concept of “political will” was defined as the “commitment to making oversight work 
effectively” (Luna & Walker, 2000, p. 99) and can be viewed as a construct to examine the 
disparity between the powers and resources of oversight agencies and their actual activities. 
In the interviews with the SIs the concept was outlined and they were asked for their views 
on the political will of their organisation in the context of investigating deaths involving the 
police. The SIs across all three oversight agencies repeatedly expressed the importance of 
the organisation having the political will to carry out its functions. The SIs did not challenge 
the concept of ‘political will’ but instead described it using terms such as ‘vital’. It was 
common for SIs to describe the political will of their organisation in passionate terms 
describing the task faced by the oversight agencies as a ‘fight’ or ‘battle’ and referring to the 
constraint that a lack of political will could have on their ability to effectively investigate. 
These passionate descriptions echoed the findings of Reiner who noted that police officers 
often regarded their work with a sense of mission (Reiner, 1992) and Savage (Savage, 2013) 
who found that oversight investigators frequently described their vocation in terms of 
making a difference and improving policing.  
The concept of political will was not without controversy as several SIs criticised their own 
organisation for not having sufficient political will at different points in their history to 
robustly carry out their functions. Other SIs felt the need to restrain themselves somewhat 
in answering the question for fear that they could be seen as overly critical of their own 
organisation. In that regard the SIs described the political will of their organisations as 
flowing from the senior management of the organisations and described the importance of 
political will being displayed by the Ombudsman in OPONI, or the Commissioners in the IPCC 
and GSOC. The SIs frequently expressed that the will of these senior role holders impacted 
directly upon aspects of their investigations and changes in personnel at senior level was 
described as watershed moments for the organisations. The SIs clearly considered the 
political will to carry out their investigative function as important to their ability to fully 
meet their investigative standards. The concept of political will was frequently aligned with 
the element of public scrutiny as it was seen necessary that the oversight agencies publicly 
and robustly present the findings of their investigations. A lack of political will was also seen 
akin to constraining the agency from thoroughly investigating matters or properly reporting 
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on their findings. The political will of the organisation impacted upon public confidence in 
the oversight bodies to carry out their functions. The SIs spoke of increased public 
confidence following robust investigations and the public reporting of findings. The SIs in 
both OPONI and the IPCC also spoke of both the will and the ability to carry out 
investigations.  
The political will of three organisations can be said then to vary according to the impact of 
both internal and external factors. In the interviews of the SIs frequent reference was made 
to periods in the history of the organisations when the political will may not have been as 
strong as it should have been.  Almost all of the SIs felt that the correct balance of political 
will had been restored to their organisations and the will existed currently to properly 
investigate any deaths involving the police. However, despite an acknowledgement that the 
political will was not a constant in any of the oversight agencies, the SIs expressed their 
organisation’s commitment to investigate deaths involving the police to the Article 2 
standards. From the interviews of the SIs in relation to this topic, it is possible to state that 
the concept of political will is a reality in policing oversight agencies and that it is important 
if not vital to the investigative activities of the agency. It is also possible to state that the 
perceptions of the SIs is that the political will of the organisation flows from senior role 
holders such as Commissioners and holders of the office of Ombudsman. There was also 
suggestion amongst the SIs that following a period of scandal or of a change in senior 
management a realignment of the political will of the organisation could be seen to have 
occurred (Herzog, 1999).  
6.9 Europeanization 
It has been acknowledged that court judgements can transform public policy (Bulmer & 
Padgett, 2004) but that it falls to each individual state to take any necessary remedial action 
following the finding of a breach of the ECHR by the ECtHR (McBride, 2003). The process of 
domestic change caused by the growing interconnectedness of Europe has been referred to 
as Europeanization (Risse, Caporaso, & Green Cowles, 2001). The concept of 
Europeanization has been applied to the increase in human rights discourse amongst 
European states and its effect on oversight mechanisms (Vaughan & Kilcommins, 2007). One 
of the objectives of this thesis was to measure the extent to which the judgements of the 
ECtHR that developed the Article 2 obligations to conduct an effective investigation into a 
death involving the police had been incorporated into each of the oversight agencies and in 
turn each of the jurisdictions. The first conclusion that can be reached from the research is 
that a level of change has occurred in each of the jurisdictions at a domestic level as a result 
of the development of the Article 2 obligations. This can be evidenced as each of the 
oversight agencies has adapted both policy and practice in response to the European 
jurisprudence in relation to Article 2. These changes can be said to be along the dimensions 
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of both “policies” and “polity” (Borzel & Risse, 2000, pp. 3-4) in that the policy fabric and the 
legal and administrative structures that carry out those policies have been altered. By way 
of example from the research, the IPCC following the judgement in the Ramsahai case 
altered their approach to the investigation of deaths involving the police and began to 
independently investigate a higher percentage of deaths involving the police. The second 
conclusion that can be reached is in relation to the manner in which the change has taken 
place. The change has been both ‘normative’ in the following of clear guidance where such 
guidance exists, for example in relation to the principle of victim involvement all of the 
agencies have established similar mechanisms for liaising with the bereaved families, and 
also change through “arguing and persuading” (Olsen, 2002, p. 927), for example the 
investigative standard of ‘adequacy’ which the SIs have engaged with and redefined as 
thorough and robust.  
The interviews of the SIs described circumstances indicating that the two conditions 
required for domestic change in response to Europeanization i.e. incompatibility between 
the European processes and the domestic processes and facilitating factors to respond to 
the adaptational pressures had at times existed in their organisations (Borzel & Risse, 2000). 
SIs described ECtHR judgements being reviewed and any potential impact upon their 
existing internal processes being measured and disseminated amongst their investigators. 
The SIs also were seen to use the language of the judgements and the majority of the SIs 
were comfortable discussing the impact of individual ECtHR judgements on their 
investigative practices and procedures. In this regard the three agencies can be said to have 
implemented the ECtHR judgements in the sense that they had transposed the 
jurisprudence on Article 2 into their own jurisdiction and amended the nature and operation 
of their domestic investigative processes and structures in order to comply with the case 
law (Haverland, 2000).  
Having concluded that the Article 2 standards have produced policy and polity change in the 
jurisdictions through both rule following and debate, the final conclusion relates to the level 
of change that has occurred. Borzel and Risse proposed three levels of domestic change due 
to Europeanization, “absorption” where the degree of change is low, “accommodation” 
where the degree of change is modest and “transformation” where the degree of change is 
high (Borzel & Risse, 2000, p. 10). The final conclusion from the research is that the policing 
oversight mechanisms in three jurisdictions have been transformed by the Article 2 
standards to conduct an effective investigation into a death involving the police in that both 
policies and processes have been replaced with substantially different ones in order to meet 
the standards and that institutions have been replaced or altered significantly as a result of 
the development of the standards. Finally, the underlying collective understanding of the SIs 
within all three oversight agencies can be seen to have been fundamentally altered by their 
knowledge and acceptance of the Article 2 standards.  
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To echo the comment in the case of Airey v Ireland76 the oversight agencies in all three 
jurisdictions can be said to be working to ensure that the rights afforded under Article 2 of 
the ECHR are not theoretical or illusory but are practical and effective. The evidence 
gathered in this research indicates that the three oversight agencies have significantly 
engaged with the Article 2 standards and have transformed their investigative practice in an 
attempt to fully comply with the standards. The independence of these organisations is 
jealously guarded by the investigators and they are both aware and wary of potential 
threats that may impact upon their effectiveness. Significant effort has also been expended 
by each of the agencies to ensure that their investigations are carried out in a timely 
manner and that the families of the deceased are engaged with throughout the 
investigation. The procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR is an ongoing 
responsibility and requires the continued effort of the three policing oversight agencies to 
ensure that any death involving the police is effectively investigated and the continued 
vigilance of the investigators to ensure that there is no decline in the capacity of the 
organisations to meet their responsibilities.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Future Research 
7.1 Introduction 
The final chapter of the thesis will begin with a reflection on the aims and objectives of the 
thesis and will outline how the research purports to have achieved them. The next part of 
the chapter will provide a summary of the key messages that can be derived from the 
research and will draw together the central findings. The next section will outline the 
contribution to original knowledge made by the research which primarily relates to its focus 
on the perceptions of the oversight investigators themselves. Finally the thesis closes with a 
consideration of further research opportunities in the area of policing oversight.  
7.2 Reflection on the Research Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the extent to which three selected European police 
oversight agencies with the remit for investigating deaths involving the police have evolved 
and adapted their investigative practice, performance and capacity to meet the five 
standards of the positive obligation of conducting an effective investigation into a death 
involving the police under Article 2 of the ECHR.  In achieving that aim this thesis examined 
the practices and perceptions of senior investigators with the responsibility for the 
investigation of deaths involving the police in Ireland, Northern Ireland and England and 
Wales. 
The thesis began in Chapter One with a consideration of the threat that a death involving 
the police can present to the legitimacy of the police, their relationship with the public and 
the democratic governance of the people (Punch, 2000). The need for fair, transparent 
investigations of the circumstances of any death involving the police was put forward as 
central to the accountability structures necessary in a democratic society (Bayley & 
Shearing, 2009; Milton-Edwards, 2000; Hegarty, 2002). In order to provide a context for the 
later discussion of the investigation of deaths involving the police, Chapter Two of the thesis 
examined the nature and role of the police and explored the types of police activity that 
could lead to a fatality occurring. The role of the police was seen to be both pervasive 
(Marenin, 2005) and complex (Herzog, 1999) and any attempt to distil the role to a simple 
explanation proved elusive. It was however possible to isolate elements of the policing role 
where a risk of serious harm or death was heightened. To provide a context through which 
types of deaths involving the police could be viewed use was made of Brodeur’s High and 
Low policing paradigms (Brodeur, 1983). Brodeur’s paradigms were discussed and it was 
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outlined that deaths involving the police could occur as a result of low policing activity such 
as the arrest and detention of an offender and in high policing activity such as an 
intelligence led pre-planned policing operation. It was argued that policing oversight 
mechanisms tasked with the investigation of deaths involving the police required the 
capacity to investigate both sets of circumstances and the ability to exert High and Low 
control of policing activity. Chapter Two then explored the concept of accountability first in 
general terms and then specifically in relation to policing. Whilst accountability is seen 
almost universally as a positive the difficulties in reaching an agreed definition and the 
sometimes blurred lines between the retrospective lens of accountability and the 
prospective focus of regulation were highlighted (Smith G. , 2009). Accountability 
mechanisms in policing terms can be seen to have evolved from internal methods of control 
to external methods and the emergence and development of independent oversight of 
policing was discussed and various typologies of oversight mechanisms were outlined. The 
cycle of scandal and reform in policing was also discussed (Herzog, 1999) in that it could be 
argued that following a scandal in policing the accountability mechanisms can be seen to 
move further along the spectrum towards external and independent oversight (Smith G. , 
2004). The importance of looking beyond the models of oversight mechanisms to focus on 
what practical investigative steps are actually taken by the agencies was stressed. The 
chapter concluded with a discussion of the evolution and introduction of the three policing 
oversight agencies subject of the research.  
A methodology for examining the investigations of deaths involving the police undertaken 
by OPONI, the IPCC and GSOC from the perspective of the investigators was then considered 
in Chapter Three. The difficulty faced in examining the work of oversight agencies was 
discussed (Prenzler & Lewis, 2005) and different models suggested in the literature for 
evaluating oversight mechanisms were considered (Stenning, 2000; Walker, 2006). The 
focus of the research as an examination of the perceptions and practices of the oversight 
investigators led to the selection of a mixed methods approach that would allow for the 
experiences and views of the investigators to be captured. However it was noted that the 
scope and scale of the research would prove to be overly ambitious and only the qualitative 
element of the research would be reported.  Issues such as sampling, transcription, ethics 
and the interviews of 30 senior investigators across the three agencies were discussed.  
Chapter Four then examined the origin and development of the five standards of an 
effective investigation into a death involving the police derived from the jurisprudence 
relating to the positive obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR and codified by the European 
Commissioner for Human Rights. The ECHR was introduced and its evolution to the point of 
being considered the cornerstone of the transnational protection of human rights was 
discussed (Hennette-Vauchez, 2011). The concept of positive obligations arising from the 
Act which require state parties to undertake specific affirmative steps was discussed and the 
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positive procedural obligation of an effective investigation arising from Article 2 the right to 
life was examined (Mowbray, 2004). The development of the positive obligation and its 
evolution through the jurisprudence of the ECtHR was outlined. Each of the five standards 
arising from Article 2 of an effective investigation: independence, adequacy, promptness, 
public scrutiny and victim involvement were then examined in turn.  The thesis then moved 
to describing the process by which the European Court judgements migrate from the ECtHR 
to each of the domestic states through a process referred to as Europeanization (Borzel & 
Risse, 2000). This concept and its application to measuring the extent to which member 
states were applying the investigative standards required by Article 2 was then discussed. 
The findings of the research were then outlined in detail in Chapter Five. The findings of the 
interviews of the SIs in all three agencies were set out first in relation to each of the five 
standards of an effective investigation and then in discussion of the high and low policing 
paradigms and the political will of each of the organisations. Chapter Six analysed these 
findings and drew conclusions from the research. The main messages of the research are set 
out below. 
7.3 Policing Oversight and the Obligation to Investigate Deaths Involving the Police 
The main conclusion arrived at through this research is that each of the three oversight 
agencies have significantly engaged with the issues arising from the positive obligation to 
effectively investigate deaths involving the police. The five standards under Article 2 of the 
ECHR of an effective investigation have been considered in depth by the three agencies and 
they have adapted their practice and procedures in an attempt to meet the standards 
required. Using the definition put forward by Borzel and Risse (2000, p. 10) the application 
of the Article 2 standards can be said to have “transformed” each of the policing oversight 
agencies and the policies and procedures for the investigation of deaths involving the police. 
The high level of awareness of the standards in the oversight bodies and the evidence of a 
high level of engagement with the case law that caused the standards to evolve as well as 
evidence of changes in practice and investigative approach in order to meet the standards 
strongly indicated that the Article 2 standards are an example of the successful 
Europeanization of a concept.  The SIs interviewed had a high level of knowledge of the 
standards and their obligations under the ECHR. The standards can be said to be grounded 
and accepted within OPONI, GSOC and the IPCC having made their way from the European 
courts to the practitioners who apply them in their investigations. The Article 2 standards 
were also viewed positively across the three organisations. All but one of the SIs felt that 
they were both realistic and attainable. The standards are seen by the oversight 
practitioners as a useful bench mark of an important part of the oversight function. The 
research produced significant evidence that each of the agencies strived to meet the Article 
2 standards in every investigation of a death involving the police.  
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The research considered the perceptions of the SIs in relation to each of the five Article 2 
standards in turn. The first standard of independence was found to be a complicated 
concept that is difficult to achieve in practical terms. The evidence from the interviews of 
the SIs would indicate that each of the organisations recognises the complexity of the 
construct that is independence. The SIs spoke of independence in terms of both asserting it 
in investigations and protecting it from denigration. Each of the organisations had faced 
challenges to their independence in their operations and the SIs outlined the effect that 
such challenges could have. Following a threat to the independence of the oversight 
agencies the SIs described how realignment occurred in which improved investigative 
practice and redefined independence emerged. There is evidence therefore that Herzog’s 
model of evolution of oversight applies to the three organisations that have faced 
challenges and in response have strengthened their independence (Herzog, 1999). The 
evidence would also indicate that their practical independence internally and the perception 
of their independence externally are both highly valued by the oversight practitioners 
themselves. The SIs in the organisations would indicate that independence does not exist in 
a linear fashion and is multi factorial. Each of the organisations discussed independence in 
kinetic terms as an evolving entity and one that must be maintained. Threats to 
independence through regulatory capture, the pervasion of a policing culture, lack of 
resources and lack of investigative expertise are all of high relevance to each of the 
organisations. The organisations are aware of the threats and attempt to counter them. 
There is significant evidence that GSOC, OPONI and the IPCC make considerable attempts to 
ensure that their investigations are conducted independently.  
The second standard of an effective investigation, adequacy, caused difficulty for the SIs in 
the three oversight agencies as it was felt that the term itself it did not sufficiently capture 
the thoroughness required in an investigation of a death involving the police. Whilst it was 
difficult to define the terms of an adequate investigation significant work had been 
undertaken in each of the agencies to ensure that investigations were conducted to a 
sufficient standard. In particular within OPONI and the IPCC a rigid structure of investigative 
reviews had been introduced to promote and ensure quality investigations. The 
requirement of promptness or timeliness in investigations of deaths involving the police was 
a matter of some difficulty for all three organisations. The SIs interviewed provided 
examples of both investigations being carried out within short timescales but also of 
protracted and delayed enquiries. This was an ongoing problem which was impacted upon 
by both resourcing and demand. No easy solutions were put forward but commitment was 
expressed in each of the organisations to improving in this regard. The SIs interviewed were 
clearly committed to investigating deaths involving the police both adequately and in a 
timely fashion.  
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In relation to the standard of public scrutiny, different approaches were seen across the 
three oversight agencies. The IPCC had exerted significant energy in this regard and had 
attained a high degree of public scrutiny of its investigations and their conclusions. This had 
led to a very high level of confidence amongst its SIs in their performance in this area. Both 
GSOC and OPONI recognised that they could improve in relation to publishing their findings. 
The SIs of all three agencies had similar views of the Coronial process in their jurisdiction 
which represented a significant commitment of resources and effort. In relation to the fifth 
and final standard of ensuring that the family of the deceased is sufficiently involved in an 
investigation into the death, a family centred approach to the investigations of deaths 
involving the police was expressed in all three organisations. Investigative resources and 
specialist skills had been deployed in all three organisations in an attempt to meet this 
Article 2 standard. Again, the attaining of this standard was seen to be an evolving process 
that required sustained effort. Encouragingly the importance of the views of the family of 
the deceased was consistently and repeatedly expressed in each of the organisations. 
Almost universally across the three agencies a significant commitment to engage with the 
bereaved families and to supply information in relation to the progress and conclusions of 
the investigations were expressed by the SIs.  
In relation to the High and Low paradigms of policing put forward by Brodeur (Brodeur, 
1983) each of the organisations’ SIs were confident that they could manage the low policing 
elements of a major investigation into a police involved death. The same confidence did not 
exist that the high policing elements would be sufficiently explored. Some level of 
reservation was expressed in each of the organisations as to whether access would be given 
to sensitive intelligence that could be required for an Article 2 compliant investigation. This 
was most marked in GSOC where little confidence existed that they would be able to gain 
access to the sensitive material that the police may use to plan an operation. This may point 
to an accountability gap in that GSOC may not be in a position to fulfil its Article 2 
obligations should a death arise from a policing operation aligned to the High policing 
paradigm.  
The theory of political will was explored with each of the SIs (Luna & Walker, 2000) . The SIs 
were universally emphatic in the requirement of oversight agencies to have and to maintain 
the necessary political will to carry out its function. The existence of political will within an 
oversight agency to investigate the matters referred to it or complained of was seen to be 
essential to its successful operation. From the perspective of the SIs the political will was 
seen to flow from the senior role holders of the organisation down to the investigative 
practitioners on the ground. The political will in each organisation was not seen as a 
constant and the importance of leadership and vision in each organisation was clearly 
stated. This was aligned to the views expressed by Walsh who stressed the importance of 
the selection of suitably qualified persons to fulfil these roles (Walsh, 2004).  
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This thesis is a contribution to the literature on accountability, policing oversight and Article 
2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Its contribution to original knowledge 
comes through its examination of the practical application of the Article 2 standards by the 
three oversight agencies from the perspectives of the Senior Investigators tasked with 
leading the investigation teams charged with the front line responsibility of investigating 
deaths involving the police. The research involved qualitative interviews with the SIs which 
obtained their perspectives on the challenges of undertaking Article 2 compliant 
investigations. It would appear from the literature that the thesis represents the first time 
that the views of SIs were sought on the practical application of the standards and the first 
attempt to measure the political will of oversight agencies to undertake the investigative 
function to which they were tasked from the perspective of the senior investigators. The 
research provides a contribution to original knowledge in its attempt to measure the 
capacity of the oversight agencies to exert high and low policing control over the police 
service in that it examines the capacity of each of the three agencies to investigate deaths 
involving the police that could be aligned to Brodeur’s High and Low policing paradigms 
(Brodeur, 1983). The thesis also makes a contribution to the literature on the 
‘Europeanization’ of human rights and specifically the degree to which the Article 2 
standards have changed domestic policies and legal and administrative institutions involved 
in policing oversight.   
7.4 Future Research 
Upon reflection the scope of this research was overly ambitious. The examination of three 
different oversight agencies presented significant logistical challenges and assessing the 
range of issues raised by the Article 2 standards meant that a large number of variables had 
to be considered in each examination. The restrictions presented by the word count also 
meant that the results of the quantitative research did not form part of the final thesis. 
Therefore a narrower approach focusing on one of the oversight agencies or one of the 
standards under Article 2 may provide further in depth analysis of some of the issues 
considered in this thesis. Also as it has been seen that meeting the five standards of 
independence, adequacy, promptness, public scrutiny and victim involvement does not 
remain constant in the life cycle of any oversight agency and recognising the significant 
impact that changes in the political will of those working within the oversight agencies can 
have on the investigation of deaths involving the police, there is scope to repeat research of 
this nature at intervals to take the ethical temperature of the oversight agency at any given 
point in its history. Similarly, the ethical temperature may also be assessed from viewpoints 
other than that of the investigators who were the subject of this research. As this research 
has concluded that the political will of the agency is derived from senior role holders such as 
the Commissioners or holders of the office of Ombudsman, valuable research could be 
conducted examining the views of this important and influential population.  
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A farther reaching examination of the issues and one that would encompass the views of all 
of the potential stakeholders in the investigation of a death involving the police is also 
possible. Although there may be some methodological challenges involved, an examination 
of the issues involved in an Article 2 compliant investigation of a death involving the police 
from the points of view of the oversight investigators, the police officers subject to the 
investigation, the families of the deceased and others such as the Coroner could present a 
worthwhile area for exploration.  In such an approach the views of the stakeholders could 
be sought directly to examine the investigation from multiple viewpoints. Although again 
fraught with methodological challenges another possible approach to examining the issues 
that arise in conducting an Article 2 complaint investigation could involve the retrospective 
structured review of completed investigations. This would not necessarily focus on the 
outcomes of the investigations but the means employed to meet each of the standards. This 
could include a qualitative assessment of the investigation methodology employed in 
conducting the investigation itself including the use of the appropriate forensic techniques 
and where necessary expert witnesses, the family liaison strategy employed to meet the 
victim involvement standard and the level and extent of public scrutiny afforded both the 
progress and conclusion of the investigation into a death. As has been discussed throughout 
the thesis, the pervasive and varied nature of the role of the police and the range of 
circumstances that deaths involving the police can occur means that the scope for 
examining the investigative choices and decisions that are made in independent 
investigation is both rich and complex.  
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Legislative Requirement for Effective Oversight Definition 
Statement of Principles and Objectives A provision setting out clearly the guiding principles 
and policy objectives of the complaints process 
provided for, and the intended priority between 
potentially competing or conflicting objectives of 
that process. 
Accessibility i. How easy is it for a potential complainant to 
lodge and pursue a complaint? 
ii. What range of complaints can be dealt with 
through the process? 
iii. Who may lodge and pursue a complaint? 
iv. What resources will be available to 
complainants? 
v. What protections against abuse of the 
process are there? 
Fairness  i. Do parties receive adequate notice of 
upcoming stages, developments and 
requirements of them in the process? 
ii. Do parties have sufficient opportunity to 
present “their side of the story” to decision 
makers? 
iii. Do parties have adequate opportunity for 
legal or other representation in 
participating in the process? 
iv. Do they have adequate opportunity to be 
heard before any sanction is imposed on 
them? 
v. Do they have access to review and appeal of 
decisions? 
vi. Does the process give complainants, 
respondents and the public access to 
procedural and substantive justice? 
Respect for Rights The rights encompassed by the administrative law 
concept of “natural justice” and any specifically 
enumerated by statute or constitution. 
Openness and Accountability The process should be open and accountable to 
complainants, respondents, police services to which 
it applies, their police boards and the public more 
generally, while protecting the legitimate privacy 
interests of those who become involved in it, the 
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integrity of police operations, and the viability of the 
police complaints process itself. 
Timeliness The process should provide for the timely handling 
and disposition of complaints while allowing 
sufficient time for adequate and effective 
investigation and resolution of them. 
Thoroughness The process should provide for the thorough 
investigation, and where necessary, adjudication of 
complaints. 
Impartiality The process should ensure the impartiality of those 
who investigate, adjudicate, dispose of and review 
the handling of complaints. 
Independence Those who investigate, adjudicate or otherwise 
process complaints must enjoy independence from 
direction, control or influence from police 
organisations, police governing authority and any 
other person or body who may have a vested or 
partisan interest in the outcome of the process. 
An appropriate balance between the ‘public interest’ and the interests of the parties involved in a complaint. 
An appropriate balance between formal (or less formal) procedures for resolving and disposing of complaints. 
An appropriate balance between remedial and punitive dispositions. 
An appropriate balance between internal management and external oversight of the handling of complaints. 
Provision of appropriate systemic information to police management and governing authorities. 
Effective integration and compatibility with internal disciplinary and grievance processes. 
Appendix One: Stenning’s Framework for Assessing Legislative Requirement for Effective 
Oversight Adapted from Stenning (2000, pp. 147-163) 
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Appendix Two: 
Semi Structured Interview Schedule 
Research Title: Pathways to Accountability: The Investigation of Police Caused Deaths 
1. What has been your experience to date of Article 2 of the ECHR and the five 
standards relating to an effective investigation? 
 
2. How do the five standards impact upon how you do your job? 
 
Independence 
 
3. How do you ensure that any investigation in which you are involved is 
independent? 
 
4. What steps do you take to avoid ‘regulatory capture’? 
 
5. Do you believe that using ex police officers in the investigations impacts upon 
the independence of the investigation? 
 
6. Do you believe that relying on police resources impacts upon the 
independence of the investigation? 
 
7. Do you believe that your organisation has adopted any elements of the culture 
of the police service they are investigating? 
 
8. What may be the barriers to independent investigation? 
 
Adequacy 
9. How do you ensure that any investigation in which you are involved is 
adequate? 
 
10. What for you defines an adequate investigation? 
 
11. How would you see the training of staff impacting upon this? 
 
12. How would you see the use of technology impacting upon the adequacy of the 
investigation? 
 
13. What may be the barriers to an adequate investigation? 
 
Promptness 
 
14. How long on average does an investigation into a death take? 
 
15. Do you feel that you can achieve timely investigations? 
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16. Do you believe you have to balance timely with another aspect of the five 
standards e.g. adequacy? 
 
17. What may be the barriers to a timely investigation? 
 
Public Scrutiny 
18. What have been your experiences with public hearings or reporting in the 
investigation of deaths? 
 
19. What has been your experience of the Coronial process? 
 
20. Do you believe that your organisation does enough to make their findings 
public? 
 
21. What may be the barriers to making the findings of an investigation public? 
 
Victim Involvement 
22. How much do you tell the family of the deceased in an investigation? 
 
23. How is the information provided? 
 
24. Do you personally meet with the family? 
 
25. What have your experiences been in this regard? 
 
26. Are there any barriers to involving the family of the deceased? 
 
27. Do you think that your organization does enough to involve the family of the 
victim? 
 
Resources and Powers 
28. How do any of the following impact upon your organizations’ ability to 
investigate deaths involving the police to the standards set by the ECHR case 
law: 
a) Resources 
b) Geography 
c) Organizational Size 
 
29. What further powers do you feel would enhance your ability to meet the 
investigative requirements? 
a) The power to compel testimony? 
b) The power to demand documents? 
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c) The power to impose discipline sanctions? 
 
 
High/Low Policing 
30. Do you believe that your organization has the capacity to investigate deaths 
resulting from either type of policing? 
 
Political Will 
31. How important do you think political will is to the effective investigation of state 
caused death? 
 
Purpose 
32.  How would you describe the actual purpose of the investigation into a state 
caused death? 
 
The Standards 
33. Do you feel that the ECHR standards are realistic? 
 
34. Do you feel that they are attainable? 
 
 
35. Do you feel that your organization meets the standards in its investigations? 
 
36. Which of the standards do you think is the most important in your 
organization? 
 
 
37. Do you believe they represent a burden on the state? 
 
38. Do you think that the civilian investigation of state caused deaths actually 
works? 
  
144 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
Study Title: Pathways to Accountability: The Investigation of Deaths Involving the Police 
            REC Ref No:  .................................................................... 
 
Information 
I would like to invite you to take part in my research study. Before you decide I would like you to 
understand why the research is being done, what the research is about and what it would involve for 
you. Talk to others about the study if you wish. If there is anything that is not clear, please do not 
hesitate to ask me to clarify.  
What is the research about?  
The primary objective of the research is to evaluate the police oversight agencies in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland in investigating deaths involving the police against the standards set by the 
European Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Courts. The research is not concerned 
with individual cases but focuses on the standards that govern investigations and how these 
standards are relevant to the oversight agencies. 
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
The purpose of the study is to gather data for the completion of a Doctoral thesis as part of a 
Professional Doctorate in Criminal Justice with the University of Portsmouth.   
 
Why have I been invited?  
You have been invited as you may have been involved in the investigation of deaths involving the 
police. I intend to interview as many Senior Investigating Officers and others of equivalent rank as is 
required for the study.  
 
Do I have to take part?  
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary. This information sheet may assist you in deciding 
whether or not to participate in the study. If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to sign a 
consent form.  
What will happen to me if I take part?  
If you agree to take part, I intend to conduct an interview with you in relation to your experience of 
investigating deaths involving the police. The interview should take around ninety minutes. So as to 
Participant Information Sheet 
Researcher: Brian Doherty E-mail: icj90567@myport.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Professor Steve Savage: Steve.Savage@port.ac.uk 
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accurately capture your responses, I intend to audio record the interview. You will not be identified 
by name in any material produced from this research.  
 
What will I have to do?  
You will be required, should you wish to do so, to answer the questions put to you in relation to your 
perceptions and views. Should you not wish to answer any of the questions, you can decline at any 
time.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
The interview will take up about an hour and a half of your time. Should you require a break at any 
time, please do not hesitate to ask.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
The interview may provide an opportunity for participants to reflect upon their professional 
involvement in investigations and their professional knowledge of the research topic itself. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
Every effort will be made to ensure that the data obtained during the interview will be kept 
confidential. You will be quoted verbatim, unless to do so would result in your identification. All 
participants in the study will be identified only by their rank and their place of work.  
 
Confidentiality could be breached in the event that the research uncovered significant malpractice 
or as a result of a legal or moral obligation.  
 
If you join the study, it is possible that some of the data collected will be looked at by authorised 
persons from the University of Portsmouth. Data may also be looked at by authorised people to 
check that the study is being carried out correctly. All will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a 
research participant and we will do their best to meet this duty.  
 
The data from the interview will be captured in the first instance by audio recording. 
 
The audio recording will be stored securely in a digital file identified by a Unique Reference Number 
(URN). Your name will not appear in the identifier of the digital file.  
 
Subsequently the recording will be transcribed by me and the transcription will be marked with the 
relevant URN.  The transcripts will be stored securely.  
 
Participants have the right to check the accuracy of data held about them and correct any errors. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
Should you wish to withdraw from the study; every effort will be made to facilitate your wishes. 
However, as this may prove difficult following the analysis of the data gathered, I may contact you to 
discuss the further use of any data you have provided. Should you withdraw from the study, the data 
you have provided will be retained for examination by the University of Portsmouth until the 
completion of the Doctoral thesis when it will disposed of securely.   
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, please feel free to bring them to my attention, 
however you should you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this by 
contacting my research supervisor Professor Steve Savage at Steve.Savage@port.ac.uk. 
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What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of this study will be published in a Doctoral Thesis submitted to the University of 
Portsmouth. You will not be identified in any publication unless you have specifically given your 
consent. 
 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
The research is not funded as it is for the completion of an academic qualification. It is undertaken as 
part of the completion of the Professional Doctorate in Criminal Justice with the University of 
Portsmouth.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given a 
favourable opinion by the Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Further information and contact details: 
Should you require any further information at any point, please do not hesitate to contact me at my 
Portsmouth University e-mail address above. 
 
Should you require information about research undertaken by the University of Portsmouth, this can 
be accessed at: 
http://www.port.ac.uk/research/ 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet, should you decide to participate in the 
research a copy of the information sheet will be provided to you and you will be asked to sign a 
consent form. 
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Study Title: Pathways to Accountability: The Investigation of Deaths Involving the Police 
REC Ref No:  .................................................................... 
Name of Researcher: Brian J. Doherty         Please initial box  
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated.. 
........................ for the above study. I have had the opportunity 
 to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
 satisfactorily.  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, up until the commencement  
of the analysis of the data in October 2012  
 
3. I understand that data collected during the study, may be looked at by  
individuals from Portsmouth University, or from regulatory authorities.  
I give permission for these individuals to have access to my data. 
 
4. I agree to my interview being audio recorded.                                                                       
 
5. I agree to being quoted verbatim.  
 
 
6. I agree to being a participant in the research and I understand that  
                I will not be quoted by name. 
 
 
7. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
Name of Participant:    Date:    Signature: 
 
Name of Person taking consent:   Date:   Signature: 
 
  
Researcher: Brian Doherty E-mail: icj90567@myport.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Professor Steve Savage: Steve.Savage@port.ac.uk 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
148 | P a g e  
 
Questionnaire on Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights  
‘The Right to Life’ 
Instructions 
This questionnaire is distributed as part of research for a thesis written towards completion 
of a Doctorate degree with the University of Portsmouth. The questionnaires are anonymous 
and all answers given or views provided will be treated as confidential. 
The research is designed to examine the relevance and application of the five principles for 
the effective investigation of deaths involving the police that engage under Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
The questionnaire is designed to be completed mostly by ticking the relevant boxes, 
however, please feel free to expand on any answer in the space provided. 
Please return the completed questionnaires to Brian Doherty via GSOC internal mail. 
Your assistance is much appreciated. 
1. How would you rate your own knowledge of the five principles for the effective 
investigation of deaths involving the police that engage under Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights? 
Very Poor □       Poor □      Unsure □     Good □       Very Good □ 
Please expand if necessary: 
 
2. How would you rate the organizational knowledge within the Garda Ombudsman 
of the five principles for the effective investigation of deaths involving the police 
that engage under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights? 
Very Poor □       Poor □      Unsure □     Good □       Very Good □ 
Please expand if necessary: 
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3. The European Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that an effective 
investigation into a death involving the police should be independent. 
Independence is defined as, “There should be no institutional or hierarchical 
connections between the investigators and the officers concerned and there 
should be practical independence.” 
In your opinion do you agree that the investigations into deaths involving the 
police undertaken by your organization are investigated independently? 
Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neutral □ Agree □ Strongly Agree □ 
Please expand if necessary: 
 
4. The European Commissioner for Human Rights has defined an adequate 
investigation into a death involving the police as follows, “The investigation 
should be capable of gathering evidence to determine whether police behaviour 
was unlawful and to identify and punish those responsible.”  
In your opinion do you agree that the investigations into deaths involving the 
police undertaken by your organization are investigated adequately? 
Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neutral □ Agree □ Strongly Agree □ 
Please expand if necessary: 
 
5. The European Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that an effective 
investigation must be prompt stating, “The investigation should be conducted 
promptly and in an expeditious manner in order to maintain confidence in the 
rule of law.”  
In your opinion do you agree that the investigations into deaths involving the 
police undertaken by your organization are investigated promptly? 
Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neutral □ Agree □ Strongly Agree □ 
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 Please expand if necessary: 
 
6. The European Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that an effective 
investigation must be subject to public scrutiny stating, “Procedures and decision 
making should be open and transparent to ensure accountability.” 
In your opinion do you agree that the investigations into deaths involving the 
police undertaken by your organization are subject to sufficient public scrutiny? 
Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neutral □ Agree □ Strongly Agree □ 
Please expand if necessary: 
 
7. The European Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that the family in an 
investigation where a death has occurred should be ‘involved in the investigation 
process [sufficiently] in order to safeguard his or her legitimate interests’.   
Do you agree that your organization has met that standard in the investigations 
you have been involved in? 
Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neutral □ Agree □ Strongly Agree □ 
Please expand if necessary: 
 
8. Would you agree that your organization has the necessary resources to 
investigate deaths involving the police to the standards established under Article 
2 of the European Convention on Human Rights?  
Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neutral □ Agree □ Strongly Agree □ 
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Please expand if necessary: 
 
9. Would you agree that your organization has the necessary statutory powers 
required to investigate deaths involving the police to the standards established 
under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights?  
Strongly Disagree □ Disagree □ Neutral □ Agree □ Strongly Agree □ 
Please expand if necessary: 
 
 
10. How would you rate the awareness of the police service(s) that you investigate of 
the five principles for the effective investigation of deaths involving the police that 
engage under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights? 
Very Poor □       Poor □      Unsure □     Good □       Very Good □ 
Please explain if necessary: 
 
 Thank-you for your time in completing this questionnaire. 
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Column1 Column2 Column3 Column4 Column5 Column6 
Question  
Very Poor/Strongly 
Disagree Poor/Disagree Unsure/Neutral Good/Agree 
Very Good/Strongly 
Agree 
Own Knowledge 
     Organisational Knowledge 
    Independence 
     Adequately 
     Timeliness 
     Public Scrutiny 
     Victim Involvement 
     Necessary Resources 
     Necessary Powers 
     Police Service/s Knowledge 
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Org:        SI No:  Mostly Negative Neutral Mostly Positive Comments: 
The Five 
Standards 
    
Independence 
 
    
Adequacy 
 
    
Promptness 
 
    
Public Scrutiny 
 
    
Victim 
Involvement 
    
Resources and 
Powers 
    
High/Low 
Policing Capacity 
    
Political Will 
 
    
Standards 
Realistic? 
    
Standards  
Attained? 
    
Civilian Oversight 
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Appendix Ten:  
Quantitative Research Findings  
The Quantitative Research Findings from the questionnaire circulated to Investigating 
Officers from the three oversight bodies are set out in pie chart form below: 
 
Investigators’ Personal Knowledge of Article 2 
 
 
Organisational Knowledge of Article 2 
17% 
9% 
65% 
9% 
OPONI 
Very 
Poor 
Poor 
Unsure 
Good 
10% 
19% 
71% 
ipcc  
Very 
Poor 
Poor 
Unsure 
Good 
5% 6% 
11% 
61% 
17% 
GSOC 
Very 
Poor 
Poor 
Unsure 
Good 
9% 
35% 
43% 
13% 
OPONI 
Very 
Poor 
Poor 
Unsure 
Good 
9% 
38% 43% 
10% 
ipcc 
Very 
Poor 
Poor 
Unsure 
Good 
10% 
32% 
21% 
37% 
GSOC 
Very 
Poor 
Poor 
Unsure 
Good 
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Questionnaire Results on Independence OPONI 
 
Questionnaire Results on Independence GSOC 
 
Questionnaire Results on Independence IPCC 
4% 
9% 
4% 
57% 
26% 
OPONI 
Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
17% 
5% 
39% 
39% 
GSOC 
Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
Neutral  
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
14% 
19% 
43% 
24% 
ipcc 
Strongly Disagree 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
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Questionnaire Results on Adequacy for OPONI, ipcc and GSOC 
 
Questionnaire Results on Promptness for OPONI 
9% 
17% 
48% 
26% 
OPONI 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
5% 
14% 
67% 
14% 
ipcc 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
5% 6% 
61% 
28% 
GSOC 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neutral  
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
17% 
Disagree 
31% 
Neutral 
17% 
Agree 
35% 
OPONI 
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Questionnaire Results on Promptness for the ipcc 
 
Questionnaire Results on Promptness for GSOC
 
Questionnaire results on Public Scrutiny for the IPCC 
Strongly 
Disagree 
19% 
Disagree 
14% 
Neutral 
43% 
Agree 
24% 
ipcc 
Strongly 
Disagree 
11% 
Disagree 
17% 
Neutral  
11% 
Agree 
39% 
Strongly Agree 
22% 
GSOC 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5% 
Agree 
76% 
Strongly Agree 
19% 
ipcc 
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Questionnaire results on Public Scrutiny for the OPONI and GSOC 
 
Questionnaire Results for Victim Involvement in OPONI 
Disagree 
5% 
Neutral 
39% Agree 
56% 
OPONI 
Disagree 
22% 
Neutral  
28% 
Agree 
33% 
Strongly 
Agree 
17% 
GSOC 
Strongly 
Disagree 
9% 
Disagree 
17% 
Neutral 
26% 
Agree 
44% 
Strongly Agree 
4% 
OPONI 
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Questionnaire Results for Victim Involvement in IPCC 
 
 
 
Questionnaire Results for Victim Involvement in GSOC 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5% 
Neutral 
33% 
Agree 
52% 
Strongly Agree 
10% 
ipcc 
Strongly 
Disagree 
6% 
Neutral  
11% 
Agree 
61% 
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Agree 
22% 
GSOC 
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